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Steffen Roth 
PREFACE 
 
 
There is a peculiar dissonance in current discourses on innovation. On 
the one hand, the label “innovation” is applied to almost every kind of 
phenomenon. New products, processes, services, methods, techniques, 
and even the market entry or the social diffusion of these innovations, are 
called “innovations.” Moreover, it is common simply to use the notion 
as a general metaphor for a change in mindsets, organizations, or entire 
societies. On the other hand, we find that most research on innovation is 
focused on the narrow “technology goes economic market” slot of inno-
vation. This research bias results in a lack of indicators and concepts of 
non-technological and non-economic form of innovations, which still 
exists today. 
 
This contradiction gave rise to the central questions discussed at the Se-
cond International Conference on Indicators and Concepts of Innova-
tion on “Non-Technological and Non-Economic Innovations” hosted 
by the Competence Center for Management at Berne School of Business 
and Administration in July 2008: 
 
– Why do we know so little about non-technological and non-economic 
innovations so far? What impact does this bias have on societies and 
economic performance? 
– What forms and dimensions of non-technological and non-economic 
innovations can be found both in literature and empirically? What im-
pact should these findings have on current concepts of innovation? 
– Are there innovations without a non-technological and non-economic 
dimension, viz. purely technological or economic innovations? 
 
This volume consists of selected answers to these questions, which are 
now presented without the technical flaws that apparently could not 
have been avoided by the Peter Lang Publishing Group, Bern, which had 
been responsible for the copy-editing and the release of the first edition. 
Five years after, the volume still testifies the curiosity of the contributing 
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researchers who, regardless of their cultural background or level of expe-
rience, had both the courage and the inspiration to conceptualize innova-
tion beyond the borders of the current mainstream. It also owes a lot to 
all the speakers and guests at our conference, who made invaluable con-
tributions to these two days in an atmosphere that was both surprisingly 
relaxed and stimulating. In this context, it is a pleasure to mention Chris-
toph Beer from the Swiss cluster management agency, innoBE Inc., as 
an ice-breaking keynote speaker and as a supportive member of the ICI-
CI 2008 conference board. 
 
The same applies to all the board members: to Dr. Jari Kaivo-oja (Turku 
School of Economics), Dr. Sayed Mahdi Golestan Hashemi (Iran Re-
search Centre for Creatology, Innovation and TRIZ), Dr. Jens Aderhold 
(Martin-Luther-University Halle-Wittenberg), Dipl.-Kffr. Judith Ter-
striep (IAT Gelsenkirchen), Juha Miettinen (Ubiquitous Computing 
Cluster Program Tampere), and to Prof. Dr. Ralf Wetzel (Berne School 
of Business and Administration), to whom I owed an incomparable de-
gree of trust, support, and autonomy. 
 
The success of the conference was also due to the generous support of the SCOPES 
program of the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF) 
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Steffen Roth 
INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS A THEORY OF ROBUST  
INNOVATION 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There is no denying a certain technological bias in innovation research 
(cf. Rennings 2000; Kaudela-Baum et al. 2008). Furthermore, but less 
strikingly, there is a bias towards economics in innovation research as 
well. Combining both biases gives a picture of the “hard core of innova-
tion”1: bringing technology to the economic market. 
Beyond this hard core, an alternative mainstream is about to establish 
itself. This trend is indicated by the increasing popularity of the labels of 
non-technological innovation (NTI) and social innovation (SI). At first 
glance, these two concepts seem to be the missing links to the whole pic-
ture of innovation yet, on closer inspection, we still have problems with 
them. In line with the OECD STI Scoreboard (OECD 2007: Chapter 
D8), most concepts of NTI focus on organizational innovations in eco-
nomic entities as well as on marketing innovations. The concept of NTI is 
thus still biased towards economics. 
Unfortunately, the notion of SI does not refer to a systematic approach 
to the entire social dimension of innovation either. Most economics lit-
erature uses the label for residual categories of non-economic success 
factors of economic innovation (cf. McElroy 2002: 37f) or even as a 
synonym for NTI (cf. Simms 2006; Pot and Vaas 2008). More directly, 
SI has been defined as new forms of organization, new rules, or new life-
styles (Zapf 1994) as well as new ideas about social relations (Marcy and 
Mumford 2007). These definitions correspond in many ways with the 
most general one of Stefan Böschen et al. (2005), applying the notion to 
all cases of intended social change. All change in the economy and—
against the backgrounds of virtualization and hybridization (Miles 
2006)—many changes in technology can thus be defined as being social 
innovation as well. 
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The bottom line is that nearly everything can be defined as a SI, includ-
ing a sect (Cornwell 2007), the eBook (Cavalli 2007), or scientific man-
agement (Mumford and Moertl 2003). 
Geoff Mulgan (2006) provides an excellent example of the correspond-
ing confusion within the discourse. He refers to the process of tertiariza-
tion of economies and the political institution of female suffrage as ex-
amples of social innovations, while claiming that social innovations differ 
fundamentally from business innovations, admitting that there “are of 
course many borderline cases” (Mulgan 2006: 146) between social and 
business innovation. Against the background of the present discourse on 
SI, he is not even so wrong with that. 
What is more, the paradox of innovation (John 2005: 54) is handed down 
from the general discourse on innovation to the specific discourse on 
NTI and SI as well: innovation can refer both to an object and a process. 
If we consider that an innovation is only an innovation when it succeeds 
on the market (cf. Rogers 2003; Aderhold 2005), then we find that inno-
vations also have a social dimension. But what is an innovation, then? Is 
a new object or idea an innovation? Should we call the process of the 
development of a (process) innovation an innovation? Or does the no-
tion apply to the process of its diffusion in(to) markets and societies? 
Finally, if innovations also have a social dimension, then is there a social 
dimension of social innovations, too? 
These questions and the confusion caused by them are more than just 
academic problems: policy makers and triple-helix managers demand 
knowledge about “elements of innovative cultures” (Dombrowski et al. 
2007), advanced indicators of innovation, including its social dimension 
(Moris et al. 2008), and more systemic views of policy (Soete 2007). Ex-
perts in marketing discuss the broadened role of their discipline and 
business against the background of the perceived increasing impact of 
corporate social responsibility concepts (cf. Maciariello 2008; Uslay et al. 
2008) or stakeholder views (Troshani and Doolin 2007) on economic 
performance. Some even question the existence of “the pure commodity 
in the age of branding” (Wilk 2006: 303). Finally, open innovation 
(Chesbrough 2003) has what it takes to become another epoch-making 
concept. 
Hence, Mulgan (2006: 145) might be right to claim “that the pace of so-
cial innovation will, if anything, accelerate in the coming century.” At 
least, this idea corresponds with the increasing NTI focus of the OECD 
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(2007), either despite of or due to the fact that both concepts do (not) 
refer to the same phenomena. In any case, there is some idea or certainty 
that the real potential of innovation lies in its social dimension (cf. Pot 
and Vaas 2008, whose concept of SI does not differ much from the 
OECD’s concept of NTI). 
One explanation for the lack of systematic approaches to most crucial 
aspects of innovation is insufficient interaction between innovation re-
search and social theory (cf. Aderhold 2005: 15). In the following, we 
will be stimulating interaction between innovation research and systems 
theory because the work of Niklas Luhmann (1987, 1997) provides us 
with both selective and universal categories for the systemizing of com-
munication. Doing this, we will refer to Jon-Arild Johannessen, and his 
colleagues, on two levels: we will pursue his “search for a systemic theory 
of organizational innovation” (cf. Johannessen 1998) by developing a 
systemic approach to the general phenomenon of “innovation as new-
ness” (Johannessen et al. 2001: 20; Roth 2009; Roth 2010). 
The result of the interaction between innovation research and systems 
theory will be a systemic concept of innovation that distinguishes be-
tween an object dimension, a time dimension, and a social dimension of 
innovation. This innovation triangle model will serve as an editorial 
framework for the individual contributions of the present volume. In 
this sense, the present introduction is a practical example of an alterna-
tive structure for discourses on (social) innovation, as well. 
After the introduction of the authors and their contributions, the present 
text focuses on the social dimension of innovation, and on economic 
innovations as a special case of social innovation. In this context, the 
first evidence for the existence of non-economic markets is also present-
ed. Based on this evidence, the introduction concludes with the vision of 
a theory of robust innovation, i.e. innovations that succeed in both eco-
nomic and non-economic markets of society. 
 
On the Meaning of Innovation 
 
We assume the concept of innovation to make sense (“Sinn” in Luh-
mann 1987: 44f; 2008: 12ff). Thus, just like every other form of sense, 
innovation is characterized most basically by the difference between ac-
tuality and potentiality. In the context of innovation this difference refers 
to the idea that something actually new cannot be old at the same time, 
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but that it may become old quite soon. Hence, the specific difference 
characterizing innovation is that between new and old (cf. Johannessen et 
al. 2001: 20; John 2005: 54). 
It is common sense to use the new/old difference in terms of time—i.e. 
in terms of the difference before and after (Luhmann 1987: 116). This 
makes sense, but only one sense among others: systems theory distin-
guishes between three dimensions of sense—i.e. beyond the time dimen-
sion there is also an object dimension and a social dimension of sense 
(Luhmann 1987: 112). In other words, we cannot only ask “new with 
regard to when?” but also “new compared to what?” and “new to 
whom?”2 It is not up to time alone to decide whether something is new 
or not: innovation is not only a matter of temporal change (after, not be-
fore) but also a matter of objective uniqueness (the one, not the other) or 
of social exclusiveness (ego, not alter). 
In this sense, we can distinguish three dimensions of innovation (cf. Fig-
ure 1): if we apply the label of innovation to new artefacts3, i.e. products, 
ideas, or methods, then we focus on the object dimension (the novelty). 
This is the dimension that authors like Jens Aderhold and René John 
(2005: 7) refer to when they are criticizing the technology bias in the cur-
rent discourse on innovation. 
 
 
Figure 1: The three dimensions of innovation (Roth 2009) 
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This object dimension can be distinguished from the time dimension of 
innovation in terms of the difference between innovation and invention: 
 
In the word innovation, we find the Latin stem novus, whereas in the word inven-
tion, we find the stem (…) venire. It is evident that the first relates to the meaning 
of something new, whereas the second, as venire is a verb that implies an action of 
moving, brings to mind the meaning of looking for something and finding some-
thing. (Cavalli 2007: 958f) 
 
In this sense, invention would be the temporal process leading to the ob-
ject(ive), the innovation. Unfortunately, Georg Krücken (2005: 65) puts 
it the other way round as he defines innovation as the process of the in-
troduction of inventions. 
For this reason, we will keep it simple and, at least for a while, follow the 
innovation sociologist René John (2005), who helps us to establish a 
minimal consensus by distinguishing between an object dimension and a 
process dimension of innovation. By focusing on the time process di-
mension of innovation we are no longer interested in novelties but rather 
in the temporal processes of innovation (John 2005: 55ff; Kaudela-Baum 
et al. 2008: 34f), in organizational change or changeability as the compe-
tence to permanently evolve (Moldaschl 2006; Baitsch and Wetzel 2008), 
or explicitly in organizational time-management strategies (Simsa 2001). 
As such, innovation becomes a synonym for transformation or change. 
But if we recall the definition of Georg Krücken, then we find that, to a 
large degree, it also corresponds to definitions that are in line with the 
diffusion of innovations approach presented by Everett Rogers (2003). 
This means that we are confronted with another paradox of innovation: 
on the one hand, we can easily conceptualize diffusion as a temporal 
process of the increasing spread or distribution of innovations. However, 
on the other hand, this means making a long story much too short: dif-
fusion is about communication paths within a given social system. Inno-
vations are thus characterized by strong social externalities (cf. Beckert 
1998: 51), which refers to their social embeddedness: “The road towards 
innovation leads through the jungle of social attribution” (Pohlmann 
2005: 10). The knowledge of the laws of this jungle as well as the posses-
sion of both exclusive (Schumpeter 1954) and inclusive (Chesbrough 
2003) means of innovation is assumed to be a competitive advantage. It is 
precisely this word that describes best the difference an innovation 
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makes if we focus on the social dimension of innovation; then innova-
tion refers to a difference in a social relation, i.e. the advantage of the 
one or the disadvantage of the other. 
By neglecting this social dimension of innovation, René John does not 
discover much about the entire “paradox of innovation” (2005: 54); 
without any doubt it is a smart idea to apply evolution theory’s triad of 
variation, selection, and re-stabilization to the analysis of the time dimen-
sion of innovation (after having distinguished it from the object dimen-
sion of innovation). But, as John exclusively focuses on the time dimen-
sion of innovation, he systematically ignores two of the three dimensions 
of innovation. By doing so, he also automatically deletes two of three 
corresponding theoretical offers from the table of content of the “super-
theory” systems theory (cf. Schimank 2003): the object-dimensional the-
ory of differentiation and the social-dimensional theory of communica-
tion. In other words, he keeps looking through only one lens, although 
his microscope would provide him with two further resolutions—i.e. 
levels of analysis (cf. again Figure 1). 
Of course, against the background of complex research objects the limi-
tation of the plurality of perspectives is not the worst strategy. But it is 
crucial to recall that fading out a paradox does not mean solving it: there 
is no logical or elective affinity between innovation research, the time 
dimension, and evolution theory. Innovation is three dimensional. 
Hence, it is most important to know what we want to know. Given that, 
it is surprising that, of all people, it is innovation sociologists who pro-
mote the time dimension as the key dimension of innovation. Without 
any doubt, it is most important to analyze the time dimension of innova-
tion, but this has little to do with innovation sociology, and even less 
with a solution for the innovation paradox. Only a concept that takes 
into account the object dimension, the time dimension, and the social 
dimension as well as the corresponding theoretical approaches will pro-
vide us, if not yet with a solution, then at least with an adequate perspec-
tive of the paradox. 
In this sense, the objective of the following section is modest: it aims at a 
first systematic sketch of the three dimensions of innovation and of logi-
cal interrelations between them. 
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The Three Dimensions of Non-Technological and Non-
Economic Innovations 
 
The basic distinction between the object dimension, the time dimension, 
and the social dimension is both selective and universal—i.e. it can be 
applied to any kind of social system as well as to any kind of level of the 
analysis of communication. Hence, in the following, our three-
dimensional approach to innovation can serve as an editorial framework 
for the presentation of the contributions to the present book, which 
could hardly be more diverse in terms of topics, theoretical approaches, 
and geographical contexts. 
 
The first part of the book is devoted to the Object Dimension of Non-
Technological and Non-Economic Innovations.  
 
First, Lukas Scheiber from the University of Stuttgart, Germany, de-
scribes the hard core of innovation mentioned above and its possible 
future changes in “Economy and Technology.” 
Veronique Favre-Bonte, Elodie Gardet, and Catherine Thevenard-
Puthod from the University of Savoy, France, then present “A Typology 
of Innovations in Retail Banking.” 
We owe insights into “The Role of Non-Technological Innovations in 
the Growth of the Engineering Industry, the Economy, and the Society 
of Rajkot” to Hardik Vachhrajani from the University of Mumbai, India. 
Hans-Werner Franz from Dortmund University of Technology, Germa-
ny, makes the final contribution to this part with “Social Science Produc-
tion or Social Innovation by Social Science Production”. 
 
The title of the second part is The Time Dimension of Non-technological and 
Non-economic innovations.  
 
Here, Nikolay Trofimov from the Russian Academy of Science in Mos-
cow, Russia, presents the results of his research on “Organizational and 
Managerial Innovations in Large Companies and their Impact on Tech-
nological Innovations and Innovation Strategies.” 
Next is Alexander Kesselring’s report on “Social Innovation in Private 
Companies: An Exploratory Empirical Study” conducted by him as a 
member of the Center for Social Innovation (ZSI), Austria. 
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Finally, Jens Aderhold from the University of Halle-Wittenberg, Germa-
ny, focuses on the “Rationalities of Innovation.” 
 
The final part deals with the Social Dimension of Non-Technological and Non-
Economic Innovations.  
 
In this part, Jari Kaivo-oja from Turku Business School, Finland, reports 
about “Integrating Innovation and Foresight Research Activities: Key 
Models and Challenges in Non-Technical and Non-Economic Innova-
tion Actions.” 
The concluding contribution by Hugues Jeannerat and Olivier Crevoisier 
from the University of Neuchâtel, Switzerland, is “From Proximity to 
Multi-Location Territorial Knowledge Dynamics: The Case of the Swiss 
Watch Industry.” 
 
This mapping of the articles indicates that there is no necessary elective 
affinity between non-technological or social innovations on the one hand 
and the social dimension of innovation on the other hand: while all con-
tributions deal with non-technological or social innovations, only a mi-
nority of them focus on their social dimension. However, can research-
ers really work on social innovations without focusing on the social di-
mension of innovation? Do we not feel like suggesting, “that innovation 
ranges across a single continuum that encompasses all three aspects” 
(Johannessen et al. 2001: 27)? We can only agree with this suggestion. 
Nonetheless, everything starts in some fashion: every idea or concept of 
innovation has to enter the three-dimensional continuum at some point, 
i.e. either at the object dimension or the time dimension or the social 
dimension of innovation. For example, if we enter the continuum at the 
object dimension of innovation, then we have three options: staying in 
the object dimension (i.e. looking for its hard core), moving to the time 
dimension, or moving to the social dimension of innovation (cf. Figure 
2). Hence, we argue that it is the object dimensional hard core of innova-
tion to define innovations as new products or commodities. We also find 
that we can treat temporal processes or social relations as if they were 
objects that can be owned (patents on methods) or sold on a market (ser-
vices). 
If we choose time as our first point of contact with the innovation con-
tinuum, then we may develop a completely different picture of innova-
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tion: the hard core of time is change, while its object reference is transfor-
mation (and not the method as means of transformation). Based on the 
time dimension, a reference to the social dimension leads to the defini-
tion of innovation as the successful process of the diffusion of products, 
methods, or services. 
 
 
Figure 2: The dimensions of innovation and their interrelations: the innovation tri-
angle (Roth 2009) 
 
Finally, our entry point could be the social dimension of innovation as 
well. Then, the concept of advantage (German: “Vorteil”) would define 
the hard core of innovation, with the notions of advance (German: “Vor-
sprung”) and label4 referring to temporal and object-related aspects of the 
social dimension. 
Keeping Figure 2 in mind, we can revisit the authors of this book and 
appreciate their contributions in a much more appropriate way. 
In his text “Economy and Technology: About the Hard Core of Innova-
tion,” Lukas Scheiber enters the discussion with the question of what 
non-technological and non-economic innovations are, before asking how 
both types of innovation are to be handled now as well as in the future. 
By crossing the differences of technological/technological and econom-
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ic/non-economic innovations, he ultimately distinguishes commodities 
(technological, economic) from services (e.g. open software, Wikipedia, 
technological, non-economic), organizational change processes (non-
technological, economic), and means of organization (networks, parties; 
non-technological, non-economic). He thus writes an excellent chapter 
of high theoretical value for the discussion on social innovation, with a 
clear focus on the object and the time dimensions of innovation. Alex-
ander Kesselring’s study “Social Innovation in Private Companies” con-
sciously fades out the social dimension of the social innovation in order 
to establish a distinction between social innovation and social change. 
He therefore focuses on the time dimension by presenting a typology of 
sustainable change processes in private companies. 
The first to perceptibly flirt with the social dimension are Veronique Fa-
vre-Bonte, Elodie Gardet, and Catherine Thevenard-Puthod: starting 
with question for “A Typology of Innovations in Retail Banking”—i.e. 
starting with the object dimension, they conclude by showing how prod-
uct innovations, process innovations, and service innovations contribute 
to competitive advantage in the banking sector. 
In his chapter on “The Role of Non-Technological Innovations in the 
Growth of the Engineering Industry, the Economy, and Society of Raj-
kot,” Hardik Vachhrajani also focuses on the object dimension of inno-
vation: he demonstrates how the competitive advantage of an Indian 
mechanical engineering cluster is assembled by raw material innovations, 
service innovations (micro-credits), and process innovations (family-
based outsourcing strategies). 
Against the background of knowledge production in the age of Mode II, 
Hans-Werner Franz also enters the innovation continuum on the object 
dimension by introducing a set of methods and tools called the social 
production of science (not social science production). Organizational change 
processes that lead to the development of the very method and the 
methods’ advantages in the context of knowledge production in social 
sciences are also discussed. 
Nikolay Trofimov’s contribution on “Organizational and Managerial In-
novations in Large Companies and their Impact on Technological Inno-
vations and Innovation Strategies” is an outstanding example of an anal-
ysis of the time dimension of innovation in the most dynamic context of 
transformation societies: he draws our attention to the current state of 
the art in organizational and management innovations (OMI) practices in 
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Russian large companies as well as to factors influencing their diffusion 
to smaller companies and other parts of society. 
Jens Aderhold’s “Rationalities of Innovation” aims to embed the innova-
tion concept historically, i.e. to identify long-term factors within the so-
cial process of transformation. His discussion of the term “transfor-
mation” supports the development of distinctive categories within the 
time dimension of innovation: while the notion of change refers to inno-
vation as an internal effect within the system of reference, the notions of 
transformation and diffusion refer to external effects on objects and sub-
jects. While the notion of transformation is often applied to change pro-
cesses with easily predictable outcomes, the concept of diffusion refers 
to change in more self-organizing and, thus, less predictable settings5. 
By “Integrating Innovation and Foresight Research Activities” and iden-
tifying “Key Models and Challenges in Non-Technical and Non-
Economic Innovation Actions,” Jari Kaivo-oja switches the focus be-
tween the time dimension and the social dimension of innovation: fore-
sight effects advance, and his integration of non-economic innovations 
into the still economy-focused concept of open innovation strongly sup-
ports the vision of a more robust competitive advantage. 
Finally, Hugues Jeannerat and Olivier Crevoisier (“From Proximity to 
Multi-Location Territorial Knowledge Dynamics: The Case of the Swiss 
Watch Industry”) emphasize the role of information flows between pro-
ducers and consumers: they assume high product quality to be the neces-
sary but no longer sufficient prerequisite for an innovation’s success in 
the age of emotionally differentiated markets. They thus focus on label-
ing strategies and community-building efforts as well as on the corre-
sponding organizational change processes of a local production system 
in the context of a de-localized system of consumption. 
Because of these discussions, on the one hand we find that our three-
dimensional concept of innovation can integrate the most diverse topics 
and approaches; on the other, we find that, in total, our small collection 
of contributions covers all dimensions and sub-dimensions of innovation 
so far. We are thus confident regarding the models’ relevance and inte-
grative power in the context of the more general discourses on innova-
tion. Nonetheless, we look forward to aspects of innovation that cannot 
be integrated in the three-dimensional concept6. 
It is noticeable that there is no contribution that focuses on only one 
dimension. The social dimension is thus still approached with object-
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related and temporal metaphors, and this is also the case in the general 
discourse on innovation where a selective approach to the social dimen-
sion of innovation is still due. 
It cannot be the purpose of the present introduction to fill this research 
gap at the present time. Nonetheless, by focusing on economic and non-
economic innovations it can present some surprising snapshots of a par-
ticular cut-off of the social dimension of innovation, at least. 
 
The Special Case of Economic Innovations 
 
If we talk about economic and non-economic innovations, then we 
more-or-less consciously base our views on a concept of functional dif-
ferentiation: the economy is not politics, is not science, and so forth. We 
also automatically refer to the social dimension of innovation. Products, 
services, techniques, organizational change, or diffusion processes are 
only economic phenomena if they are related to the competitive sphere 
of economic advantage, i.e. the economic market. However, this inter-
pretation is only one among other possible interpretations: there are 
non-economic products (e.g. in the arts, cf. Cohen 2007), as well. An in-
voice does not accompany every service. The introduction of a new 
management style into a public service is politics, not economics (Wolf-
gang-Renninson 2007). The diffusion of the knowledge presented in this 
book is an aspect of science, first of all. There are even non-economic 
spheres of competition in society (cf. Baecker 2006). 
As far as the economic character of an innovation is concerned, it is thus 
the social dimension that makes the difference. Economic innovations 
are objects or processes leading to advantages on the economic market 
that can be interpreted as economic innovations themselves. If we recall 
the idea that there are non-economic objects and processes that are pro-
duced or performed with regard to non-economic advantages, too, then 
we find that economic innovations are only one of a number of types of 
social innovation. 
Furthermore, if we can imagine these kinds of non-economic innova-
tions, then we also need to take into account the existence of non-
economic markets (Roth 2012). This also makes sense against the back-
ground of differentiation theory: systems theory (Luhmann 1997) distin-
guishes three major forms of social differentiation: segmental, stratifica-
tion, and functional differentiation. It is quite common to apply the first 
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two forms of differentiation to geographically segmented markets as well 
as in terms of target groups deduced from social structure-focused mar-
ket research. There is thus no logical reason why the third form should 
be neglected. This applies even more against the background of the idea 
that functional differentiation is the primary form of differentiation in 
contemporary world society (cf. Stichweh 1995, 1997; Luhmann 1997). 
Consequently, we follow Dirk Baecker (2006: 333) who states “markets 
count as economic phenomena but they are common in other social 
spheres as well.” As Niklas Luhmann (1997) distinguishes ten functional 
systems of society, we can identify nine further markets in society: politi-
cal markets, scientific markets, arts markets, religious markets, educa-
tional markets, legal markets, health markets, sports markets, and the 
mass media system. Accordingly, evidence for the existence of non-
economic markets can be found in this book as well as in economic an-
thropology, economic sociology, innovation sociology, and business sci-
ences (cf. Roth 2008; Roth 2012). Nonetheless, there is still a research 
gap concerning the comparative analysis of forms and functions as well 
as of interrelations between all the markets in society. 
 
Towards a Theory of Robust Innovation 
 
Even the most economic innovation can be defined as the outcome of 
pan-societal efforts (Barré 2001; Nowotny et al. 2001) or as the result of 
the co-evolution of both economic and non-economic functional sys-
tems of society (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000; Leydesdorff 2005, 
2006). 
At the end of this introduction, we can draw two consequences from 
this. First, in accordance with a developing alternative mainstream in in-
novation research, the contributions to the present book stress the im-
mense impact of non-technological and non-economic innovations on 
economic performance. Unfortunately, current discourses on innova-
tions that are non-technological, non-economic, or social tend to lead to 
logical dead ends or case-study based detours rather than consistent 
pathways towards competitive indicators and strategies of innovation 
beyond the “bringing technology to the economic market” paradigm. 
Against this background, the three-dimensional concept of innovation 
developed in this introduction is an invitation to take one step back in 
order to take two steps forward. By making the most basic distinction 
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between an object dimension, a time dimension, and a social dimension 
of innovation, it presents a continuum of both universal and distinctive 
categories of innovation. This so-called innovation triangle makes it pos-
sible to analyze, to compare, and to coordinate the most diverse ap-
proaches to innovation. First, this applies to the present book; it con-
tributes by serving as an editorial structure. In this sense, the single con-
tributions stand for interest-specific access points to the innovation con-
tinuum and, thus, for the development of problem-adequate concepts 
and indicators of innovation. We are confident that further discourses on 
innovation will be inspired by our systemic approach to innovation. 
Second, with special regard to the social dimension of innovation, in a fi-
nal step we adapt the concept of socially robust knowledge (Nowotny et 
al. 2004): we argue that innovations that succeed in more than one mar-
ket are innovations that are more robust. Robust innovations can thus be 
defined as objects, processes, and advantages that realize (further) ad-
vantages in more than just one market in society. To this effect, these 
multi-impact innovations can be assumed to be both more profitable and 
more sustainable than single-market innovations (Roth 2014). Against 
the background of geographical segmentation or social stratification, this 
idea seems quite self-evident: if a product, a method, or a service con-
quers new world regions or target groups, then it is likely to produce 
more advantages7. The idea that products, methods, and services diffuse 
between (non-) economic markets as well, will take us slightly longer to 
get used to, even though most of us are used to dealing with these kinds 
of diffusions every day. For example, since the dawn of Mode II we 
know that scientific objects, processes, and advantages can diffuse to the 
economy, and that they usually need specific support to do so. The con-
stant efforts of business entities to deal with intangibles, or to develop 
new sense organs for what they call stakeholders in the context of corpo-
rate social responsibility or open innovation, can be interpreted as fur-
ther examples of a more-or-less conscious orientation towards non-
economic markets. Despite all the signs, there is neither a sound trans-
economic market concept nor a corresponding theory of robust innova-
tions. Accordingly, there is no specific marketing concept for the promo-
tion of robust innovations either. 
Nonetheless, the aim is what the synopsis of the contributions to this 
volume suggests: a focus on the realization of robust objects, robust 
pro­cesses, and robust advantages, i.e. in total robust innovation, irre-
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spective of whether one’s own starting point is in economy, politics, sci-
ence, or any other market of society (Roth 2012). 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 Please refer to Lukas Scheiber’s contribution to this volume. 
2 Regarding these questions we are on the one hand inspired by Johannessen et al. 
(2001) who ask three questions about innovation in the context of “economic 
units” (Johannessen et al. 2001: 27), as well: “What is new?” “How new?” And: 
“new to whom?” On the other hand, the authors themselves state that the di-
mensions deduced from the “what?” and the “how?” question are not very selec-
tive against the one deduced from the “whom?” question (Johannessen et al. 
2001: 23). It also seems to us that the “how?” question cannot be located on the 
same level of analysis as the “what?” and the “whom?” question because you 
cannot answer the first question without knowing the answers to at least one of 
the latter (which does not apply the other way round). 
3 This includes both material and immaterial artifacts (cf. Rammert 1993: 11). 
4 In this context, the term “label” refers to brands, social addresses, or status sym-
bols of all kind, as well. 
5 For example, Manfred Moldaschl (2005) shows that it is both quite common and 
most important (not) to mix up these two dimensions. 
6 The three dimensions of sense are deduced from (only) three of the six basic in-
terrogatives: what, when, and who. Maybe there is space for three further dimen-
sions in innovation research. 
7 For a discussion of the challenges involved in such transfer cf. Roth, Kaivo-oja 
and Hirschmann (2013). 
 
References 
 
1. Aderhold, J. (2005) Gesellschaftsentwicklung am Tropf tech-
nischer Neuerungen. In: J. Aderhold and R. John (eds.): Innova-
tion. Sozialwissenschaftliche Perspektiven. Konstanz: UVK. 
2. Baecker, D. (2006) Markets. In: A. Harrington, B. L. Marshall 
and H.-P. Müller (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Social Theory. Lon-
don: Routledge, pp. 333–335. 
3. Baitsch, C. and Wetzel, R. (2008) Organisationale Lernfähigkeit 
gestalten. OrganisationsEntwicklung, 2, pp. 79–86. 
 
 
24 
4. Barré, R. (2001) The Agora Model of Innovation Systems: S&T 
Indicators for a Democratic Knowledge Society. Research Evo-
lution, 10, pp. 13–18. 
5. Beckert, J. (1998) Handlungstheoretische Aspekte der Organisa-
tion von Innovationen. In: F. Heideloff and T. Radel (eds.): Or-
ganisation von Innovation—Strukturen, Prozesse, Interven-
tionen. München: Hampp, pp. 19–44. 
6. Böschen, S., et al. (2005) Nebenfolgen. Analysen zur Kon-
struktion und Transformation moderner Gesellschaften. 
Weilersvist: Velbrück. 
7. Cavalli, N. (2007) The Symbolic Dimension of Innovation Pro-
cesses. American Behavioral Scientist, 50/7, pp. 958–969. 
8. Chesbrough, H. (2003) Open Innovation: The New Imperative 
for Creating and Profiting from Technology. Boston: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
9. Cohen, J. (2007) The Decline of a Craft: Basket Making in San 
Juan Guelavia, Oaxaca. Human Organization, 66/3, pp. 229–
239. 
10. Cornwell, B. (2007) The Protestant Sect Credit Machine: Social 
Capital and the Rise of Capitalism. Journal of Classical Sociolo-
gy, 7/3, pp. 267–290. 
11. Dombrowski, C., et al. (2007) Elements of Innovative Cultures. 
Knowledge and Process Management, 14/3, pp. 190–202. 
12. Etzkowitz, H. and L. Leydesdorff (2000) The Dynamics of In-
novation: From National Systems and “Mode 2” to a Triple He-
lix of University–Industry–Government Relations. Research 
Policy, 29, pp. 109–123. 
13. Johannessen, J.-A. (1998) Organisations as Social Systems: The 
Search for a Systemic Theory of Organizational Innovation Pro-
cesses. Kybernetes, 27/4, pp. 359–387. 
14. Johannessen, J.-A., B. Olsen and G. T. Lumplin (2001) Innova-
tion as Newness: What Is New, How New, and New to Whom? 
European Journal of Innovation Management, 4/1, 20–31. 
15. John, R. (2005) Innovationen als irritierende Neuheiten. Evolu-
tionstheoretische Perspektiven. In: J. Aderhold and R. John 
(eds.): Innovation. Sozialwissenschaftliche Perspektiven. Kon-
stanz: UVK. 
 	  
	  
25 
16. Kaudela-Baum et al. (2008) Innovation. Zwischen Steuerung 
und Zufall. In: Arbeitsbericht IBR der Hochschule für 
Wirtschaft Luzern, 001/2008, pp. 1–61. 
17. Krücken, G. (2005) Innovationen—neo-institutionalistisch 
betrachtet. In: J. Aderhold and R. John (eds.): Innovation. Sozi-
alwissenschaftliche Perspektiven. Konstanz: UVK. 
18. Leydesdorff, L. (2005) The Triple Helix Model and the Study of 
Knowledge Based Innovation Systems. International Journal of 
Contemporary Sociology, 42/1, pp. 12–27. 
19. Leydesdorff, L. (2006) The Knowledge-Based Economy and the 
Triple Helix Model. In: W. Dolfsma and L. Soete (eds.): Under-
standing the Dynamics of a Knowledge Society. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 
20. Luhmann, N. (1987) Soziale Systeme. Frankfurt am Main: Suhr-
kamp. 
21. Luhmann, N. (1997) Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft. Frank-
furt am Main: Suhrkamp. 
22. Luhmann, N. (2008) Ideenevolution. Frankfurt am Main: Suhr-
kamp. 
23. Maciariello, J. (2008) Marketing and Innovation in the Drucker 
Management System. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Sci-
ence, online, May. 
24. Marcy, R. T., and Mumford, M. D. (2007) Social Innovation: 
Enhancing Creative Performance through Causal Analysis. 
Creativity Research Journal, 19/2, pp. 123–140. 
25. McElroy, M. (2002) Social Innovation Capital. Journal of Intel-
lectual Capital, 3/1, pp. 30–39. 
26. Miles, I. (2006) Innovations in Services. In: J. Fagerberg et al. 
(eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Innovation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
27. Moldaschl, M. (2005) Das soziale Kapital von Arbeitsgruppen 
und die Nebenfolgen seiner Verwertung. Gruppendynamik und 
Organisationsberatung, 36/2, pp. 221–239. 
28. Moldaschl, M. (2006) Innovationsfähigkeit, Zukunftsfähigkeit, 
Dynamic Capabilities. Moderne Fähigkeitsmystik und eine Al-
ternative. In: G. Schreyög and P. Conrad (eds.): Management-
forschung 16, Wiesbaden: Gabler, pp. 427–443. 
 
 
26 
29. Moris, F., J. Jankowski, and Perolle, P. (2008) Advancing 
Measures of Innovation in the United States. Journal of Tech-
nology Transfer, 33, pp. 123–130. 
30. Mulgan, G. (2006) The Process of Social Innovation. In: Inno-
vations: Technology, Governance, Globalization, 1/2, pp. 145–
162. 
31. Mumford, M. D. and Moertl, P. (2003) Cases of Social Innova-
tion: Lessons from Two Innovations in the 20th Century. Crea-
tivity Research Journal, 15/2, pp. 261–266. 
32. Nowotny, H, P. Scott, and Gibbons, M. (2001) Re-Thinking 
Science, Knowledge and the Public in the Age of Uncertainty. 
London: Polity Press. 
33. OECD (2007) OECD Science, Technology and Industry Score-
board 2007. Innovation and Performance in the Global Econ-
omy. Published on October 25, 2007: 
www.oecd.org/sti/scoreboard, Chapter D8 (accessed January 
15, 2013). 
34. Pohlmann, M. (2005) The Evolution of Innovation—Cultural 
Backgrounds and the Use of Innovation Models. Technology 
Analysis and Strategic Management, 17/1, pp. 9–19. 
35. Pot, F. W., and Vaas, F. (2008) Social Innovation, the New 
Challenge for Europe. International Journal of Productivity and 
Performance Management, 57/7, pp. 468–473. 
36. Rammert, W. (1993) Technik aus soziologischer Perspektive. 
Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag. 
37. Rennings, K. (2000) Redefining Innovation: Eco-Innovation 
Research and the Contribution from Ecological Economics. 
Ecological Economics, 32/2, pp. 319–332. 
38. Rogers, E. M. (2003) Diffusion of Innovations. New York: Free 
Press. 
39. Roth, S. (2008) The Exchange Rates of Society: An Essay on 
Bringing Society Back in Market. Leading Systems, 08/2, 
pp. 32–53. 
40. Roth, S. (2009) New for whom? Initial images from the social 
dimension of innovation, International Journal of Innovation 
and Sustainable Development, 4/4, pp. 231-252 
 	  
	  
27 
41. Roth, S. (2010) The Diaspora as a nation’s capital: Crowdsourc-
ing strategies for the Caucasus, International Journal of Transi-
tion and Innovation Systems, 1/1, pp- 44-58. 
42. Roth, S. (2012) Leaving commonplaces on the commonplace. 
Cornerstones of a polyphonic market theory, Tamara: Journal 
for Critical Organization Inquiry, 10/3, pp. 43-52. 
43. Roth, S. (2014), Booties, bounties, business models. A map to 
the next red oceans, International Journal of Entrepreneurship 
and Small Business, 22/4, pp. 439-448. 
44. Roth, S., Kaivo-oja, J., and Hirschmann, T. (2013) Smart re-
gions. Two cases of crowdsourcing for regional develop-
ment, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small 
Business, 20/3, 272-285. 
45. Schimank, U. (2003) Einleitung. In: H.-J. Giegel and U. 
Schimank (eds.): Beobachter der Moderne—Beiträge zu Niklas 
Luhmanns “Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft”. Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, pp. 7–18. 
46. Schumpeter, J. A. (1954) History of Economic Analysis. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
47. Simms, J. R. (2006) Technical and Social Innovation Determi-
nants of behaviour. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 
23/3, pp. 383–393. 
48. Simsa, R. (2001) Zeit in Organisationen—Eine kurze Bestand-
saufnahme. Gruppendynamik und Organisation, 32/3, pp. 259–
268. 
49. Soete, L. (2007) From Industrial to Innovation Policy. Journal 
of Industrial Competition and Trade, 7, pp. 273–284. 
50. Stichweh, R. (1995) Zur Theorie der Weltgesellschaft. Soziale 
Systeme, 1, pp. 29–45. 
51. Stichweh, R. (1997) Inklusion/Exklusion, funktionale Differen-
zierung und die Theorie der Weltgesellschaft. Soziale Systeme, 3, 
pp. 123–136. 
52. Troshani, I., and Doolin, B. (2007) Innovation Diffusion: A 
Stakeholder and Social Network View. European Journal of In-
novation Management, 10/2, pp. 176–200. 
53. Uslay, C., R. Morgan and J. Sheth (2008) Peter Drucker on Mar-
keting: An Exploration of Five Tenets.  Journal of the Academy 
of Marketing Science, 37/1, pp. 47-60. 
 
 
28 
54. Wilk, R. (2006) Bottled Water: The Pure Commodity in the Age 
of Branding. Journal of Consumer Culture, 6/3, 303–325. 
55. Wolfgang-Rennison, B. (2007) Historical Discourses of Public 
Management in Denmark: Past Emergence and Present Chal-
lenge. Management and Organizational History, 2/1, pp. 5–26. 
56. Zapf, W. (1994) Modernisierung. Wohlfahrtsentwicklung und 
Transformation. Berlin: WZB. 
 
  
 	  
	  
29 
PART I 
 
THE OBJECT DIMENSION OF NON-TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
NON-ECONOMIC INNOVATIONS 
 
 
  
 
 
30 
  
 	  
	  
31 
Lukas Scheiber 
ECONOMY AND TECHNOLOGY: ABOUT THE HARD CORE  
OF INNOVATION AND ITS FUTURE CHANGE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
To develop a better understanding of non-economic and non-
technological innovations, which are expected to have a bigger impact in 
future, it is valuable to understand or at least narrow down, the funda-
mental logic of economics, technology, and innovation in modern socie-
ty. The three concepts and how they are intertwined belong to an under-
standing of society and societal change that strongly corresponds with 
our understanding of modern industrial society, as we have known it 
during the last 160 years. With the invention of computers and their 
networks, a new type of society seems to be developing; Baecker, in ac-
cordance with Drucker, calls it the “next society” (Baecker 2007). This 
society, being a knowledge society, would be characterized by the follow-
ing: 
 
– Borderlessness, because knowledge travels even more effortlessly 
than money. 
– Upward mobility, available to everyone through easily acquired 
formal education. 
– The potential for failure as well as success. Anyone can acquire the 
“means of production”, i.e., the knowledge required for the job . . . 
(Drucker 2002) 
 
Within this “next society” we have good reason to expect a shift in the 
interlacement of economics, technology, and innovation because access 
to the means of production will differ and new social rationalities can 
enter the stage. Empirical examples show the new impact of business 
models such as those described by Wikinomics (Tapscott and Williams 
2007), where the economy no longer plays the one and only role for in-
novation. For example, Mozilla develops its products using volunteers 
who are highly motivated. They are not paid with money but perhaps by 
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reputation or inclusion in social networks. The profit for Mozilla is not 
privatized but refinances future product development over the Mozilla 
foundation. Furthermore, technology, as the selection of the Mozilla ex-
ample shows (i.e. computer, Internet and software), increasingly be-
comes a medium of communication and is not determined by, or im-
portant because of, its materiality or hardware. 
The wording of the title outlines that a central goal of the following con-
tribution lies in the development of a heuristic framework as a core con-
cept, in which it is on the one hand possible to extract reasons for the 
actual (or the actual past) interlacement of, and the societal preference 
for, economic and technological innovations. On the other hand, it 
should be possible to derive structural perspectives and problems that 
have to be taken into consideration when we talk about non-economic 
and non-technological innovation. 
How might it be possible to handle non-economic and non-
technological innovation in an uncertain future? 
 
The Frame of Reference: Social and Technological 
Systems 
 
In the literature, when researchers write about economics, technology, 
and innovation, they are often unclear and do not explain what they 
mean; a lot of premises are not mentioned explicitly and remain unclear. 
With the social system theory developed by Niklas Luhmann (1998), it is 
possible to work out the differences and connections between all three 
concepts. For a start, it is possible to differentiate between social and 
technological systems, and the economy can be regarded as one func-
tional system in society. 
Society as a social system is itself differentiated functionally: social sys-
tems can be observed as being functional systems that solve different 
particular problems for society. In this context we can isolate the econ-
omy, politics, science, and so forth, as being functional systems where no 
single system can dominate another or solve problems for it. For exam-
ple, politics cannot communicate economically in a literal sense because 
it is not possible to buy political power. (Society calls this phenomenon 
corruption and tries to avoid this systemic coupling by regulating it with 
the legal system.) Every functional system interacts with itself and its en-
vironment using its own specific code. The function of a code is to use a 
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binary logic to reduce contingency by operating regardless of the conse-
quences, For the economy this logic is “to pay or not to pay”; for science 
the logic is “true or false” (and nothing else). 
On another level, society shows a further type of social system—one 
that has the biggest influence on our current innovation systems: organi-
zations and nowadays networks are the type of social system where deci-
sions for innovation are possible and different sorts of systemic rationali-
ties can be dealt with. Enterprises as organizations, for example, are goal 
oriented and have to make a profit. This allocates them clearly to eco-
nomics and to the economic code. But they cannot proceed without tak-
ing the law, scientific truth, or societal development into consideration 
(Roth, Scheiber, and Wetzel 2010; . Organizations are the social loci 
where innovations are made and all kinds of systems (technological, bio-
logical, psychological and social), and especially the different codes of 
social systems, are intertwined or translated. 
In contrast, technology as a system is not social at all but is socially con-
structed or shaped (Bijker et al. 1993; Bijker 1997). Technology cannot be 
seen as being defined by its physical objectivity and it has physical condi-
tions. The media of technology determine the kind of form in which it 
appears and which kind of purpose can be expected of it. The forms of 
technology media can be identified; for example, habitualization, mecha-
nization, and algorithmization (Rammert 2007). 
Habitualization, as a form of technology, is built on the medium of bod-
ies as biological “wet ware.” Action, then, is schematized as consisting of 
routines such as workflow, revue dancing, or surgical technique. Mecha-
nization, as a form of technology, mirrors the classical interpretation of 
technique as a machine. This “hard ware” picture has for decades been 
linked with steam engines, railroads, rockets, and so forth, and defines 
the medium of mechanization as physical objects. Algorithmization, as a 
form of technology, enters the field because computers can transfer in-
formation into binary codes and binary codes into information by using 
programs built up by binary codes. The medium of algorithmization is 
“soft ware” made of symbols. 
Research about non-economic innovation, following these distinctions, 
involves observing “only” societal innovation, political and legal innova-
tion and organizational innovation, by excluding all economic logic, 
which also has to be excluded when we observe non-technological inno-
vation. 
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Is this possible? The answer at this point in the discussion cannot be 
“yes” or “no.” The question is one of standpoint, perspective, and ob-
servation. The differences between the types of social or technological 
systems show that a clear allocation of innovation as non-economic and 
non-technological and vice versa is not possible because society today 
seems to have the form of a “seamless web” (Bijker 1997) where every-
thing depends on everything. What can be separated and observed, how-
ever, are the systems that shape and form innovations by operating with-
in their codes as frames of reference. 
 
An Evolutionary Model of Innovation 
 
How can we link social and technological systems with the problem of 
innovation? With current interest in “innovation” and increased research 
on innovation, a lot of process models have appeared that clearly show 
single and linear planned steps of innovation but neglect the role of so-
cial and technological systems in the process. From a structural perspec-
tive they all separate into a chaotic pre-innovation area that is often 
called “creativity,” “idea,” or “invention.” A process of decision making 
then follows, which has some “stop-and-go” rules. The last step is often 
called the diffusion of innovation and addresses the issue of how innova-
tion “is communicated through certain channels over time among the 
members of a social system” (Rogers 2003). 
With an evolutionary model that works with variation, selection, and sta-
bilization, it is possible to avoid the often-constructed linearity of inno-
vation processes. Innovation processes can be modeled as recursive pro-
cesses with feedback and feed-forward loops that have to cope with the 
fundamental problem of innovation as a future paradox. 
The future is always, and remains, unknown. Operating into the future 
always means coping with the paradoxical situation that the future is not 
accessible for rational planning and control (Luhmann 2000: 158). Eve-
rything new that occurs is developed under assumptions that are basical-
ly not “adequate” for this future, so that the conditions for success have 
to be built up simultaneously (John 2005: 54). Pohlmann describes this 
phenomenon and one possible “solution” as follows: “Organizations and 
other social systems prefer innovations that are ‘conform–non-conform’. 
They have to be understandable and usable according to old rules but 
rule breaking at the same time” (Pohlmann 2005: 11). The trick in this 
 	  
	  
35 
“solution” seems to be the linkage of two contradictory terms: “con-
form” and “non-conform.” The future paradox of innovation is reflected 
in different streams of research and practice that are not only under the 
poles “conform” and “non-conform.” It appears in Schumpeterian re-
search as “creative destruction.” 
In an evolutionary innovation model, “creative destruction” can be ob-
served as variation in social systems. This variation, for example an acci-
dent, an earthquake, or some action that is unknown and does not fit in a 
given context, has to be communicated in social systems; otherwise, it 
does not exist and has no influence. Variation is not made for selection, 
however, social systems like enterprises try everything to increase the 
probability of being selected. 
Whether a variation is selected depends on its compatibility with given 
structures. Climate change, for example, becomes a topic for social sys-
tems when it is possible to translate it into existing codes like “to pay or 
not to pay” or political power. The structural filters of selection are the 
codes of the social systems mentioned above. 
In order to make a selection durable, stabilization is a fundamental need. 
In social system theory, selection itself has a stabilizing function because 
what is selected already has a certain kind of stable form (Luhmann 
1998: 485). But every selection has to be brought into a new relationship 
with the system concerned. From the perspective of innovation in organ-
ization, there have to be processes of system building by differentiation 
(Halfmann 1996: 104). At the organizational level, the emergence of new 
production processes, new departments, new organizational forms, and 
so forth, are observable. 
Irrespective of how social systems have built up their innovation pro-
cesses, the future problem of innovation remains the fundamental para-
dox: operating into the future without being able to predict it. 
To address this difficulty, social evolution has produced several tech-
niques that act as if the future were predictable and accessible. Risk man-
agement gives a first hint of how this could work. Risk is described as a 
certain kind of social theory that operates into the future by building up 
alternative future scenarios and evaluating them by connecting them to 
probable costs and profits. On balance, risk management works with 
economic parameters of costs and profits and inside a certain “range” of 
causality. 
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The Economy of Innovation 
 
Whether a variation, such as a creative idea or an accident, makes sense 
or not can be decided if social systems have the ability to translate it into 
their own code or have the ability to rank codes, as in the case of organi-
zations. First of all an innovation as a (market) product has to make 
sense in an economic context. Then it has to keep up with the micro-
political structure of hierarchies, and so forth. Nevertheless different di-
mensions have to be mixed and brought in order to reach a decision. 
Risk management was one example of such a translation into the eco-
nomic system. What could be responsible for the dominance of econom-
ic-oriented decisions in the case of innovation? 
Economy in this context is not observed as an input-output system but 
as a so-called autopoietic, self-referential system (Luhmann 1988: 58). 
On the one hand, the economy produces itself using economic elements. 
Nothing can rule economy directly from the outside. On the other hand, 
the economic environment, such as politics, law and so forth, have to be 
translated into the code of the economy (which was described above as a 
binary difference of “to pay and not to pay”). 
In this theoretical discourse the economy is a social system that solves 
and, significantly, produces one problem of society: scarcity, which 
means there is not enough for all. The economy shows a so-called dou-
ble coding: scarcity of property is translated into the scarcity of money 
and vice versa. Double coding is responsible for economic dynamics by 
forcing equilibrium and disequilibrium as stable and simultaneously un-
stable states of economy. The property of someone is always the non-
property of all others. Acceptance of this social state is generally low and 
all non-owners have to be motivated to accept the unequal allocation of 
property. Doubling the cycle of goods, represented by property and its 
exchange, with the cycle of money, increases the possibility of people 
accepting this unequal allocation. Every transferred property is assigned 
a certain monetary value. The owning or not owning of goods is trans-
ferred after monetization into the owning and not owning of money, and 
accordingly into solvency and insolvency. “While ‘just’ property is quite 
uninteresting—what should I do with a backyard with 20 apple trees?—
The medium money universalizes scarcity and interests” (Luhmann 1998: 
349, originally in German). 
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The monetized code is expressed and operated by the economy as a me-
dium of success with two options: to pay or not to pay. The word “suc-
cess” should not be interpreted as economic success but as the increased 
probability of an acceptance of communication (Luhmann 1998: 349). 
First of all, money as a medium of success bridges the social difference 
between alter and ego. Alter-ego constellations are marked by double 
contingency. In such a case money links someone’s choice, for example 
to consume a product, with the motivation of somebody to accept this 
choice. The combination of selection and motivation has not always 
been solved as peacefully as it is when money is used. Using force of 
arms has been an appropriate instrument for a long time to solve double 
contingency in society. But with the evolutionary achievement of money, 
a new way of solving double contingency entered the stage. 
Compared with a more general understanding of communication as talk 
or discourse, money is symbolic. As a symbolic medium, money has the 
ability to be transferred and the ability to forget. When money is spent, it 
is gone and you can imagine as hard as you want but it will not come 
back in your wallet. But what you spent it for and what it was spent on 
before it was in your wallet is not saved on the physical symbol. The 
transfer transports only the quantitative information that is the reason 
for its discharging effect. Nothing else has to be communicated or 
proved when you want to buy a pretzel at the bakery—only that you 
have the money to afford it. The so-called generalization of money guar-
antees that it is spendable for different reasons and unspecific in its us-
age. 
In addition to these characteristics on the social dimension, money has 
the ability to be an effective medium in a temporal context. Whether a 
payment makes sense or not can be decided by the price, which is under-
stood as the economic program that shows which side of the code 
should be marked. In the case of innovation, future prices are unknown 
but with money, it is possible to bet on future developments. Innovation 
in this context does not start with a good idea but with an investment, 
which means spending money with the expectation of getting more back 
in future. The net present value method shows clearly the mathematically 
expressed connection between money and time (Majer 2001: 157): 
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The connection between money and time allows measurable feedback 
(did we earn money?) and, especially important for innovation, feed-
forward communication. With every selection, a bet on future develop-
ment is possible. Besides, the double coding of economics enables inno-
vation dynamics. With an innovation it is possible to produce and reduce 
scarcity and to transfer scarcity of products into the scarcity of money, 
with which it is possible to bridge, over time, gaps in innovation pro-
cesses (cf. Scheiber 2010). 
Money as a medium of success has the ability to reduce and transform 
future uncertainties like no other medium. Because of this character it 
may be regarded as the main reason for the social preference for eco-
nomic-oriented innovation. Economy as one structural filter in innova-
tion processes seems to play the role of a goalkeeper for the selection 
process of inventions. But the ability to reduce future uncertainties can-
not only be observed in the case of money but also in the case of tech-
nology as is shown in the following passage. 
 
Technological Innovations 
 
In all the diversity of “wet ware,” ”hard ware,” and “soft ware” as media 
of habitualization, mechanization and algorithmization as forms of tech-
nology, two connecting moments can be observed that characterize 
technology in its core: causality and repeatability. Technology as a medi-
um can be defined as fixed causality (Halfmann 1996; Luhmann 2000). If 
we press the light switch, there is light. From this point of view, technol-
ogy has the function of delivering predictable effects. This could be a 
similar discussion to the one about the effect of money because both 
money and technology create an open space for other communication. 
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For instance, the main thing when driving a car is not the fixed causality 
between turning the key and starting the motor but the choice of other 
modalities of communication like whether to speed or to cruise through 
the city. The more contexts of communications are selectable (speeding, 
cruising, transporting, and so forth), the “better” technology seems to 
be. The more the information that technology is based on remains in the 
background, and the more functions technology has, the “better” tech-
nology is observed to be (e.g. NBIC as the converging of nanotechnolo-
gy, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science). 
When fixed causality itself becomes a topic of communication, technolo-
gy can then be defined as installation (Halfmann 1996: 126). Then the 
border between included causality (which was of no interest until then) 
and excluded environments, which were until then free for other com-
munication, disappears. In this situation the physical, biological or chem-
ical construction of technology enters the stage and must be brought 
back in causality by using other causalities like glue, screwdrivers, or 
codes. In this frame technology can be seen as memorized communica-
tion of intended purposes and expected effects (Schulz-Schaeffer 2000: 
75). 
This system-theoretical point of view neglects the perspective that tech-
nology is a social practice and counts it in the environment of social sys-
tems by drawing a sharp distinction between technology as a medium of 
the social and as an installation. 
Nevertheless this sharp distinction may help us to understand socio-
technical phenomena like innovation. What is the internal logic of tech-
nological evolution? Technological evolution and social evolution are 
intertwined, co-evolving, and tend to build up more variety. By orienting 
these technological conditions towards innovation, one fundamental dif-
ference between society and technology can be observed. While society 
is a self-reproducing social system, technology has the form of an allo-
poetic system that cannot reproduce itself. As a medium it provides the 
potential to be used in social contexts by appearing in different forms. 
When we observe technology as supply technology, which can mostly be 
described by its most widespread form of mechanization, technology has 
the function of making society independent of its ecological environ-
ments. Prominent examples start with fire and hand axe and end with 
water and energy supply, canalization, and nuclear power plants. That 
form of technology is corresponding with the proposition of Arnold 
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Gehlen, that the human being is an entity of imperfection (Mängelwesen, 
Homo inermis) and therefore has to use technology to boost its wet ware 
(Gehlen 1950). Nowadays, our understanding of technology has funda-
mentally changed since the rise of information technology and computer 
networks. Technology as a medium is increasingly becoming a medium 
of dissemination of communication. Prominent examples are the print-
ing press and computers. Social systems use technology either as supply 
technology or as medium of dissemination of communication. 
“What works, that works.” (Luhmann 1998: 518). Technology has the 
function of establishing consent and the possibility of coordinating al-
ways difficult and conflict-laden human action. The ongoing societal 
preference for technological arrangements or technological innovation 
has to be seen in the context of the possibility of handling complex situa-
tions of double contingency by communicating over (often complicated 
but always causal) technological systems. 
 
Building Blocks of Future Innovation: Media of Success 
and Media of Communication 
 
The social preference for everything that is marked as “new” could have 
different reasons. What is pointed out here is the fundamental problem 
of innovation as a future paradox. Paradoxes cannot be solved but they 
can be transferred or bridged over. In the case of innovation we found 
two strong mechanisms to reduce complexity and temporal gaps. Money, 
as a medium of success, and characterized as symbolic and generalized, 
has the ability to bridge over time. It works by neglecting all other social 
contexts like morality, power, love, and so forth. In its economic con-
texts it is related to property and scarcity, which are the starting and end 
points of economic dynamics, and it facilitates the “need” for innova-
tion. In terms of content, we observe a social preference for technologi-
cal innovation because of its causal simplification. By using technology 
as a medium of communication, much more complexity could be built 
up and handled. 
What other structural possibilities does society have to be innovative and 
to build up innovations? It seems that our modern society is evolving in 
a direction where the interplay of economics, technology, and innovation 
seems to be changing. Since the invention of the Internet, the computer 
has introduced a new medium of dissemination: by algorithmization 
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much more information can be saved, activated, and disseminated than 
ever before. The range of communicative accessibility has increased and 
hypertext allows non-linear communication. The Internet itself, and cor-
responding new social forms of networks, for example in civil society, 
the ecology movement, or open source, show the first blueprints of the 
so-called next society.  
First, the kinds of innovations that seem to be possible, or are actually 
empirically observable in the unmarked space of economy and technolo-
gy, should be established. Table 1 shows the result of crossing economic 
and technological innovation with the unmarked space of non-economic 
and non-technological innovation: 
 
 Technological Non-technological 
Economic Cars, trains, mobile phones, 
computers 
Organizational innovation 
Non-economic 
 
Open software (Linux), 
Wikipedia 
Social networks, political parties 
Table 1: Crossing of non-/economic and non-/technological innovations 
 
Structural problems associated with innovation will continue; the future 
will be uncertain, but the ways in which innovation processes are de-
signed and the kinds of results that are possible can be expected to be 
different. One main question at this point in the discussion concerns the 
kind of form future media of success will have to allow selection and 
communicative closure of variation in a way that there will be a result 
that could be called innovation. 
Social and technological evolution is accompanied by the evolution of 
social and technological segments in a reciprocal relationship. The more 
complexity can be handled by technology, the more complexity is possi-
ble in society and vice versa. Computer communications already allow 
new organizational forms like networks, where enterprises, social net-
works, single persons, and other computers are loosely coupled, but 
where enough double contingency restrictions can be found so that 
communication can be processed. 
The question here concerns the problem of how future innovation pro-
cesses can be managed and with what kind of media. 
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Conclusion: New Media of Innovation 
 
When we observe non-economic and non-technological innovation we 
can ask for selection mechanisms beside money. Which medium has the 
quality of increasing the probability of acceptance of communication and 
which corresponding structural filter can be used in innovation process-
es? This filter has to have two structural qualities: it has to be symbolic 
and generalized. Symbolization guarantees that it is reusable without de-
manding new consent. Reusability implies the possibility of temporal du-
rability and increases the likelihood of being used in the future. The me-
dium has to be generalizable, which means that its use is unspecific. Re-
turning to the medium of money, discussed earlier, it is possible to spend 
money for (nearly) everything that occurs as a potentiality in social 
communication. 
Which kinds of candidates have been discussed so far? Morality is one 
often-discussed candidate. Morality (what is good and what is bad) is 
much more about conflict than ensuring the acceptance of communica-
tion (Luhmann 1998: 317; Roth 2012b; Roth 2013). Values are not so 
discussable or fluid that a shared basis can be found from which selec-
tions of variations are likely. The chance to run innovation processes 
over time because the running itself is good or valuable is often very 
small. Here we would like to propose reputation as a possible “candi-
date” as a medium of success in the next society (Scheiber 2011). Open-
innovation projects and open-innovation models show that reputation 
seems to have the ability to connect selection and motivation on a social 
and temporal dimension. Nevertheless, reputation has some restrictions 
in comparison with communicating by money. Reputation is not as easily 
usable, shareable or exchangeable because it is strongly connected to 
trust, which makes it asymmetric in its proceeding. Reputation takes a lot 
of time to build up and can disappear in a second under “wrong” condi-
tions. Symbolization and generalization are heavily conditioned, which 
complicates the combination of selection and motivation and its pro-
cessing over time. Research and practice on the trustworthiness and 
credibility of organizations can reveal the impact and importance of rep-
utation in computer communication. Communicative affiliations in in-
novation processes have to take the context of reputation into considera-
tion. But whether society has the ability to build up, and will build up, 
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new media of success is a practical and not a theoretical decision in the 
frame of the outlined structural terms. 
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Veronique Favre-Bonte, Elodie Gardet, and Catherine Thevenard-Puthod 
A TYPOLOGY OF INNOVATIONS IN RETAIL BANKING 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The French banking sector has experienced profound changes and in-
creasing competition since the mid-1980s (Zollinger and Lamarque 
2004). In this difficult context, banks have had to find solutions through 
innovation to remain competitive, either by reducing costs, or by differ-
entiating themselves from competitors. Innovation allows new products 
to come on the market, which can give a pioneer bank an advantage over 
its competitors (even if it is temporary). 
Despite the increasing number of innovations introduced into the bank-
ing sector (OCDE 2000), the literature rarely focuses on this. In a more 
general way, services remain the “poor relative” of the literature about 
the management of innovation (Gallouj and Gallouj 1996; Dumont 
20011). Most studies in the management of innovation are more interest-
ed in technological innovations, and in particular those developed in the 
biotechnology, semiconductor, and other sectors (Baum et al. 2000; 
Gilsing and Nooteboom 2005; Roijakkers et al. 2005). However, the re-
sults of these studies hardly appear transferable to services (Sundbo 
1997). For example, the main criteria for measuring innovation in tech-
nology, such as number of patents or research and development budgets, 
do not seem to be valid measures of services. In the same way, innova-
tion in services is often less tangible, more human and relational than 
technological (Warrant 2001; De Jong and Vermeulen 2003). Finally, 
within services, specific forms of innovation can be found (for example, 
“tailored” innovations that exist in numerous business to business service 
sectors, but not necessarily in the environment of retail banking), which 
encourage researchers to focus on a single sector: insurance (Gallouj and 
Gallouj 1997), hospitals (Djellal and Gallouj 2005), audit (Gallouj and 
Gallouj 1996), and so forth. Some authors writing on banking innova-
tions either focused on the development of new products (De Jong and 
Vermeulen 2003), or considered that banks could not innovate outside 
new technologies (Karmarkar 2000; Ding et al. 2007). In our opinion, a 
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framework for the assessment of innovations in the retail-banking sector 
is missing. 
Innovation refers to the creation of value, directed mainly at the custom-
er, but also being able to concern other parties such as the organization 
itself (Flipo 2001). Innovations can also involve several dimensions (Av-
lonitis et al. 2001; Djellal and Gallouj 2001): the concept of service, pro-
cess (information system or method of work), the organization (hierar-
chical level, structures, and so forth) and the type of external relation 
(such as new types of interface or intervention of an intermediary). We 
consider that innovation exists when there are deliberate actions aimed at 
profiting by modification (De Jong and Vermeulen 2003). By using this 
definition, the objective of this chapter is to better define what banking 
innovations cover, to show that there are several categories of innova-
tion in retail banking, and to suggest a typology. 
In the first part, a literature review of the main work on innovation in 
the banking sector as well as in services in general leads to the proposi-
tion of a typology. In the second part, the proposed typology is applied 
to the case of the main French retail bank: Crédit Agricole (CA). This 
case study also illustrates that an innovation is not an isolated phenome-
non in the organization. We shall try to show how a first innovation can 
engender a series of others. 
 
Looking for Innovations in Banks 
 
Having explained why innovation is an issue that particularly affected 
banks since the mid-1980s, we present a synthesis of the literature on 
innovation in the banking sector. The synthesis has two limitations: (a) a 
focalization of research on new offers (visible innovations for custom-
ers) and (b) technological progress as the major source of innovation. 
We will try, then, to propose a typology of innovations that allows a bet-
ter explanation of the variety of banking innovations. 
A Banking Sector in Full Mutation that Urges Banks to Innovate 
Since the mid-1980s, the French banking sector has experienced pro-
found changes, which stimulated banks to evolve from a structural and 
strategic point of view, notably forcing them to develop their innovation 
practices. 
World deregulation and the French banking law of 1984 put an end to a 
period during which the French banks were “a little protected” 
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(Zollinger and Lamarque 2004). This legal evolution changed the com-
petitive landscape profoundly by modifying the positions of traditional 
banks and by favoring the arrival of new entrants on the banking market. 
Besides foreign banks, two new types of actors appeared: large-scale re-
tailers and insurance companies. The leaders of large retailers did not 
hesitate to create their own banks (for example, Accord for Auchan, and 
S2P for Carrefour) and to offer credit cards and other financial services 
to their customers. Insurance companies also penetrated the banking 
sector by relying on important portfolios of particular customers (for ex-
ample, Axa Bank and AGF Bank). Consequently, competition intensified 
strongly, and the market for the main banking services (accounts, checks, 
credit cards, and so forth) reached saturation (97% of the French popu-
lation possesses a bank account, according to Lamarque 2003). 
At the same time, banks have to face greater demands from their cus-
tomers, notably in the transparency of invoicing and return on invest-
ments. Better educated customers want to optimize their financial man-
agement and they do not hesitate to appeal to consumer associations in 
case of litigation. Many people are clients at several banks and they play 
the competition to obtain preferential treatment (for example, with re-
gard to property loans). 
Finally, at the technological level, progress in information and communi-
cation technology revolutionized the functioning of banks. If banks have 
had to cope with new types of competitors (the “virtual” banks, which 
have very limited physical infrastructures), leading them to seek solutions 
to reduce their operating costs, they have also benefited from Internet 
opportunities to communicate with their customers in different ways, 
and to offer new services. The costs of integrating these new technolo-
gies are particularly heavy; thus, banks have had to make trade-offs in 
terms of the allocation of resources, both financial and human. All of 
these regulatory, sociological and technological changes have resulted in 
a renewal of the way in which banking is designed, and a change in man-
agement practices (Zollinger and Lamarque 2004). The banks have had 
to think about how to create a sustainable competitive advantage. Two 
generic strategies (Porter 1982) are being used in a complementary man-
ner: reducing the costs and differentiation. Cost reduction concerns 
mainly the “production” of the service or what is called the “back-
office” (De Coussergues 2007). Thanks to computers, banks seek to 
minimize the price of routine operations and to carry them out in a cen-
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tralized fashion. Differentiation has several aspects. Thus, despite many 
regulatory constraints that banks have to face (including supervision by 
the authorities, which severely limits the scope for creating new prod-
ucts), they regularly try to launch new offerings (Oseo 2005). Then, as 
they cannot play on the price (there are few references to prices in the 
commercial messages, the impact of this factor is low—Ferrary 1997), 
nor on offered yields, they are trying to find other ways of differentia-
tion, through a better quality of service (Zollinger and Lamarque 2004): 
product customization, setting up new distribution channels (for exam-
ple, the Internet) that allow greater proximity to the customer, better 
service availability, and greater speed of transactions. 
We can see the challenge of innovation emerging: whether to lower costs 
or to differentiate themselves, banks need to innovate in order to remain 
competitive in the market (Reidenbach and Moak 1986; Storey and Eas-
ingwood 1993; Drew 1994). Despite the challenge and the reality of the-
se practices, there are few researchers who are interested in banking in-
novation (Reidenbach and Moak 1986; De Jong and Vermeulen 2003; 
Athanassopoulou and Johne 2004; Menor and Roth 2006). They adopt a 
fragmented view of innovation and focus either on the development of 
new services, or on the impact of technological progress on the func-
tioning of companies. 
 
The Major Limitations of Current Research 
 
Earlier research on innovation in banking has raised the question of the 
existence of innovations and their strategic importance. According to 
Reidenbach and Moach (1986) and Reidenbach and Grubs (1987), banks 
do not always consider innovation as a means of development. However, 
those that establish and formalize development programs for new prod-
ucts perform better than others, whatever their size. Näslund (1986), in 
his comparison between financial and industrial innovations, shows that 
banks innovate, but these innovations are easier to imitate than in indus-
try because they are easier to implement. A bank that innovates will ben-
efit from its lead in the market only for a very short time, because its 
competitors will quickly imitate the new product, which cannot be pa-
tented. 
As we can see, previous research was only interested in what the Anglo-
Saxon literature called NSD (new services development—Sundbo 1997). 
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Some additional works (for example, De Jong and Vermeulen 2003; 
Athanassopoulou and Johne 2004; Menor and Roth 2006) also ignore 
other types of innovation, such as those affecting the process of issuing 
the service. However, technological progress has affected many facets of 
bank functioning, especially the back office. For example, the automa-
tion of many administrative tasks has allowed officers to spend more 
time with customers and evolve toward more trade missions and advice. 
The banking business is often regarded as being one of the most ex-
posed to informatics mutations (Cooper and De Brentani 1991). 
Based on this influence of technological and computer progress, Barras 
(1986 and 1990) has constructed a theory of technological innovation 
diffusion in services. The installation of a new computer system by a 
bank causes a succession of innovations, which can be described in three 
stages: 
 
1. The learning of new software at first causes incremental process 
innovations, designed to improve the efficiency of service (such as 
the automation of back-office banks by the introduction of com-
puters). 
2. As a second step, we can observe an improvement in the quality of 
service through more radical process innovation (such as the bank-
ing ATM, which can cut costs and improve the quality of service). 
3. Finally, product innovations may emerge (home banking). 
 
For Barras, innovation does not exist outside technological possibilities. 
In line with his work, several authors focused on the role of technology 
in banking innovations (Karmarkar 2000; Ding et al. 2007). Ding et al. 
(2007) focused on the development of self-service activities (hydrants 
rebate check, print account statements, and so forth), and considered 
that technology is an essential resource that all banks must master. 
However, if the impact of technology on innovation in the banking sec-
tor is undeniable, it seems that banks can develop innovations outside 
technology (Eiglier and Langeard 1987; Gadrey et al. 1995; Sundbo 
1997; Djellal and Gallouj 2001; Flipo 2001; Kandampully 2002; Abi 
Saab and Gallouj 2003). Technology is only a component of the delivery 
system. Other factors may be at the root of innovations: deregulation 
allowing the introduction of new services that were previously prohibit-
ed, changing behavior of customers who show new requirements or 
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new needs, increasing competitive intensity that pushes banks to differ-
entiate themselves and to develop new human resource skills (Tremblay 
1989; Gallouj and Gallouj 1997). In addition, banking innovations are 
not always very visible. This is the case with social innovations (Warrant 
2001), which relate to the behavior of individuals (new roles that are al-
located to employees of the company, for example). However, the hu-
man dimension is often forgotten. Finally, the Barras model indicates 
that banks have rather reactive behavior in relation to innovation. As 
Gallouj (2002) suggests, this seems to be a simplistic vision of reality. 
In summary, neither approach focuses on NSD, nor do approaches 
based on the impact of technology consider the heterogeneity of banking 
innovations. That is why we develop a typology that fills this gap by ad-
dressing the diversity of innovations better. 
 
Proposal for a Typology Covering the Variety of Banking 
Innovations 
 
There are few authors who have tried to compile a typology of innova-
tions in banking. Existing works are linked to the NSD and are thus par-
tial. Karmarkar (2000) focuses only on services in connection with the 
new information and communication technologies (Internet, telephone, 
interactive terminals, and so forth) and proposes a two-axis typology: the 
mode of access to the service (centralized: the client must move, or de-
centralized: the client has access to the service without moving), and the 
cost of access to the technology (a continuum from low to high). 
We have expanded our field of investigation to the literature on innova-
tion in services in general. We found several typologies. 
Most of these typologies are constructed from a single dimension: 
 
– The element affected by innovation (product, process or organiza-
tion, criteria that draw on the work of Djellal and Gallouj 2001 as 
well as Hamdouch and Samuelides 2001). 
– The degree of novelty of innovation, which can also be combined 
with the risk level of innovation (incremental, radical or total inno-
vation, based on Dumont 2001). 
– The method of production of innovation (with the participation of 
the client or not—Sundbo and Gallouj 1998). 
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These criteria, although relevant, are used in a very isolated way and do 
not appear to be able to fully encompass the variety of innovations in 
banking. The combined use of two criteria would doubtless refine exist-
ing typologies. There are some classifications that are apparently built on 
several criteria, but these are not always clarified (Gallouj and Gallouj 
1997; de Vries 2006). None of the existing typologies therefore seems 
operational enough to identify the different types of innovation that can 
exist in the banking sector. That is why, without denying the contribu-
tion of this earlier work but, on the contrary, trying to summarize it, we 
are proposing a two-dimensional matrix (Table 1). The first dimension 
relates to the subject of innovation—the element that will be affected by 
the novelty. The second dimension focuses on the degree of novelty of 
an innovation. For the first criterion (the subject of innovation), we 
chose to use the Eiglier and Langeard (1987) model, which identifies five 
components in a servuction system (a neologism used by the authors to 
describe the production of a service). The system of internal organization 
(also called the “back-office” or “backstage” in Lovelock and Lapert 
1999), includes all the traditional functions of the company not seen by 
the customer (marketing services, HRM, purchasing, and so forth) and 
how these services work (their working methods, equipment, infor-
mation system …). In the front office, we find tellers (advisers), the 
physical medium, which is the equipment used by the staff or clients in 
the issuance of the service (bank, robots, but also more generally in the 
premises where the service is delivered) and the customer, who will be 
more-or-less involved in the production of the service (he may, in some 
cases, define the problem and/or assume a number of operational tasks). 
Finally, the system issues a “product”—the service itself—which corre-
sponds to the offer that is made to the customer. The advantage of this 
model is that it differentiates more components of a service than the 
mere criterion product/process/organization model, and it makes it pos-
sible to distinguish between what is visible to the customer and what is 
not. This model allows us to show an essential constituent of the system 
in the case of banks: the back office, where fundamental skills are often 
located. 
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functions, 
information 
system … 
   
* Innovation that is invisible to the customer. 
** Innovation that is visible to the customer. 
Table 1: Proposal for a retail banking typology 
 
The second dimension focuses on the degree of novelty of an innova-
tion. This criterion makes it possible to identify whether banks are able 
to develop innovations other than minor ones, as critics often contend. 
We distinguish three levels of innovation: incremental innovations, 
which relate to items already in the bank, which were either improved or 
recombined (within the meaning of Gallouj and Weinstein 1997)—that is 
to say grouped or organized differently; radical innovations that desig-
nate the introduction of new elements to the company (but which can 
also exist in other banks), and finally, total innovations that result in the 
introduction of an entirely new element, new both to the company and 
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to its environment (an element that has not existed before at any of the 
competitors). We propose now to test our typology it on the heterogene-
ity of banking innovations within the first French retail bank, Crédit 
Agricole. 
 
Methodologies and Results 
 
In this section, we begin with an overview of the methodology used to 
better understand innovations in the bank that was studied. Then we will 
explain and place each innovation in our typology. Finally, we select two 
examples of innovations to better detail them, and especially to highlight 
a phenomenon we have seen many times: the cascade effect of innova-
tions. 
 
Sampling 
 
To assess the relevance of our typology, we chose to study the case of a 
retail bank in depth. The objective was to identify the various innova-
tions of the company over the last decade and to classify them. The aim 
of the case study was therefore to describe and to illustrate (Hlady-Rispal 
2002). 
The case has been selected to illustrate the phenomenon studied. We 
chose Crédit Agricole for different reasons. Crédit Agricole is the first 
French credit institution. Its own funds came to 69.4 billion euros in 
June 2007, it has more than 80,080 employee, and its market share in re-
tail banking has been over 25% since its acquisition of Credit Lyonnais. 
As a leader in the retail market, the bank seemed to develop a large 
number of innovations. It was also regarded as one of the most dynamic 
banks in the market (Ferrary 1997). 
As the Crédit Agricole is very decentralized, with 41 autonomous region-
al entities, we chose to focus our attention on the functioning of one of 
these entities2. Each entity has a certain freedom; although, in most cas-
es, it adopts innovations developed by the headquarters, it is authorized 
to propose its own innovations. 
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Data Collection and Analyses 
 
In order to identify innovation practices within the regional entity, we 
performed ten semi-structured interviews (see Table 2), with an average 
duration of one-and-a-half hours. These interviews were designed to fa-
cilitate an understanding of the key innovations developed over the pre-
vious decade, their nature, their origins, their degree of novelty and their 
strategic impact on the entity. 
 
Duration Function of interviewee Innovations studied Date 
1h45 Marketing manager Mozaic / green points / products  
for seniors / new agency concept 
04/05/07 
2h00 Vice director of the 
bank 
Insurance / mozaic / green 
points / products for seniors / 
new agency concept 
30/05/07 
1h30 Bank service manager Products for cross-border 
workers / intelligent billing 
05/07/07 
1h00 Agency manager Products for cross-border 
workers 
04/07/07 
1h45 Check service officer Automation of check deposit 09/07/07 
2h00 International service 
employee 
Products for cross-border 
workers 
21/08/07 
1h00 Marketing manager 
assistant 
Mozaic / green points / products 
for seniors / new agency concept 
09/07/07 
1h30 Geographical area 
manager 
Products for cross-border 
workers 
20/08/07 
2h30 Marketing manager 
 
Products for cross-border 
workers / Mozaic / IHM / 
seniors / new agency concept / 
green points / new methods of 
diagnosis /  
square habitat 
04/01/08 
1h30 Logistics officer New agency concept/, IHM 
ergonomics / intelligent billing 
08/01/08 
Table 2: An overview of the interviews conducted within the regional bank 
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These interviews were supplemented by internal secondary data (internal 
memoranda written by the headquarters, presentations of innovations to 
employees) and external (newspapers articles). The codification has been 
done according to the recommendations made by Miles and Huberman 
(2003). Each interview was encoded and gradually refined during the re-
search. This was achieved as soon as possible after each interview and 
was the basis for the preparation of subsequent discussions. We also 
compared the information, when possible, and made a triangulation be-
tween the primary and secondary data. 
 
The Case of Crédit Agricole 
 
The regional entity of Crédit Agricole has regularly innovated or adopted 
innovations from the headquarters over the past decade. We particularly 
focused on the 13 most frequent innovations. Each innovation is pre-
sented using the same structure: first (a) a general description of the in-
novation and its context, then (b) an explanation of its position within 
the typology. 
 
Mozaic 
INNOVATION IN A FEW WORDS: this is a specific product for people aged 
from 10 to 25 years. The Mozaic account holders have a service package, 
which may include various banking products (checking account, credit 
card, student loan at preferential rates and no fees), as well as other ben-
efits (discounts on the products of corporate partners like cinema tickets, 
CD, invitations to the event operations, driving licence and so forth). 
POSITIONING IN THE MATRIX: this innovation is a new offer, which is 
incremental in nature. The various services existed, they were combined 
through the establishment of a package, and improved (that is to say, 
adapted to the specific needs of the target). 
 
Loans for seniors 
INNOVATION IN A FEW WORDS: the bank offers older people packages 
that include consumer loans, mortgages (such as a lifetime mortgage 
loan), transmission conventions (such as life insurance contracts) with 
the heirs, and so forth. 
POSITIONING IN THE MATRIX: this new offer is incremental as it is an 
assembly and an enhancement of pre-existing offerings. 
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New Methods of Diagnosis 
INNOVATION IN A FEW WORDS: the establishment of diagnostic tools in 
the agencies to facilitate the work of consultants: insurance, savings, 
credit, tax optimization, transmission and so forth. These formalization 
innovations (as defined in Sundbo and Gallouj 1998) help the staff struc-
ture interviews with issues that help them to understand the customer. 
POSITIONING IN THE MATRIX: incremental innovation of front office 
enabling the staff to propose offers nearer to the needs and expectations 
of customers. 
 
Improved Ergonomics of Man-Machine Interfaces (MMI) 
INNOVATION IN A FEW WORDS: the general thinking on the use of bank-
ing equipment concerns different aspects. It applies to both customers 
and the back office (employees at headquarters or agency network). With 
regard to the customers, the introduction of machines requires manage-
ment of the interface in order to facilitate their use (colors, provision of 
the text, data density, placement of buttons, writing messages, and so 
on.). For example, in the early robots, customers first received the mon-
ey and then withdrew the card. But many clients were taking the money 
and forgetting to withdraw their card. This caused many to oppose the 
technology and an additional workload for staff. Following new devel-
opments, the two actions have been reversed. 
In the back office, there were large changes with the collaboration of 
Google for employees’ computers (easier access to information through 
a more fluid navigation; search assistance by topic on the intranet since 
November 2007, and so forth). 
POSITIONING IN THE MATRIX: we therefore have both an incremental 
innovation in the front office (visible to the customer) on the physical 
medium, which is being constantly improved thanks to the behavior of 
customers towards automated machines, but also an incremental innova-
tion in the back office. 
 
Pacifica (Property Insurance) 
INNOVATION IN A FEW WORDS: CA has embarked on insurance of prop-
erty (such as vehicles and furniture) via a subsidiary, Pacifica. It has of-
fered its customers packages and credit insurance. But unlike the compe-
tition, the CA was the first bank to establish a direct link between the 
garage, the expert, and the insured. The insured has a single interlocutor 
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and also benefits from fast service (file treatment within 48 hours). Final-
ly, the product is new: re-equipment without any conditions. 
POSITIONING IN THE MATRIX: this is a new product that corresponds to 
a radical innovation for the company (the “property insurance” service is 
new to the CA), which had to learn new skills outside its core business 
(the creation of a subsidiary called UDM: Unit for Disaster Manage-
ment). Naturally, this innovation is not new to the market, because of 
the prior existence of insurers offering essentially the same type of ser-
vice. 
 
Square Habitat 
INNOVATION IN A FEW WORDS: CA opened real-estate agencies, which 
issue a global transaction, lease, or property management. The CA has, 
for example, created the Green Mandate. The new mandate allows the 
seller to receive compensation if his property has not been sold after 
three months and one day. In addition, the CA is committed to making 
the seller announcement every week in newspapers and provides the 
publications evidence. 
POSITIONING IN THE MATRIX: radical innovation for the company, 
which is deploying to a new function—that of real estate agent. Crédit 
Agricole had to learn new skills outside its core business. Before 2006, 
the CA real estate sales were limited to credit financing and the promo-
tion and sale of products to new investors. However, this activity is not 
new to the market because the basic service was already provided by tra-
ditional real estate agents. 
 
The Online Bank 
INNOVATION IN A FEW WORDS: an Internet site allows easy access to ac-
counts and provides an opportunity to be closer to the bank without 
moving (accounts are available 24 hours per day, seven days per week for 
conducting online transactions and account management). 
POSITIONING IN THE MATRIX: this is a front-office innovation (teller, 
physical support, customer participation) as it is a new distribution chan-
nel. It is radical for the company but not for the market as CA was not 
the first bank to launch the concept. 
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Intelligent Billing System 
INNOVATION IN A FEW WORDS: the new intelligent billing aims to cus-
tomize the pricing of services depending on the customer (age, status as 
a “good” customer, and so on). It leads to a better understanding of the 
customer, thanks to the recording and analysis of data. These data can 
then help customize the offer and retain customers. 
POSITIONING IN THE MATRIX: back-office innovation (invisible to the 
customer), which required the deployment of an ad hoc computer sys-
tem to identify the customer history: simulation and diagnostic software 
to adapt offers to customers. It is a radical innovation for the company, 
which required new computer skills. 
 
Products for Cross-Border Workers 
INNOVATION IN A FEW WORDS: due to the specificity of the market, 
there are many products for cross-border workers within the regional 
entity (there are a great number of cross-border customers, with high 
purchasing power and with specific expectations). Among a wide range 
of new offerings, we can include the transfer of cross-border wages to 
their current accounts in France (which necessitated the establishment of 
a partnership with foreign banks), loans in foreign currencies (for con-
sumption or real estate) at fixed or variable rates, and savings products 
that protect customers from volatile exchange rates. 
POSITIONING IN THE MATRIX: CA has been a pioneer in setting up these 
specific offers for cross-borders. They are total innovations (new for the 
competitive environment). Although competition has since sought to 
imitate these offers, CA remains “one step ahead” through its longer ex-
perience. 
 
Green Points 
INNOVATION IN A FEW WORDS: CA gives some merchants located in ru-
ral areas the opportunity to deliver banking services to their customers 
(cash withdrawal, money transfer, booking a credit card, and so on). This 
helps them maintain a close relationship with customers in geographical 
areas where there is no agency. A new regulatory constraint is at the 
origin of this innovation, which for security reasons prohibits advisers 
from carrying money outside the agencies. 
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POSITIONING IN THE MATRIX: this is a new distribution channel. This is 
a total innovation for the environment: no other bank had proposed 
such a “channel” for distribution. 
 
The New Agency Concept 
INNOVATION IN A FEW WORDS: The CA has a very dense entities net-
work which is a prerequisite for a local strategy. The network determines 
the frequency of contacts and requires the development of infrastruc-
tures to reduce operating costs and improve advices. To this end, the CA 
has developed the ATICA device, which aims to renovate agencies by 
integrating automatic machines, which allow greater autonomy to cus-
tomers and 24-hour availability for current operations, and thus reposi-
tion staff (advisers) on operations with higher added value. 
POSITIONING IN THE MATRIX: front-office innovation with a redefinition 
of the staff mission, an investment in a wide range of automatic ma-
chines (physical media), and the greater involvement of customers. On 
this innovation, CA has been a pioneer and has the broadest automated 
network in France: it is therefore a total innovation. 
 
New Check Processing 
INNOVATION IN A FEW WORDS: the creation of a subsidiary, the Centre 
of Processing and Payment Operations (CETOP) for check processing. 
Checks are scanned by retailers or individuals (via a machine in the agen-
cy) and the information (amount, customer identification) is stored. This 
information is directly sent to the CA platform. This helps to secure 
transactions (there is no problem of the loss of checks), and to credit 
customers much faster (the period is reduced to one day whereas it was 
on average three days before the implementation of this process). 
POSITIONING IN THE MATRIX: this is a back-office innovation for which 
CA had to acquire new technological and organizational skills and make 
major investments. Moreover, this innovation is a total innovation for 
the competitive environment since CA was the first bank to introduce 
this type of organization (some competitors outsource their own check 
processing to CA). 
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Table 3: Crédit Agricole’s innovations 
 
All these innovations have been positioned in the matrix (Table 3). It 
would therefore appear that our typology is not only able to encompass 
the variety of innovations (despite their heterogeneity), but can also dis-
tinguish between them. 
Several observations can be made on the relevance of this matrix. First, 
we could not find an example of innovation that focused only on the 
evolution of the degree of participation of the customer. We thought it 
was quite rare in retail banking that for the participation of customers to 
change without either the introduction of a new physical medium or a 
proposal by tellers. But the marketing director of the regional entity, who 
effectively recognized that no innovation of this kind had been devel-
oped in the bank, confirmed the existence of such innovations among 
competitors3. Where innovations for improvements relate to the com-
ponents of the front office (teller or physical medium), the major part of 
most radical innovations appears at the launch of a new distribution 
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channel (green points, a new concept of agency, or online banking), 
which, in fact, affects the three components of the front office. 
These examples of banking innovation also allow us to draw a number 
of conclusions. If technological progress opens up many tracks of inno-
vation (online banking, check processing . . .), both in the front office 
and back office, a number of innovations remains unconnected with new 
technologies. This is the case with all the new offerings studied (products 
for cross-border workers, Pacifica, Square Habitat, and so on), some dis-
tribution channels (such as green points) or innovative forms of formali-
zation (new diagnosis methods). The easing of regulations, new customer 
needs, and competitors’ innovations as potential sources of innovation 
are at least as important as (if not more important than) the information 
and communication technologies. 
These cases of innovation also show that retail banks are able to produce 
innovations with a high degree of novelty (radical innovations, or even 
total innovations), even though some of them are invisible to customers 
(that is the case of innovations that relate to the back office, as in check 
processing). In this case, the question is: “how can a bank create value 
for customers and enhance its competitive advantage?” The answer lies 
in the lower cost and therefore in the price, or in the quality improve-
ment of the offered service. The competitive advantage that this type of 
“hidden” innovation confers appears perhaps more defensible in the 
long term (its components are indeed less visible to competitors, as they 
are embedded in the structure of the company). 
This analysis enables us to highlight a characteristic of the banking sector 
that some researchers have already identified in other sectors (Warrant 
2001): the “cascading ffect” of innovations. 
 
Cascade Effects of Banking Innovations 
 
Several of the innovations studied have led to a series of other innova-
tions in different places in the servuction system (see Table 4) regardless 
of their initial goal (to propose a new service for the customer or im-
prove the back office). So a spread of innovations progressively touches 
other elements, or even the entire system. This phenomenon appears as 
a thin red line in the works of Barras (1986 and 1990), and later much 
more in that of Warrant (2001). However, in addition to this research, 
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our analysis shows that these effects, which can be described as “snow-
ball” or “cascade” effects, can be unrelated to the use of new technology. 
 
Studied innovations 
N
ew
 o
ff
er
 
New “servuction” process 
Front office* Back 
office** 
Teller Physical medium 
Customer 
participation 
Mozaic + + + – ++ 
Products for seniors + – – – – 
New diagnosis methods  – + – – + 
IHM ergonomics:      
– Automatic machines – – + – – 
– Employees’ computer 
screens – + + – + 
Pacifica ++ ++ ++ – ++ 
Square Habitat ++ ++ ++ – ++ 
Online bank  + ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Intelligent billing – + – – ++ 
Products for cross-border 
workers 
+++ – + + ++ 
Green points  + +++ +++ +++ – 
New agency concept  + +++ +++ +++ + 
Processing of checks + + + + +++ 
Legend: 
– Not an innovation. 
+ Incremental innovation. 
++ Radical innovation for the firm. 
+++ Total innovation for the competitive environment. 
* Innovation which is visible for the customer 
** Support functions, information system … 
Grey cells correspond to the starting point of an innovation. 
Table 4: The cascading effect of the innovations studied 
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A trend also seems to be emerging where the higher the degree of 
novelty of innovations is, the greater the effects on the entire system are. 
A radical or total innovation will have more impact on other parts of the 
system than an incremental one. Finally, we propose that the starting 
point for a series of innovations may be the back office and the front 
office as well as a product. 
To illustrate this cascade effect, we will discuss two examples of innova-
tion with different purposes in more detail (a new product and a back 
office innovation for the other), but the degree of innovation remains 
the same (with reference to our typology, these are total innovations). 
Those innovations are products for cross-border workers and processing of checks. 
Let us return for a minute to the presentation of these two innovations 
before describing their impact on the servuction system. 
The raison d’être of the processing of checks innovation was to cut costs be-
cause it was difficult to bill the customer. For that purpose, CA estab-
lished a new organization. As a first step, the customer can file checks 24 
hours daily using a scanner. The images of checks are then sent to a cen-
tral platform that manages the flow of the different agencies and that 
credits customers. Two video-coding workshops correct any errors (in-
correctly read checks) and the Cetop (central check processing) compare 
the image files of the platform and the real checks. The subsidiary then 
distributes these checks to the various regional entities and to competing 
banks (checks of less than 5,000 euros are archived for 60 days and 
DVDs are returned to agencies each day). 
This back-office innovation has caused other innovations at various lev-
els of the servuction system. Indeed, at the front office, it has meant: 
 
– an increase in the degree of customer involvement by scanning 
their own checks4; 
– the introduction of new physical media (successive generations of 
scanners); 
– the reduction of staff associated with check administration. 
 
The supply has also been improved because the customer is now credit-
ed to D+1 instead of D+3. 
With regard to products for cross-border workers, the activity of offering new 
services to such clients with special needs (transfer of wages collateral-
ized exchange, loans in currency at fixed rates . . .) was accompanied by 
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changes in physical media (specific space created on the web site and 
new machines to change currency), and the back office. Changes in the 
back office included the development of new computer programs to 
monitor the stock markets and to offer customers a competitive ex-
change rate, and partnership with a foreign bank in charge of aggregating 
wages filed by the cross-border workers in different banks in the cross-
border country before making the transfer to the CA in France. 
This cascade of innovations suggests that a bank that wishes to innovate 
drastically needs to be able to change the various components of the ser-
vice system in a coherent manner (Warrant 2001). It must anticipate the 
impact of a radical innovation, which can affect different parts of the 
servuction system. 
Doubt also remains regarding the relevance of research that is only inter-
ested in the development of new services. Such research can only have a 
fragmented view of mechanisms or outputs of innovation since the in-
troduction of a new offer may produce other types of innovations. The 
performance of a NSD can be linked to another innovation, such as 
back-office innovation. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has attempted to provide a better understanding of the 
forms of innovation in retail banking. The case study within the CA has 
brought four main results: 
Firstly, we can see that banks are able to innovate, and not just incre-
mentally. They are able to commercialize new bids or put in place origi-
nal servuction processes. 
Secondly, whereas literature has often focused on technology as the only 
source of innovation, our results show that banks can develop multiple 
innovations without any technological advances. Thus, regulation and 
the changing needs of customers are also important causes of innova-
tion. 
Thirdly, the typology that we have proposed allows us to overcome 
some limits to previous works, broadening the discussion to all banking 
innovations, and not just to those of new services. In the banking sector 
many back-office innovations exist; these, if they are not visible to the 
customer, may be strategic, particularly by reducing operating costs. The 
bank must then take up the challenge of showing its creation of value to 
its customers. 
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Finally, an innovation is rarely isolated. When it is radical or total, it of-
ten leads to other innovations, located on other components of the ser-
vuction system. The typology developed makes it possible to highlight 
the impact of an innovation on the entire company. 
Further work could usefully complement this research. Our study focus-
es on innovation in a part of the banking sector (retail banking), and only 
on one company (Crédit Agricole). This research must be replicated in 
other banks (Yin 1994), in order to obtain external validity. Moreover, 
future research might show the importance of the process in implement-
ing innovations in the banking sector. Finally, the cascade effect high-
lighted in this chapter should serve to encourage future researchers wish-
ing to work on banking innovation to adopt qualitative methods. These 
make it possible to focus on a more comprehensive and detailed vision 
of innovation—a vision that is useful in order to understand the many 
facets of innovation and to capture the complexity of these cascading 
effects. In line with De Jong and Vermeulen (2003), dealing with the 
process of emergence of innovations, we propose to study these pro-
cesses of the emergence of innovation further, depending on the type of 
innovation developed (Roth 2009; Roth 2010). That way, the cascade 
effect that we have identified could be better appreciated. 
 
Notes 
 
1 “Les mécanismes de l’innovation sont complexes et une abondante 
littérature s’efforce d’éclairer le sujet. Le management des entreprises 
de services est lui aussi complexe et une littérature non moins abon-
dante lui est consacrée. Mais l’intersection de ces deux sujets, 
l’innovation dans les services, forme un ensemble étroit, en France 
comme à l’étranger, et limité à quelques travaux pionniers,” Dumont 
(2001: 14). 
2 For reasons of confidentiality, we do not mention the name of the re-
gional entity. 
3 Thus the Laydernier Bank sets up a sponsorship system for its clients: 
they obtained numerous advantages when they bring people to open a 
bank account. 
4  The customer deposits checks without support from the staff, then 
the receipt is automatically produced by the machines. 
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Hardik Vachhrajani 
THE ROLE OF NON-TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS IN 
THE GROWTH OF THE ENGINEERING INDUSTRY, ECONOMY 
AND SOCIETY OF RAJKOT (INDIA) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years India has emerged as one of the major destinations for 
conducting offshore corporate research and development (R&D). India 
has emerged as a strong outsourcing hub for innovation for industries 
like IT and biotechnology. The 2007–8 edition of The Global Competitive-
ness Report of The World Economic Forum ranks India as 26th worldwide for 
“innovation and sophistication” in the economy, ahead of countries such 
as Spain (31), Italy (32), Portugal (38), Brazil (41), China (50), and the 
Russian Federation (77) (WEF 2007). The Organization for Economic 
Co-Operation (OECD) ranks Indian as being the eighth largest R&D 
investor worldwide. The European Union (EU) counts India among 
“major R&D performing countries in the world” (INNO METRICS 
2006). Many other recent studies suggest India to be one of the most at-
tractive locations worldwide for R&D and innovation offshoring. 
These astonishing figures bring to light a fact that has thus far hardly 
been noticed by the world. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are the 
real backbone of the Indian economy. India has nearly three million 
SMEs, which account for almost 50% of industrial output and 42% of 
India’s total exports. They constitute the largest employment-generating 
sector and are an effective tool for the promotion of balanced regional 
development. They account for 50% of private sector employment and 
30–40% of value addition in manufacturing. 
Indian SMEs are usually family-owned businesses that run on low to 
medium resources with limited manpower. Most of them do not have 
high-end product innovation capabilities such as laboratories or testing 
centers. First- or second-generation entrepreneurs run most of the SMEs 
and they do not let the lack of resources stop them on the way to the 
success of their organization. This lack of resources, in fact, prompts 
them to think differently about their organizational processes and to 
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make new innovations that can help them stay in business or help them 
succeed in competition. As they have few resources to innovate the 
product, they start innovating on other non-technological aspects that 
can give them competitive advantage. The saying “Scarcity is the mother 
of invention” can truly be applied in this case. This area of non-
technological innovation is the least studied in the field of innovation 
research. Non-technological innovations can range from raw material 
innovation to networking or distribution innovation. They play a decisive 
role in the growth and survival of these SMEs. This innovation has be-
come so deep rooted that it has started to affect not only the cluster in 
which the organizations are operating but also the economy and society 
of the region at large. 
The research presented here is an attempt to study the role non-
technological innovations have played in the growth of engineering in-
dustry, economy and society of Rajkot (India) as a whole. 
 
The Context 
 
Rajkot, the central city of Saurashtra region in Gujarat, is located in the 
western part of India, approximately 250 km from Ahmedabad and 650 
km from Mumbai, India’s financial capital. Rajkot has seen industrial 
growth from the early 1940s, when skilled craftsmen migrated to Rajkot 
from Pakistan. The region initiated its manufacturing journey by produc-
ing diesel engines and has moved up the value chain in the last 60 years. 
Today, Rajkot is home to more than seven clusters ranging from the en-
gineering industry, casting and forging to the production of diesel en-
gines, electric motors, oil mill machinery, oil mills, and machine tools. A 
major contributor to the development of Rajkot and its economy has 
been the growth of engineering industry. Today the clusters are thriving; 
they consist of around 3,000 enterprises with a turnover of about Rs. 
3,000 crore and generate employment for more than 100,000 people 
(UNIDO 2004). 
The industry of Rajkot has witnessed a huge upturn in the last six dec-
ades; and has its own set of strengths and weaknesses (Vachhrajani 
2006). 
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The major strengths of industry in Rajkot are: 
 
– Easy availability of raw material (for most of the key industries like 
casting, forging etc.). 
– Cost-effective labor. 
– Availability of highly skilled craftsmen. 
– Easy availability of cost-effective workers. 
– Cluster approach brings competition; competitiveness brings a 
greater number of buyers to Rajkot for their requirements. 
 
The major weaknesses of the industry of Rajkot are: 
 
– Low focus on structured innovation efforts. Innovation efforts in 
Rajkot have been sporadic and have not been professionally exe-
cuted to get maximum leverage. 
– Low awareness about quality requirements. 
– Low technology orientation. 
– Missing professional management approach. First/second-
generation entrepreneurs with the age-old traditions of manufactur-
ing still manage most of the businesses. This does not attract the 
next generation to join the business; because of this, the industry 
suffers from acute succession issues. 
– Unavailability of professionally trained manpower. 
– Low retention ratio of trained manpower. 
 
Key Innovation Imperatives of the Rajkot Region 
 
Industry in Rajkot has been known for its craftsmanship for years and 
has always remained a destination for quality buyers. Rajkot has been in-
novating from its early days in industry. The first innovations came when 
diesel engines of Kirloskar were made in Rajkot, which transformed the 
industrial landscape of the city and made Rajkot India’s leading diesel 
engine manufacturing hub. Even in the worst of times for the diesel en-
gine industry, Rajkot continued innovation with lightweight diesel en-
gines (Nayak 2006). After the decline in the diesel engine business, Raj-
kot has successfully undertaken aggressive innovations in the machine 
tools industry and automobile auxiliary business. 
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Although it was a “push” innovation after a sharp decline in sales be-
cause of technology obsolescence of diesel engines in early 2000, Rajkot 
has taken advantage of the opportunity and has undertaken large-scale 
innovation initiatives, which have helped the industry grow and establish 
its own unique identity. 
Major innovative contributions were in technology; where Rajkot-based 
units started innovating in their old technology products and turned 
them into high-tech products. Machine tools manufacturers such as Jyoti 
CNC and Macpower CNC, who both led this, were conventional lathe 
manufacturers that totally transformed themselves into high-end ma-
chine manufacturers. Rajoo Engineers is another good example of an 
organization that has evolved: it has become a quality plastic industry 
machine manufacturer in the last decade. 
Another set of very important innovations came in the form of process 
innovation undertaken by hundreds of automobile auxiliary units. With a 
strong focus on process control and quality, automobile auxiliary units in 
Rajkot today can produce the best products at the most cost-effective 
rate by leveraging that unique “Rajkot advantage.” Some small but con-
siderable innovations flourished during the same time with the success of 
Balaji Wafers’ new innovation model of “successful packaging, bundled 
with customer friendly pricing and extraordinary reach,” which made it a 
case study worth analyzing and which has kept food giants such as Frito-
Lay guessing as well. It is interesting to study the growth of Balaji Wafers 
in context with other industries of Rajkot (i.e. automobile, machine 
tools). Here there is no spillover, no cluster, and still the company has 
thrived, defying all established advantages of Rajkot. 
This innovation in Rajkot has shaped the city, its economy and culture. 
Rajkot is made of these innovations, and these innovations have their 
own unique “Rajkot” in them. Rajkot serves as the ideal cluster of SMEs 
to study innovations, as such clusters thrive across the country and con-
tribute to the national economic development and employment. Rajkot 
has a strong base for non-technological innovations that are core sup-
porters of the major innovation system of technological innovations. 
Non-technological innovations in fact support the major technological 
innovations taking place in Rajkot. The research undertaken here studied 
the role of non-technological innovations in the growth of the engineer-
ing industry, the engineering SME cluster and the economy of Rajkot. 
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Literature Review 
 
Innovation, the process of bringing new products and services to mar-
ket, is one of the most important issues in business research today. In-
novation is responsible for raising the quality and lowering the prices of 
products and services, which have dramatically improved consumers’ 
lives. By finding new solutions to the problem, innovation destroys exist-
ing markets, transforms old ones, or creates new ones. It can bring down 
giant incumbents while propelling small outsiders into dominating posi-
tions. Innovation has the capacity to transform a regional economy and 
has long-term impacts. 
 
Defining Innovation 
 
Innovation has numerous definitions; however, only those that are uni-
versally accepted and most suitable to the proposed research are exam-
ined here. 
Schumpeter’s (1934, 1950) early research on innovation pointed to the 
following five characteristics: new goods, new processes, new markets, 
new source of supply of raw material, and a new organization status. In-
novation is defined as an interactive process initiated by the perception 
of a new market and/or new service opportunity. 
Galanakis (2006) proposed a much broader definition of innovation: 
 
“The creation of new products, processes, knowledge or service by using new or 
existing scientific or technological knowledge, which provides a degree of novelty 
either to the developer, the industrial sector, the nation or the world to succeed 
in the market place.” 
 
In innovation the important thing is to create some value, and this value 
should be manifested by its acceptance in an existing market of the 
emergence of a new market. 
Rogers (1983) defined innovation as “an idea, practice of object that is 
perceived to be new by an individual or other unit of adoption.” Innova-
tion represents an orientation fundamentally different from the tradi-
tional financial or market outcomes for a firm. Muffato (1998) suggested 
that, in the innovation process, the creation of an innovation climate and 
related professional knowledge and capabilities are needed to support 
innovation activities. Hence, there is a need to change organizational ar-
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rangement and culture in order to foster innovation. This argument is in 
line with human capital theory used to explain an organization’s competi-
tiveness in innovation outcomes as well with multidimensional ap-
proaches to innovation (Roth 2009; Müller, Roth, and Zak 2010; Roth, 
Wetzel, and Müller 2011; Scheiber, Roth, and Reichel 2011). 
 
Innovation and SMEs 
 
Innovation is one of the principal challenges to the management of 
SMEs. Innovation is critical to enable SMEs to compete in domestic and 
global markets. The importance of innovation for SMEs and start-up 
firms was highlighted by various researchers who argued that, due to lack 
of resources, scale diseconomies, and questionable reputation, innova-
tion is the key competitive advantage for SMEs because it depends on 
quality and quantity of R&D personnel and complex social relationships. 
All of these are difficult to copy. 
Large firms have the wherewithal (large-scale production and capacity, as 
well as marketing, financial and R&D infrastructure) to exploit new 
technology. On the other hand, the argument in favor of small firms is 
that they have flexibility in using employees in innovation-related pro-
jects and a less complex management structure when implementing new 
projects. Most empirical studies test the Schumpeterian hypothesis about 
the effect of firm size on invention/innovation activity (input or output) 
at the firm or industry level. 
Small and medium enterprises are renowned for their creativity and new 
product-development capabilities. This applies in particular to SMEs that 
have the ability to innovate effectively and develop new products more 
rapidly than larger firms. Indeed, there was little doubt that SMEs were 
capable of effective innovation. However, many SMEs still fail to see the 
opportunities and advantages that are open to them, such as the flexibil-
ity of customizing products to the requirements of the consumer, and 
advantage adopted by larger firms (O’Regan et al. 2006). Devenport and 
Bibby (1993) state that SMEs increasingly need to develop their innova-
tion capabilities beyond that of technological innovation. This need 
comes from increased agility in larger organizations, which enables them 
to erode traditional SME niche markets. Furthermore, increased interna-
tionalization has encouraged some SMEs to operate in more competitive 
global markets where continual improvement is a prerequisite to innova-
 	  
	  
77 
tion, as distinct from solely technological development. Thus people, 
process, and product dimensions are included (Tidd et al. 2001). Porter 
and Stern (1999) stress that such innovation involves much more than 
just science and technology. 
Bessant and Francis (1998) suggest that effective innovation must in-
volve all areas of an SME with the potential to affect every discipline and 
process (McAdam 2000). Innovation can be transformational, radical or 
incremental depending on the effect and nature of the change. Afuah 
(1998) suggests that innovations do not have to be breakthroughs or 
paradigm shifts, although organizations should strive for larger innova-
tions. 
Although there are a number of studies on continual improvement in 
SMEs (Gunasekaran 1996; Bessant and Caffyn 1997; Bessant and Fran-
cis 1999), there is a relative paucity of in-depth studies of innovation im-
plementation (McAdam 2000) and its impact on the growth of the or-
ganization with reference to SMEs, and there is a huge vacuum when it 
comes to study the role of non-technological innovation in SMEs. It 
cannot be assumed that innovation implementation principles in large 
organizations are directly transferable to SMEs, and that the SME can be 
treated as a scaled-down version of the large organizations. Thus there is 
a need for studies on how innovation is implemented and what the im-
pact of this is on the growth and transformation of the organization, 
which is particularly noticeable in the areas of SMEs and longitudinal 
studies. They stress the need for further innovation research in these are-
as. 
 
The Role of Innovation in the Growth of SMEs 
 
Growth is considered to be an outcome of the change process in the or-
ganization. So all theories that relate to the organizational change would 
be reviewed, along with special references to innovation and subsequent 
change that it has brought in the organizational framework. There are a 
series of cases that track innovation and organizational growth like the 
case of Cadila in India (Manimala 1993) and the global ones of Motorola, 
GE, and so forth. 
The relationship between innovation and growth can be described as 
something of a paradox—on the one hand, a broad range of theoretical 
and descriptive accounts of firm growth stress the important role inno-
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vation plays for firms wishing to expand their market share. For exam-
ple, Carden (2005) presents the main results of the McKinsey Global 
Survey of Business Executives, and writes that “executives overwhelm-
ingly say that innovation is what their companies need most for growth.” 
Another survey of Accenture says that 95% of executives believe that 
innovation is critical to their organizational growth. Another survey fo-
cusing on SMEs reports that investment in product innovation is the 
single most popular strategy for expansion, a finding which holds across 
various industries (Hay and Kamshad 1994). Economic theorizing also 
recognizes the centrality of innovation in the growth of a firm. 
On the other hand, empirical studies have had difficulty in identifying 
any strong link between innovation and growth, and the results have of-
ten been modest and disappointing. Indeed, some studies fail to find any 
influence of innovation on growth at all. Commenting on the current 
state of our understanding of firm-level processes of innovation, Cefis 
and Orsenigo (2001) write: 
 
“Linking more explicitly the evidence on the patterns of innovation with what is 
known about firms growth and other aspects of corporate performance—both at 
the empirical and at the theoretical level—is a hard but urgent challenge for fu-
ture research.” 
 
A major difficulty in observing the effect of innovation on growth is that 
a firm may take a long time to convert economically valuable knowledge 
(i.e. innovation) into economic performance. Even after an important 
discovery has been made, a firm will typically have to invest heavily in 
product development. In addition, converting a product idea into a set of 
successful manufacturing procedures and routines may also prove to be 
costly and difficult. Furthermore, even after an important discovery has 
been patented, a firm in an uncertain market environment may prefer to 
treat the patent as a “real option” and delay the associated investment 
and development costs (Bloom and Van Reenen 2002). There may there-
fore be a considerable lag between the time of discovery of a valuable 
innovation and its conversion into commercial success. Another feature 
of the innovation process is that there is uncertainty at every stage, and 
that the overall outcome requires success at each step of the process. 
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Rajkot’s Cluster, Industry and Its Growth 
 
After reviewing innovation literature and its role in the growth of SMEs, 
let us examine innovation in Rajkot. Rajkot’s industry more-or-less fol-
lows the diamond model suggested by Porter and Stern (1999). The 
model, established by Yorkshire Forward in A Guide to Cluster Development 
(2006), truly represents the Rajkot’s industry. 
 
Figure 1: Yorkshire model for cluster growth (Source: Porter and Stern 1999). 
 
– Company rivalry and collaboration: horizontally and vertically the organ-
izations of Rajkot are very well integrated. They compete for the 
utmost cost reduction but also collaborate to procure raw material 
or work at the best rates. 
– Input or factor conditions: Rajkot has favorable input conditions such 
as easy availability of raw material and cost-effective sub-processors 
and assemblers. 
– Supply chain conditions: a supply chain can easily be established in the 
industry of Rajkot as there are numerous workers available 
– Customers: Rajkot is the largest customer for its own products. In 
the year 2006–2007, Rajkot and nearby areas purchased around 300 
CNC machines (70% of the total production of both the large-scale 
CNC manufacturers) (company data).] 
 
A model like this has created an environment conducive for industry in 
Rajkot. The seeds of the industrial cluster of Rajkot were sown in the 
1940s when entrepreneurs began manufacturing the spare parts of diesel 
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engines. Diesel engines were the lifeline for agriculture in the water-
scarce Saurashtra region. In the 1930s, all diesel engines were imported 
from abroad. During the Second World War, there was a problem arising 
from the lack of availability of imported spare parts, which meant that 
users faced difficulties in repairing diesel engines. To overcome that 
problem, some pro-active entrepreneurs started manufacturing diesel 
engine spare parts in the 1940s, and later they started manufacturing the 
entire diesel engine. Entrepreneurs joined Laxmanrao Kirloskar and 
started assembling/manufacturing diesel engine and parts, and this gave 
birth to the engineering cluster at Rajkot. The industry received further 
impetus after independence when industrial estates were set up in 
Saurashtra State, including Rajkot. Meanwhile, subsidies on the purchase 
of diesel engines by farmers continued to boost this industry. Gradually, 
Rajkot emerged as a key center for the production of slow-speed, low-
horsepower diesel engines by small-scale enterprises, while the old, es-
tablished, and larger enterprises in the organized sector shifted to more 
sophisticated, higher speed, and high-power engines. NABARD provid-
ed funds to the state-level banks for land development and the diesel en-
gine was included in their national level scheme. Support and allied in-
dustries like foundry and forging also emerged and machine tools were 
also manufactured in the cluster. There was horizontal growth and other 
products like agricultural implements, kitchenware, pumps, watchcases, 
and so forth, were manufactured in this cluster. These clusters thrived 
because of their “first mover advantages,” despite the fact that both raw 
material and the bulk of the final consumers were located outside the 
region. 
After liberalization the industry had its own ups and downs, the most 
surprising being the death of the diesel engine industry, which had 
served as the mother industry for Rajkot. Rajkot’s industry adjusted posi-
tively to this shock, and successfully diversified into various other indus-
trial products and has been able to create its own niche in the market. 
Most of the products are basically industrial in nature and the customer 
base consists of reputed units like Bajaj Auto, TELCO, Kirloskar, Kinet-
ic, Mahindra & Mahindra, Gujarat Tractors, and so forth. The allied sup-
port firms include 400 foundries, 1,000 enterprises engaged in assem-
bling and sub-assembling, 30 enterprises that manufacture agricultural 
equipment including assembled products and spare parts, 200+ enter-
prises engaged in submersible pumps and 2,000 units engaged in produc-
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ing machine-tools parts, diesel engine parts, agricultural implement parts, 
pumps, motors, and so on. There are other units that supply cutting 
tools, cutting oil, pig iron, scrap, plating chemicals, foundry chemicals, 
and so forth. 
Research on industry in Rajkot is largely confined to the study of the de-
velopment of clusters and its implications on the area (UNIDO 2002–
2005). In the cluster framework, the diesel engine has still dominated the 
research. WTO and Survival of Small-Scale Industry: The Five Myth Entrepre-
neurial Framework with the Case Study of Rajkot Diesel Engine Industry by 
Shukla (referred by to Vachhrajani Hardik B.) depicts details about the 
entrepreneurship and the diesel engine cluster. There have been few 
studies on the entrepreneurship pattern of Rajkot. The Entrepreneurship 
Development Institute (EDI) and the Indian Institute of Management at 
Ahmedabad lead most of the key research. There are no major studies 
conducted on the innovation in region but Chandra (2006) compares 
three clusters, TAMA of Japan, Wenzhou of China, and Rajkot of India. 
The study yields a detailed comparative study of the pattern found 
amongst all three clusters. An extended search has made it clear that 
there is no literature available on non-technological innovation in Rajkot. 
Chandra (2006) studies the role of innovation in the cluster of Rajkot, 
but the research focuses only on technological innovations of the cluster 
and those to which it is compared. This research into non-technological 
innovation is thus an attempt to create literature an area that is critical 
for industry and society in Rajkot. 
 
Methodology 
 
The methodology used for the research is that of qualitative grounded 
theory as proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). The researchers visited 
ten engineering organizations that have been in the engineering business 
in Rajkot for more than ten year; the researchers are thus aware of the 
whole life cycle of the business. The organizations are also considered to 
be pioneering organizations in the field of engineering in Rajkot. The 
methodology included interviews with the owner entrepreneurs and/or 
key managers and observations during the organizational visits. All ten 
organizations were visited personally by the researcher several times with 
notes and memos generated from the key ideas observed and key points 
raised during the meeting with the entrepreneur. Although there was no 
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cap on the number of industry to be studied for the research, the re-
searcher found that after five interviews the categories were overlapping 
and no new category was generated after the eighth interview. As sug-
gested by Strauss and Corbin (1998), coding by “microanalysis,” which 
consists of analyzing data word-by-word and coding the meaning found 
in words or groups of words, was carried out. An example of the same is 
given below. 
 
Interview Text Codes 
From my experience of non-technological innovations in 
Rajkot is 
Personal view 
The major challenge to innovation in Rajkot is  Assertion 
From my experience innovation only works in Rajkot if Personal view 
Can never guarantee innovation  Assertion  
 
Another method used during the interview was that of key point coding. 
The points regarded as important to the investigation were identified in 
the transcript and given an identifier attributed sequentially, starting at 
the first interview and continuing through subsequent interviews to give 
P1, P2, and so on, where “P” indicates “key point”. 
 
ID Key point Code  
PA1 The key non-technological innovation which drives 
innovation in Rajkot is strong family network of 
organizations which run the engineering industry of 
Rajkot  
Networking 
PA2 We rely totally on outsourcing for innovation Outsourcing 
PA3 Most of the customers are industries run by 
relatives. 
Networking 
PA4 Our outsourcing saves time and we assign work to 
an industry which belongs to the same family; this 
keeps money within the network.  
Networking 
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To differentiate key points made longitudinally in subsequent case stud-
ies, these identifiers were distinguished with a suffix A to J. For example 
key point 8 made by the entrepreneur in case A would be coded as PA8. 
Thus, it is possible to trace back through interview transcripts to the ac-
tual context of each key points. The following is one example from the 
actual data. 
Along with the grounded theory approach, secondary data—reports of 
the engineering association, chamber of commerce, past studies, various 
articles published in the newspapers and magazines—were extensively 
used. 
Once the web of hypothesis was generated, the researcher organized a 
focused group discussion between Dr. Hemixa Rao (Head, Department 
of Sociology, Saurashtra University, Rajkot), Mr. Mitul Shah (leading in-
dustrialist and director, Supack Industries Ltd. and alumnus of the En-
trepreneurship Development Institute, Ahmedabad) and Mr. Rajubhai 
Patel (leading industrialist and director, Sun Forge Pvt. Ltd.). The role of 
non-technological innovations in the growth of the economy and society 
of Rajkot was discussed. The major findings of the discussion are report-
ed below. 
 
Findings 
 
The findings of the research are divided in two categories. The first cate-
gory describes the findings of the grounded theory research carried out 
to investigate the research objective “What is the role of non-
technological innovation in the growth of engineering industry of Raj-
kot?” The second category describes the findings of the focused ground 
discussion, which tries to answer the research question “What is the role 
of non-technological innovation in the growth of the economy of Raj-
kot?” 
 
The Role of Non-Technological Innovations in the Growth  
of the Engineering Industry of Rajkot 
 
Traditionally, Rajkot has been a hub for technological innovations, and 
industry in Rajkot is popularly known for its CNC machines and techno-
logically advanced machine tools, spares, and so forth. In relentless pur-
suit of technological innovations, Rajkot has a strong pattern of non-
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technological innovations that has remained largely unnoticed. The fol-
lowing are the key findings of the study. 
 
Raw Material Innovations have Significantly Contributed to the Growth of the 
Engineering Industry of Rajkot. 
 
When the going gets tough, the tough get going. This rule of thumb can 
be applied to the engineering industry of Rajkot. The cluster of Rajkot is 
dominated by small and medium enterprises that run on low resources 
and have limited capabilities to innovate in terms of product and pro-
cesses. So the industries created a new stream of opportunity to inno-
vate. They began working on innovative raw material. Rajkot first inno-
vated with raw material when the first lightweight diesel engine was de-
veloped there. Since then, the engineering industry of Rajkot worked 
closely with customers and vendors to engender raw material innovation. 
This innovation can further be divided into two aspects: process innova-
tion and product innovation. Providing forged components instead of 
cast components saved a lot of money and time; it is a good example of 
process innovation and finding a cheaper alternative to the raw materials 
that customers have used for years in order to achieve better product 
quality and low cost. Most of the organizations studied in the research 
have worked closely with customers and vendors to innovate raw mate-
rial. 
Although the primary reason for the innovation was to cut costs and 
give similar or better quality to the customer, of late various large organi-
zations have accepted and adopted the raw material innovations done by 
the engineering industry in Rajkot. 
 
Intense Outsourcing (“Partnering”) has Significantly Contributed to the Growth of 
the Engineering Industry 
 
Industries in Rajkot mostly fall into the “small” category. They are start-
ed with limited capital investment and are developed slowly, as and when 
the entrepreneur starts getting returns from the business. This limits the 
ability of the industry to conduct all processes under a single roof and 
creates the need for outsourcing. Engineering setups of Rajkot require 
200–300 items on average, which makes outsourcing inevitable. Hence, 
they depend on other firms to supply them the components and services 
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to complete an order. This has led to the growth of “processing 
firms”—firms that do rough casting and finish, machining, drawing, and 
so forth—firms performing individual operations for other firms. Bes-
sant’s survey of firms in 1997 revealed that about 77% of the sample 
firms outsourced jobs to other firms in Rajkot. Amongst the benefits 
cited were the ability to meet orders from premises of limited size, and 
ability to reduce costs (however, this led to intense price based competi-
tion between assemblers and subcontractors alike). Often family, friends 
or former employees owned the outsourced firms. 
The partnering phenomenon in the engineering industry of Rajkot can 
be further divided into two. The industry does partnering (or outsourc-
ing) within the organization where various processes are outsourced but 
the process has to be performed within the organizational premises, 
which can lead to better quality control on the product. A second form 
of partnering is done where a whole process is outsourced in order to be 
performed at the vendor’s location. The organization only has incoming 
quality control over the product. This may not look like innovation, as 
across the globe organizations are doing outsourcing, but the scale at 
which this is done and the impact that outsourcing has on the overall 
innovation representation of the organization to the customer, is truly 
remarkable and leaves the researcher with no choice but to incorporate 
the same as an innovation. From the research conducted it was found 
that there are various patterns of outsourcing followed by organizations 
and no definite pattern can be traced from the study of ten organiza-
tions. Further research is thus required to study the types or patterns 
used by the organizations in terms of outsourcing. 
 
The Ability to Innovate on Meeting the Delivery Schedules of Customers has 
Significantly Contributed to the Growth of the Engineering Industry of Rajkot 
 
Meeting the delivery schedule of the customer again and again is very 
successfully used by industry as a unique selling proposition. All the or-
ganizations studied had small batch sizes, short changeover time and ef-
ficient die and product change mechanisms, which mean that they were 
able to produce more variety in small batches, which resulted in very 
quick and effective delivery of products. This ability gives an advantage 
to the industries in that they can immediately become vendor of any 
supplier. Once they get the entry they can prove themselves to be the 
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quality supplier who can provide better service time and again. To 
achieve this, organizations use various types of innovations in die han-
dling, maintenance, and reworking. There were certain organizations that 
have even created different models of product distribution to make sure 
that delivery is on time. This innovation affects the whole manufacturing 
chain of an industry from stock keeping, production planning to dis-
patch. A flip side of this innovation was also noticed. Most of the engi-
neering industries of Rajkot have huge stock, which is kept to make sure 
that delivery is met. This makes it very costly to keep the stocks, and, in 
an uncertain price environment, entrepreneurs often make losses because 
of their inability to follow approaches in time. 
 
The Agility to Change According to the External Changes has Significantly 
Contributed to the Growth of the Engineering Industry of Rajkot 
 
Agility is considered as a decisive virtue in the field of management to-
day. Baldridge Standard also puts great emphasis on it. Agility is an or-
ganization’s ability to proactively accept external changes. All the organi-
zations in this study were found to be very agile in response to the 
changes taking place around them. They use their agility as a tool to 
make themselves more competitive. This has a direct correlation with the 
ability to meet customer delivery schedules—one of the signs of agility. 
The engineering industry of Rajkot goes beyond meeting schedules to 
make sure that changes that are going to follow are foreseen and that or-
ganizations have been geared up to meet the challenge. Almost all entre-
preneurs believed in the importance of projecting customer demand and 
projecting the macro-level changes, and all of them took steps to make 
sure that they are gearing up their organizations for the same. Certain 
organizations pioneered some of the technologies that were accepted at a 
later stage by other large organizations. This agility comes from entre-
preneurs’ ability to retain task-based employees and to outsource pro-
cesses that are not the core competencies of the organization. There is 
no doubt that SMEs have capability to innovate faster than large organi-
zations. This also seems to be true in the case of non-technological in-
novations after completing the study. All entrepreneurs were aware of 
the benefit that they had compared to the large organizations, and were 
already using this to the maximum. 
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Lean organization structures with the process owner approach made 
them far more agile than their large counterparts. In most of the organi-
zations studied, the top management of the organization carried out re-
views at various stages to incorporate and cultivate changes in the pro-
cesses, products. or organization structures to ensure that they stay com-
petitive in the market. 
 
Networking within and amongst the Industry and Entrepreneurs has Significantly 
Contributed to the Growth of the Engineering Industry of Rajkot 
 
Networking is discussed last in the findings as it was considered to be 
the most vital non-technological innovation in the engineering industry 
of Rajkot. The impact of this innovation was evident across the board on 
the economy of Rajkot and the society at large. 
Networking, as an innovation, has its roots in the economy of Rajkot 
from the times of diesel engines. During the mid-1980s, when diesel en-
gines were considered as the lifeblood of the Rajkot’s economy; entre-
preneurs started outsourcing processes to other units of Rajkot. As the 
volume of outsourcing rose, entrepreneurs started promoting their fami-
ly members to float companies that could do the outsourcing work and 
started keeping a share in the outsourcing company. This phenomenon 
became deep rooted in the industry of Rajkot and in the last 20 years the 
whole economy of Rajkot became a big network of entrepreneurs. 
This networking helped entrepreneurs to offer complete solutions to the 
customer with enhanced confidence of quality and delivery and low in-
vestment. Every organization studied was not complete in terms of pro-
cess capabilities but was confident about the product that it could deliver 
to the customer as outsourced activity was done at captive units of some 
related or possibly from the same network. 
This networking created Rajkot’s identity across the country. The re-
searcher talked with one vendor development manager of India’s leading 
automobile company whom a few of the studied organizations were 
supplying and found that the customers had higher confidence in the 
outsourced activity of the networked unit than in that of a normal out-
sourcing unit as organizations were ready to take responsibility for prod-
uct quality and were ready to share the risk associated with product rejec-
tion. Networking in industry in Rajkot promotes outsourcing and in turn 
is the core reason behind the indomitable entrepreneurial spirit of the 
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region. However, all has not gone well with networking in last ten years. 
There have been instances of difference of opinion between the net-
worked partners, and there are certain units that have decided not to 
network of late and have created their own capacity; but still the ad-
vantages largely override the disadvantages. These differences have in 
fact helped the economy of Rajkot, as those who have left this network 
have started their own networks, which have immensely benefited the 
economy. Product innovations stay at the core of these networks and 
every new network starts with a new product innovation that is replicat-
ed by other, and the network strengthens. 
 
The Role of Non-Technological Innovations of the 
Engineering Industry on the Economy and Society of 
Rajkot 
 
 
Figure 2: Non-Technological Innovation Eco-System of the Rajkot Engineering 
Industry (Vachhrajani 2008). 
 
On the surface, Rajkot’s engineering industry is a great product innova-
tor and has consistently striven and survived in volatile macro-economic 
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situations with its product innovation capabilities. But behind those 
product innovations lie core non-technological innovations, which not 
only drive the product innovation but also create their own impact on 
the industry, cluster, economy, and society at large.  
The outcomes of the research were given as a focused group discussion 
topic to the panel of experts, which included leading educationists, soci-
ologists and industrialists from the city. The key outcomes of the discus-
sion are given in Figure 2. 
 
Networked Economy and Society 
 
As the findings of the research suggest, the engineering industry in Raj-
kot has strong networking for sourcing, outsourcing, and innovation. 
This has created a web of networks of industries and families that are 
interconnected for their business needs. This has helped Rajkot to retain 
traditional nuclear families in times of rapid transition in India. The net-
worked economy and society enable new initiatives to come faster to 
Rajkot and to replicate to scale faster. This makes sure that things come 
to Rajkot through that network and they get maximum advantage of the 
volume that they can offer. The researcher found a single group in more 
than 12 pieces that gave them the best price took that cutting machine. 
So, networking keeps Rajkot united and gets the best deal in purchases 
for all. 
Such networking ensures that Rajkot can even afford to create large set-
ups in numbers; the collective strength of family and network can afford 
this. In last decade more than ten manufacturing setups with investments 
of more than Rs. 50 crore have been created. This is unusual for a town 
with a population of less than 2 million. Networking gives diversity to 
industry in Rajkot. People associated with the network keep on investing 
in newer business avenues in order to decrease their existing business 
risks. Few of the organizations studied had network interests ranging 
from industry and education to stock markets. 
Nowhere is the social impact of networking more evident in Rajkot than 
in the banking sector of the city. The banking market in the city is nei-
ther dominated by the large nationalized banks nor by multinational pri-
vate-sector banks. Small but very effective co-operative banks that are 
largely run by the large networks that we discussed dominate the market. 
These banks offer all services ranging from lending at reasonable rate to 
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ATM facilities. As networks and trust form the basis for the banks, non-
performing assets (NPAs) are, surprisingly, lowest in the country (some 
of the banks have NPAs as low as 0.1%). Networking is even more evi-
dent in the hundreds of credit societies functioning in the city working 
for microfinance. Rajkot still has tradition of significant family bonding, 
and large family gatherings during Hindu New Year are a very common 
thing. 
 
Agile Economy and Society 
 
As the research shows, agility is a key decisive innovation for the engi-
neering industry in Rajkot. This agility has its roots in the nimbleness of 
the society and people. Six out of ten entrepreneurs studied in the re-
search came from a different business background before coming into 
the engineering business. Three of them had changed two businesses be-
fore venturing into this business. This is a clear indication that the peo-
ple and society in Rajkot are truly agile and are ready to accept and 
mould themselves according to the challenges. Seven entrepreneurs stud-
ied had their stake in other businesses. 
Rajkot is very flexible. Changing business is not something to be 
ashamed of. In fact, in most of the cases, your reputation or the success 
of past business can help you get credit for the new business. “We un-
derstand that business dynamics change and accordingly people have to 
change their business. We appreciate that and make sure that good en-
trepreneurs are not deprived of credit,” says Mr. M. K. Bheda, Manager 
of Credits, Co-Operative Bank of Rajkot Ltd. So, it is a clear indication 
that agility is deeply rooted in the culture and society of Rajkot. The 
roots of agility can be traced back to the early 1900s when people of 
Saurashtra had to relocate every summer to places where there was 
enough water, as Saurashtra was considered to be the area of the country 
with greatest water scarcity. This agility is fueled by huge migration of 
people from Rajkot to other parts of the world, especially the United 
States, the United Kingdom and Australia. Patel, who usually belongs to 
areas near Rajkot, is regarded as the most enterprising Indian community 
in the United States. 
Dr. Rao points out that the ability of people to relocate represents inher-
ited agility. The people of Rajkot have been great migrants internally as 
well as externally and this creates a spirit of flexibility and of accepting 
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changes. Hinduism and the strong religious orientation of the people of 
Rajkot also play a noteworthy role in sustaining this agility. 
 
 
Resolute Spirit of Entrepreneurship 
 
Rajkot has more than 3,000 small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
spread across an area of 20 km2. They are linked with non-technological 
innovations as explained above. These innovations ensure that entrepre-
neurship in Rajkot is promoted and keeps growing. Strong networking 
and intense outsourcing promote entrepreneurship and this has made 
Rajkot’s entrepreneurship a hub of western India. Today, because of the 
enterprising spirit of Rajkot, throughout the country Rajkot is respected 
as a quality place for buyers. The spirit of enterprise of Rajkot keeps it 
ahead of other cities of the region in terms of per capita income and per-
centage of employment. Networking also keeps families together in ac-
cordance with Hindu family values. Rajkot is not immune to transfor-
mation taking place in Indian society but the tradition of large families is 
still preserved in Rajkot. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The research shows that, behind the successful technological innovation 
for which Rajkot is famous across the country, there is a strong non-
technological innovation ecosystem that keeps product innovations tick-
ing and is as strong as that of the product innovation system. These non-
technological innovations are not only limited to industry in Rajkot but 
they have substantial impact on the overall economy and society of Raj-
kot. In fact, they have become an integral part of society there and im-
pact society at large. The study found that non-technological innovations 
like networking and agility have a direct correlation with social character-
istics. Raw material, process, and delivery innovations make Rajkot a hub 
for product and process innovation. 
The outcome of this study strengthens the idea that non-technological 
innovations do have a significant impact on the economy and society of 
Rajkot. There is a lot of room for further research in the field, where we 
can study the role of other non-technological innovations beyond the 
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engineering industry, like trading, servicing, designing, and so forth, 
where Rajkot has a significant presence. 
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HANS-WERNER FRANZ 
SOCIAL SCIENCE PRODUCTION OR SOCIAL INNOVATION BY 
SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF SCIENCE? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the first decade of the 21st century and the emerging knowledge soci-
ety, the social sciences, and particularly sociology, one of their core dis-
ciplines, seem to be running into a very difficult situation. On the one 
hand, we can observe a growing demand for social knowledge and mean-
ing in the different fields of society. On the other hand, social science 
itself is undergoing a profound crisis. The traditional academic methods 
of knowledge production and dissemination no longer work in a way 
that offers society satisfactory answers and solutions. As a result, a pro-
cess of “marginalization” (Wiesenthal 2008) and deep irritation about the 
efficiency and social importance of social science can be stated (Roth 
2009; Müller, Roth, and Zak 2010; Roth, Reichel, and Müller 2011; 
Scheiber, Roth, and Reichel 2011; Roth 2011). 
As a response to this situation, there has been growing interest from so-
cial scientists in the discussion on the public understanding of science 
(e.g. Nowotny et al. 2001). This discussion may be seen as a result of an 
attitude saying “Our traditional concepts and methods of knowledge 
production are still sufficient. We only have to change the ways we sell 
them.” 
Contrary to this position, we think that the crisis in academic methods of 
knowledge production goes deeper and reaches further (Bonss 1999; 
Weingart 2001). New modes of production of social science and the so-
cial production of science will become therefore the two faces of a more 
and more relevant type of professional scientific work of social scientists 
in the knowledge society. “Mode 2” has been the label tagged to this 
newly emerging type of knowledge production by Gibbons et al 1994; 
Nowotny et al. 2001), mostly referring to natural or engineering sciences. 
For us “social science production” is a specific type of social knowledge 
production by social intervention. 
 
 
96 
This chapter provides a self-reflective discussion of new modes of 
knowledge production in the field of organizational development and 
networking. Starting from a specific case, the Sozialforschungsstelle 
Dortmund (sfs), it describes new ways of knowledge production includ-
ing the consequent changes of products and processes, methods and in-
struments, of the functional organization and personal work styles. Sfs, a 
central research unit of the Dortmund University of Technology, has 
been developing a catalog of the functional characteristics of effective-
ness and efficiency of an enterprise, a community of performance, by 
working with private companies and for the research and consultancy 
market, eventually understanding itself as a competence network in a 
network of networks. It also shows the tensions arising from the splits 
between public and/or private use(r) orientation, on the one hand, and 
the (reconfirmed) necessity of the autonomy of science on the other, 
leading to the question of what problems arise and which criteria are 
necessary to define viable or socially robust knowledge. 
 
Institutional Background 
 
Since 2007, sfs has been a central research unit of the Dortmund Univer-
sity of Technology. Established in 1972 by the federal state parliament, 
the Landtag, it has the mission of “accompanying industrial change” by 
empirical research. Originally founded in 1946, right after the Second 
World War, as an institute of the University of Münster—there was not a 
single university on the Ruhr at that time. In the 1950s and 1960s it be-
came a large institute with a high profile reputation. With few exceptions, 
the whole post-war promotion of German professors in the social sci-
ences worked at some time in this centre. After the creation of a series of 
universities in the Ruhr Area during the 1960s, in 1972 the institute be-
came a pure research center fully financed by the federal state budget, 
holding a total staff of nine scientists plus support functions. 
Today sfs is an institute with a EUR 4 million turnover (2007) of which 
only one-third, EUR 1.3 million, is public institutional funding, and some 
80 employees, of which about 45 are scientific staff. The strategic social 
research and intervention focus of sfs is on modes of social innovation 
covering the whole range of work-related research and consultancy on 
areas such as vocational education and training (VET), organization de-
velopment, HRD, quality and ecological management, flexible working 
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time arrangements, issues of (internal and external) labor markets and 
regional development, gender aspects, health and safety organization, 
and so forth (cf. Franz 2000).  
 
A New Type of Knowledge Production 
 
In our research area, over the last ten years, important impulses for the 
development of new ways of knowledge production had their origin in a 
series of projects in the field of organizational development and net-
working (Howaldt 1998b and 2003; Howaldt and Kopp 1998). They had 
a number of characteristics with obvious parallels to ordinary consulting 
processes. In the course of these projects we recognized that the process 
of what we used to call knowledge transfer is very complex. It turned out 
to be no longer a process of transferring knowledge produced by re-
search institutes into the companies, trade unions, and so forth. Instead, 
we were confronted with a much more complex step-by-step process of 
joint problem definition, joint problem solving or knowledge produc-
tion, and joint application of what had been newly developed. It was a 
small step from there to recognizing that we ourselves were part of this 
step-by-step change process, and that, in fact, it was a common learning 
process, our responsibility being the co-ordination and shaping of it 
(Howaldt 1998b). The core task of social scientists in the framework of 
this emerging form of knowledge production is the creation of networks 
in which scientists and practitioners work together in solving their prob-
lems in a process of intense, project-based interaction. In this setting, 
social researchers frequently become managers or facilitators of complex 
research and implementation processes (cf. Franz 2007). 
This type of knowledge production aims at the production of what 
Nowotny et al. (2001) call “socially robust knowledge,” which is suitable 
for solving practical problems. It may be focused on, for example, im-
plementing new forms of work organization or total quality schemes in 
companies, developing new forms of networking along the value crea-
tion chain within companies or across organizational boundaries, sup-
porting institutional change in regional networks, drafting new schemes 
of social security, implementing new forms of civil service organization, 
and so forth. Basically it emerges wherever researchers admit that practi-
tioners are experts of their own technical, professional, and organiza-
tional reality and contribute to problem solving on even grounds with 
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scientific staff intervening in these processes. Hence, it demands new 
approaches, methods, and tools for organizing the work of scientists in 
such projects. 
 
The Main Characteristics of the Project Type 
 
This type of projects is characterized by the following: 
 
– Orientation towards being useful by solving specific practical prob-
lems. 
– Problem development and definition as a process of consensus 
building and negotiation. 
– Problem solving/knowledge production in the framework of com-
plex cross-disciplinary and cross-institutional networks. 
– New, continuously changing forms of project organization. 
– New approaches, methods and tools of working. 
– Multi-dimensional criteria of evaluation considering general scien-
tific value as well as practical usefulness. 
 
The development of the project design and the definition of problems 
becomes an interactive process between the scientists, experts, and prac-
titioners (who are experts in their practice as well). All participants deliv-
er their special views, interests and demands on what has to be done and 
how. 
 
Problem-Solving and Knowledge Production in Networks 
 
In the classical process of social science production, research takes place 
in research institutions, society being an excursion from the ivory tower 
for mining data, a source of empirical data and information in the best 
case, but not a partner. It also addresses knowledge-transfer activities 
(dissemination) once research is concluded. Social science production as 
we and increasingly other researchers practice it, is the social production 
of science. Social actors from the fields of social action relevant to the 
research theme or project participate in the whole process of research. 
Social scientists are social actors among others with the special task and 
role of driving the process towards the production of knowledge. Ex-
perts from companies and institutions, scientists, consultants, employ-
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ees—all these groups work together to create new knowledge. So the 
different forms of knowledge created have to be combined and tested to 
evolve into socially robust knowledge. 
 
New Forms and Tools of Project Organization 
 
Projects are thus essentially networks of cooperation oriented towards 
the solution of practical and scientific problems. Research itself becomes 
an action learning process requiring new forms of project organization. 
Given this operational and situational framework, different methods, 
tools, and modes of operation are necessary. 
Traditional research and researchers are used to working in the commu-
nication structures often still practiced at universities: open, (seemingly) 
unlimited, and unrestricted process-oriented discourse. Projects with 
clearly defined conditions in terms of expected/promised results, time 
and money originate very different communication requirements. Result-
oriented communication needs completely different tools for structuring 
time, information, and outcomes, nevertheless, maintaining open dis-
course as a necessary source of creativity and openness. 
For the researchers this often means that they are forced to change their 
personal work styles. First of all, they need to change their language: Ac-
ademic and non-academic project partners with different practical back-
grounds are experts in their own rights and have completely different 
cultures, languages and terminologies. 
Beyond these changes in the external work context, the nature of these 
projects conveys serious consequences for the internal work contexts of 
research institutes. For example, individual time and task management 
have changed considerably. Reliable project and network management 
have become a must. Depending on the specific problem, new modes of 
operation have to be developed and tested. Every project has to be 
shaped in an individual way, referring to the special conditions of the 
corresponding fields of action (project partners, financial conditions, 
time schedule, and so forth). 
Finally, this type of project demands multi-dimensional evaluation crite-
ria, which must refer to the practical as well as to the scientific objectives 
of the project. 
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New Function and Role of Social Scientists 
 
There is a significant difference between an analytical research position 
and a situation where one must come to practical conclusions for action 
and implementation in order to achieve previously established objectives. 
The traditional position of a researcher is usually a passive and contem-
plative one, at most, of participative observation. A consultant or action 
researcher (institute) in the role of a change agent must think in strategic 
terms or in terms of problem solving and feasibility under conditions of 
restricted time and other resources, self-evidently without losing the ca-
pacity of critical analysis and scientific generalization. Participative ob-
servation turns into observing participation as a minimum requirement. 
As a rule, researchers are in a practical, coordinative and facilitating func-
tion, along with their analytic and synthetic role as scientists. Their per-
formance as facilitators is an essential practical condition for the pro-
ject’s success. Help for self-help would become the main approach in 
consultancy and action research, which necessarily includes a participa-
tive way of working involving all relevant actors in a given field. It in-
cludes the recognition that the actors in a given field are, and must stay, 
experts in their work. The central requirement becomes to organize pro-
gress as a participative learning process among all people involved, in-
cluding the researchers, by building and knitting networks. These may 
become interrelated over time, evolving into a network of networks 
(Howaldt 1998a; Franz 2003a). 
Thus, social scientists come to offer special services for their partners 
that may be summarized as follows: 
 
– Project and network management. 
– Development of innovative concepts. 
– Organizational development. 
– Explicit or implicit training in project management techniques. 
– Generating new socially robust knowledge. 
– Transfer of experience. 
 
In fact, researchers find themselves in a difficult position. On the one 
hand, they become facilitators of a network-based research process in 
which their usefulness is defined by practical as well as by scientific out-
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comes. One could say that from the point of view of the social project 
partners, after all, they are only really useful if the project leads, and if 
they lead the project, to socially robust, i.e. feasible knowledge. Thus, the 
outcome is competence. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the 
scientific community to which they remain obliged in theory, methodol-
ogy, and personal career aspects, the project (or a series of thematically 
focused projects) will only be useful if the coordinating researchers suc-
ceed in leading the project with its social network structure to meaning-
ful scientific results. By adding and relating it to the scientific debate, the 
outcome is scientific knowledge, science. Thus, scientific management 
retains a not-at-all Taylor-inspired meaning for this social type of science 
production. 
 
New Structures of Research Organization 
 
There are many ways of dealing with the organizational consequences. 
We will summarize how we have dealt with them adopting a subjective 
way of description. A much more detailed description can be found in 
Franz (2003a (English) or 2003b (German)). 
Along with the development and application of these social ways of 
knowledge production, the whole institute as a research organization and 
as an economic organization experienced a profound transformation, 
which, at the same time, required a long-drawn record of continuing pro-
fessional development and personal change from the researchers, we. 
 
– We had to change our traditional social fields of research. Tradi-
tional social labor research used to be—and still is very frequent-
ly—oriented towards large, industrial companies, trade unions and 
contexts, in our case very often even more restricted to coal and 
steel and the chemical industry. Since coal and steel dwindled away 
and as the most important action programs of the European Union 
and national ministries increasingly adopted a clear SME focus, we 
had to shift our attention to SMEs, which are a very different 
world, and increasingly to services. From large to small companies. 
From industry to services. From research orientation to action ori-
entation. From trade-union orientation to stakeholder and even 
customer orientation, the scientific community being one im-
portant customer. From supply to demand orientation. 
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– We had to change our products. The traditional products of a tradi-
tional research institute are publications. Of course, we must pro-
duce publications since our researchers also need a publication rec-
ord for their individual career face to the scientific community 
where publications in “refereed journals” are the non plus ultra. 
But most of our customers do not want a book or an article in a 
scientific review as a project output. They want something they can 
use in their normal and current activity. They want results in a lan-
guage they can understand and in a format they can use for their 
work. Often they want tools. Normally we must convince them 
that they cannot have recipes. So we have now two different 
groups of customers, the scientific community and the economic 
or political world, and we must strive to avoid double work by op-
timizing the work and its products. 
– We had to change our organization. Working for the market and 
for SMEs requires becoming an SME yourself. The structural 
change of our (scientific) work organization has been described 
above. But beyond this, the whole of the institute’s internal func-
tioning and procedures had to change. The former line organiza-
tion based on seniority has become a network organization with a 
high degree of autonomy of the research areas and of individual re-
searchers working in teams. Seniority has been replaced by perfor-
mance in acquiring and running projects successfully. Not even the 
management team is exempt from this basic rule. Any allocation of 
time resources paid from the basic public funding is linked to spe-
cific tasks, and nobody is paid fully. Traditional scientific organiza-
tions tend to be communities of practice; our institute is a commu-
nity of performance. The whole management of resources has be-
come much more flexible. We had to skip the old cameralistic way 
of budgeting, which is normal for public institutes. We had to 
adopt cost unit accounting and calculations in daily work packages. 
Even the structures of our building became deficient as we needed 
much more communicative facilities, with the logical consequence 
that we moved to new facilities. Management acquired much more 
of a service role than before. The functions of the secretarial staff 
changed completely from typing pools to flexible project assistance. 
The institute has become a medium-sized research and consultancy 
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company with many (seemingly) “freelancers” working in internal 
and external networks. 
 
Along with the changes in the approaches, methods and tools outlined 
above, the process that sfs has undergone can be summarized in the fol-
lowing way. In the beginning, we—at least many of us—thought we 
could be catalysts of change, change agents without changing ourselves. 
We have learnt that it is impossible to be a change agent without chang-
ing and being changed. Briefly, we had to change everything. And it was 
a long and uncomfortable learning and change process, which has not 
finished yet. It will never finish since we have to learn and change to-
gether with our customers and stakeholders. In fact, this is not enough: 
we must learn and change before our customers do. In other words, ex-
perience counts as much as science. Customer orientation in research, 
transfer activities, and consultancy has profound consequences for the 
whole way of thinking and working. 
We had to change our way of thinking. We had to change ourselves. 
 
Facilitators of Social Innovation 
 
Facilitating cooperation among project partners with different and vary-
ing interests in the common project is a task that has become typical for 
many organizational contexts. Facilitators are agents of progress in many 
types of project, be they within organizations or among organizations. 
Usually they are leaders without hierarchy, driven and being able to drive 
only by the endeavor of achieving the commonly agreed objectives. 
Working together under conditions of equality and agreement instead of 
hierarchy and direction implies that all partners either do their work 
moved by their own motivation or moved by social obligation in the co-
operation context. It is the facilitator’s task to make cooperation on such 
grounds viable. Seen from this viewpoint, social scientists practicing so-
cial research in the above-described way are socially innovative them-
selves. The innovation consists in making participatory schemes of 
communication and cooperation work effectively and efficiently, thus 
strengthening advanced democratic cooperation structures and methods 
in a social and societal environment—economy—where hierarchy and 
direction are usually on the agenda. 
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A wide range of methods and tools have been collected or developed by 
sfs, based on action learning concepts (cf. Kopp et al. 2003) that allow 
making professional use of them. Moderation and visualization are the 
key methods of making common learning by doing and doing by learn-
ing a coherent process. This basic method, hardly known beyond the 
boundaries of German-speaking countries, is accompanied by a special 
mix of tools gathered from creative thinking and problem-solving tech-
niques as well as from organization and human resource development or 
from quality management. A considerable number of these tools have 
been developed by sfs researchers, such as my tool kit for “sustainable 
organization and human resource development” (Franz 2003c). A fur-
ther book dedicated to such methods and tool of facilitating networking 
is Franz and Sarcina (2009). 
Such methods and techniques are powerful drivers of effective commu-
nication for planning and preparing common action. Organization de-
velopment and quality management, as such, are relevant levers of social 
innovation and can lead to major improvements in the effectiveness of 
organizations as well as of the professional management of human co-
operation as one of the most important drivers of innovation, be it social 
or technological. Enhancing the systematic use of such methods and 
tools in research cooperation contexts can transform the process of re-
search into a relevant driver of cooperation capacities. Thus, not only is 
the management of cooperative social research processes rendered more 
effective and efficient—all people participating actively in them learn 
from such experience and may transfer their learning to their own organ-
izational framework. 
Problems and Questions 
Even if we come to the conclusion that the transformation of social sci-
ence production and its institutions is a necessary process of learning for 
“survivability” of the social sciences and in the emerging knowledge-
based learning society, there are still a number of questions to be ana-
lyzed and answered. Some of them are: 
 
– If science has lost its monopoly of creating and administrating new 
knowledge, and new suppliers enter the market, what is the specific 
product and value research institutes may offer? For example, is there a 
specific surplus use value as a result of the close connection between 
research and service/consultancy activities? Will we be able to compete 
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on even ground with commercial companies in the field of consultan-
cy? Can social science, as a parallel to engineering sciences, draw its 
strength from developing, testing, and maybe even taking to market, 
new, innovative knowledge services (for example, network manage-
ment)? 
– What will be the future relationship between production and applica-
tion of knowledge? Both are closely connected in the project networks 
we work in. Will it be possible to transfer knowledge into different 
contexts? 
–  Will we be able to master the institutional changes that are necessary 
in the research institutions and universities? How will the borders be 
drawn between the new and the old modes of social science produc-
tion? What is the political and structural framework we need to cope 
with these new and strong demands? 
 
There is a large gap between the traditional understanding of social re-
search and science and the new mode of generating socially robust 
knowledge (science?) under the framework conditions as we have out-
lined them. The new mode will definitely require a thorough review of 
the classical criteria of what is scientific along with the development of 
new concepts, methods, procedures, and organizational structures 
(Bender 2001). Discussion about such an innovative approach to the 
production of social science as a process of social production could be 
very valuable for understanding the specific contribution of the social 
sciences to the emerging “knowledge society.” 
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PART II 
 
THE TIME DIMENSION OF NON-TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
NON-ECONOMIC INNOVATIONS 
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Nikolay Trofimov 
ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGERIAL INNOVATIONS  
IN LARGE COMPANIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON TECHNO-
LOGICAL INNOVATIONS AND INNOVATION STRATEGIES 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Complex relations between science, society and industry, growing atten-
tion to non-technological innovations (NTI), and rapid changes, are all 
attributes of modern societies (Roth 2009; Müller, Roth, and Zak 2010; 
Roth, Wetzel, and Müller 2011; Scheiber, Roth, and Reichel 2011). Col-
laboration and networking are of ever growing importance for industry 
and services. Highly developed social capital with a lot of networking 
relations and R&D collaborations is a distinguishing trait of many suc-
cessful firms. 
A long time has passed since Robert K. Merton justified the crucial role 
of “pure science” but today there are probably as many reasons as before 
to confirm the status of academia (universities and publicly sponsored 
research institutions) as basic sources of scientific advances. Modern 
universities are located in even more demanding environments than was 
the case during the time of Merton and they have even more functions 
than previously. In this respect, their direct and indirect contribution to 
industry has to be assessed from various points of view, taking into con-
sideration the effects of knowledge dynamics on secrecy and on 
knowledge protection, and new organizational forms of knowledge pro-
duction, such as techno parks, technology incubators, and research net-
works, as well as many other aspects. 
External knowledge acquisition and a more rational use of internal R&D 
are the relative benefits of networking and collaboration for industries 
and, as usual, industries are ready to finance research in academia and to 
develop new forms of collaboration with academia if they see the chance 
to obtain relevant scientific results. The rediscovery of the “science-
push” is, to a certain extent, the consequence of an erroneous interpreta-
tion of “Mode 2” implications for academia. Even if the outcome of sci-
entific activity of academia sometimes becomes less technological and 
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more socially oriented, factually academia continues to play the central 
role in knowledge production. 
For example, Schmoch (2007) stresses the importance of the “science-
push” factor and the increasing interaction between industry and univer-
sities. He also points out the growing interest of industry in scientific ad-
vances at universities and develops a model of feedback reaction, called 
the “interaction model,” which serves to describe the collateral reactions 
of the activities of scientific institutions, providing scientific output, with 
the activities of industry, performing applied research. In his model, “ex-
ploration,” “innovation,” and “diffusion” are carried in parallel, and sci-
entific input plays a determinant role throughout this process. 
The importance of the “science-push” view is easily demonstrated by the 
fact that weak scientific output renders any further commercialization of 
scientific advances almost impossible. As a result, modern universities 
are located in very competitive environments, and are exposed to con-
stantly growing pressure for more science production. Besides, they are 
very sensitive to the socio-economic outcomes of innovations: these de-
termine the universities’ capabilities to respond to varying social de-
mands simultaneously and help them to perform their functions as insti-
tutes of socialization and nation-building entities. Furthermore, universi-
ties are sensitive to governmental and industry financing. Industrial 
funds can boost the innovations at universities. But too large volumes of 
industrial R&D can also hinder innovations by making universities more 
oriented to short-term incremental innovations and applied R&D, rather 
than excellence in research. 
Intricate regulations in the field of intellectual property and knowledge 
transfer affect open-minded approaches in research by modifying licens-
ing, patenting, and secrecy strategies in both private companies and uni-
versities. As a result, universities can patent fewer discoveries and firms 
can produce less valuable products. For example, the so-called “tragedy 
of anticommons” in biotechnology, with too many rights on valuable 
and scarce resources, can induce firms to divert resources to less promis-
ing projects with fewer licensing obstacles. The same obstacles can lead 
to badly performed R&D due to incomplete background knowledge 
(Heller and Eisenberg 1998). 
Fewer patents in universities might signify that academic research is be-
coming more secretive because of growing restrictions limiting academic 
research, such as secrecy agreements with industry. In some cases even 
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publication activity can be delayed or postponed (Caulfield et al. 2006). 
Another concern is that too much emphasis on commercialization and 
privatization in publicly sponsored academia could not only retard the 
progress of science but could also cause results that are against the public 
interest (Bouchard and Lemmens 2008). 
The non-linearity and dynamism of complex relations between modern 
governments, academia and industry, situated in a broader social envi-
ronment, gave impetus to the development of a new paradigm of evolu-
tionary economics, called “triple helix model” (Leydesdorff and Meyer 
2006). This model is putting into evidence non-technological aspects of 
the innovation process and postulates the integration of public, private 
and academic sector along a “triple-helix” spiral pattern of linkages 
emerging at various stages of the innovation process (Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff 1995). Although this is an abstract model, its heuristic value 
consists in demonstrating the evidence of a nexus among the institution-
al environments that were previously considered as being independent or 
statically overlaid structures. 
Such institutional environments are rapidly evolving and the ever grow-
ing volumes of information require improved capabilities for infor-
mation processing and human resources to perform constant in-depth 
analyses. In this respect, the determination of initial conditions is crucial 
for the description of any single evolutionary process and for the identi-
fication of relevant indicators. 
The role of initial conditions is ambivalent. On the one hand, the initial 
conditions, given by a highly pre-structured environment, allow a select-
ing system to better develop its endogenous dynamics, thus enhancing 
system’s variation (Avinmelech and Teubal 2006). On the other hand, 
the process of variation influences the de-regulation of the environment. 
For example, emerging venture startups deploy multiple organizational 
strategies for the IPO initiation and for the diffusion of R&D, thus 
providing an input for capital market (de-)regulation and adaptation. 
This can be done, for example, through liberalization of law for venture 
capitalists or through the creation of investment banks. These changes of 
the environment augment its overall disorder and disarray, although they 
may be directed towards the establishment of new links between institu-
tional structures. Leydesdorff and Meyer described the dichotomy of ini-
tial conditions as indicators of selected pathways and underlying operat-
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ing mechanisms of industry–government–academia selective environ-
ments: 
 
The observable arrangements inform us about the initial (historical) conditions 
or, in other words, the pathways selected by the evolving systems hitherto. How-
ever, the reflexive specification of the evolutionary dynamics in terms of selection 
environments may enable us to propose improvements in terms of the operating 
mechanisms. How can three sources of variance be expected to operate as selec-
tion environments for each other, and under what conditions can the interaction 
terms be used for innovations? (Leydesdorff and Meyer 2006: 1444) 
 
The value of this concept consists in the consideration of already ex-
pressed trends together with complex developing mechanisms, providing 
a momentum for innovation. Though the three sub-dynamics, represent-
ed by government, industry and academia, can be in some cases consid-
ered as analytically independent sources of variation, in reality they al-
most always rely on the existing initial conditions and act as selective en-
vironments on each other. 
In this respect, one important question is: To what extent do selective envi-
ronments act as constructs? It can be supposed that transition from one pro-
spective state to another depends upon the ability to manage discourses 
at the interfaces of selective environments and to implement major trunk 
innovations, such as information and communication technologies 
(ICT). In some phases of the system’s evolution, the “butterfly effect” 
can be generated quite easily and lead to unpredictable social perturba-
tions. In these phases actions need to be undertaken to provide multiple 
possible scenarios, which can be effectively sustained. 
While it is not possible to use a double-helix model, such as the model of 
DNA-molecule, for the description of the triple-helix model of innova-
tion, such a model could be adopted to illustrate the difference between 
statistical and dynamical aspects of a complex system. According to 
Leydesdorff, the model of the DNA molecule provides us with an ex-
ample of “co-evolution between two dynamics,” that is to say the unidi-
rectional (irreversible) change in time of the non-linear processes, de-
fined by a set of initial conditions and regular changes (Table 1). When 
we talk about co-evolution we need to distinguish between initial condi-
tions (e.g. a determinate evolutionary stage) and basic trends (e.g. their 
regular outcomes). 
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 Endogenous 
(inherent 
functions acting 
through variation) 
Exogenous 
(environment 
acting through 
selection) 
Subdivision of 
dynamical aspects 
Statistical aspects    
a) Qualitative and 
quantitative 
descriptors 
a) E.g. genetic 
alphabet, 
complementarities, 
codons, anticodons, 
sequences, etc. 
a) E.g. cell 
environment 
 
b) Trends (given 
initial conditions of 
a DNA-system at a 
certain evolutionary 
stage) 
b) E.g. number of 
chromosomes 
b) E.g. somatic 
attributes 
 
Dynamical aspects    
a) Evolution 
(irreversible, 
random1) 
a) E.g. gene 
expression 
a) E.g. irreversible 
epigenetic 
(in)activations 
Regular, linear 
 Adaptive change 
(slow, under a 
definite foresight 
horizon) 
 
Mutation-specific 
change (radical, 
under an indefinite 
foresight horizon) 
 Irregular, non-linear 
b) Cycles 
(reversible, 
complex) 
b) E.g. DNA or 
RNA replication 
b) E.g. reversible 
epigenetic 
alterations 
Regular, linear 
Irregular, non-linear 
Table 1: Statistical and Dynamical Aspects of a Complex System, Provided by the 
Model of a DNA Molecule 
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An interesting attribute of a DNA system is its inherent capability to 
evolve through endogenous innovations. These, in turn, react to the sys-
tem itself in the quality of selective environments as the system is in-
creasingly expressed. Similarly, the dynamics at the interfaces of industry, 
government and academia are generated endogenously (Etzkowitz and 
Leydesdorff 2000). They act on the reconstructing selective environ-
ments, as such environments activate or deactivate the tacit (non-
expressed) codes of the system. To this extent, the selection mechanisms 
are included in the variation paths of the system. Of course, social sys-
tems cannot be directly compared to biological systems, because differ-
ent constructs, such as ideal types, cannot be considered as stable and as 
unconscious as the elements of a biological system. Nevertheless, the 
metaphor can be useful for a better understanding of social environ-
ments for the very reason of the presence of a code, lying at the bases of 
both systems. Obviously, religions, languages and cultures are codes as 
well and they are similar to the genetic alphabet (with the exception of 
the high reflexive power of social constructs). The neo-Durkheimian 
concept of voluntary action is another reason for rejecting simplistic bio-
logical metaphors (OECD 2001). It has to be furthermore considered 
that all the deliberate (intentional) actions in social systems are oriented 
on values and goals (“zweckrational” and “wertrational,” individual and 
collective rationality) and thus they carry some elements of causality. 
In social systems the dynamic aspects (non-linear relations) of non-
technological innovations (NTI) include three major kinds of interac-
tions: the impact of one type of NTI on another and their effect on the 
whole; the impact of the company environment on the NTI; the reflec-
tion of NTI on corporate culture and decision-making process. The 
principal peculiarity of social systems consists in its enormous reflexive 
capabilities on a social and cultural level. In comparison, a DNA-system 
is much more “linear” and “simple.” 
If we take a look at other than “triple helix” and more technology-based 
paradigms of evolutionary economics, we will find out that they describe 
the starting conditions and the heredity of technologies in a more linear 
way. For example, Schumpeter and Kondratiev postulate regular succes-
sion of technology cycles (and their socioeconomic effects), lasting for a 
time span of approximately two generations (~48 years). The curse of 
each single technology becomes increasingly evident during its matura-
tion in parallel with the increasing uncertainty of the overall reaction of 
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institutional environments to the adoption of derivate emerging technol-
ogies. When foresight horizons become increasingly restricted due to 
complex circumstances, new algorithms of organizational behavior 
emerge. Social implications of such transformations might include new 
views about quality of life and life standards, innovation culture, and in-
novation management. 
Kondratiev made an important distinction between two types of dynam-
ical processes, namely between evolutionary processes that are non-
repeatable and wave processes, evolving over a determinate period of 
time. He strongly criticized the assumption of a unidirectional linear rela-
tionship between production, innovation and socioeconomic processes 
(Hirooka 2003).  
Both complex processes of “triple helix” and the Kondratiev “long cy-
cles” have some regular aspects. The long cycles are repeatable (every 
time on a new evolutionary level) and triple-helix dynamics are subject to 
reverse engineering. This means that complex interactions between aca-
demia, governments and industry can be reconstructed as the whole sys-
tem undergoes some apparently chaotic reconstructions. In this case the 
actions of a single firm have to be, in a certain sense, chaotic as well. Be-
cause a firm as an organized entity cannot permit internal disorder and 
cannot deal normally with the uncertainty of future outcomes of a com-
plex present, some new external organizational forms (like, for example, 
networks) have to appear in order to mitigate the sudden chaotic chang-
es. To observe the change without governing it is what can be called real 
chaos. The idea of regular outcomes of an apparently and inherently ir-
regular structure is not new per se. A good example of a practical ap-
proach towards management of chaos and by chaos is given by Google, 
whose management achieved success in deploying the principle of 
“structured chaos” (Lashinsky 2006). 
A number of questions arise when we talk about technological and non 
technological factors of innovation in a broader context of industry-
government-academia relations. To what extent can NTI be the result of 
technological state-of-the-art, or an indication of technological stagna-
tion, or market-led approaches dictated by the firms? Are NTI only a 
function of technological advances and technological innovations? To 
what extent do technological advances imply the direction of further sci-
entific and technological progress by facilitating the introduction of NTI 
in governments, enterprises, and society? How do trade and non-trade 
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markets coexist in modern societies and what apparent forms can they 
take? Are adaptive changes, performed with the aim of conforming to 
standards, as good as truly radical innovations, determined by system’s 
variation? These questions will be taken into consideration in the follow-
ing sections, although many aspects of them go beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
The rest of the chapter is structured in the following manner: The next 
sections describe the complex interaction of non-technological and non-
market innovations with economic and technologic innovations. The en-
suing sections explain the conceptual framework for organizational and 
managerial innovations and describe the results of a preliminary case 
study involving many large Russian companies. The study provides some 
valuable insights on the attitudes and strategies of the Russian companies 
towards the implementation of organizational and managerial innova-
tions. 
 
Non-Technological Innovations and Their Hypothetic 
Relation to Technology Innovations 
 
I start with the assumption of complex relations between technological 
and economical innovations and NTI. While technological innovations 
are at the core of all other transactions which occur in modern 
knowledge-based societies and which are regulated by economic systems, 
the influence of NTI, be it a social innovation or a lifestyle acceptance, 
should not be underestimated. There is much evidence for the leading 
role of TI. The lack of evidence for NTI may be a consequence of the 
fact that many inquiries simply do not take into consideration the possi-
ble impact of non-technological factors on technologies (Trofimov 
1999). 
It is at least premature to think about NTI as a kind of an artificially con-
structed pattern of cultural assimilation. Successful models of behavior 
and adaptation that can be totally emulated and tackled from the top 
down as well as from the bottom up, are relatively few. Voluntarism as-
sumes that innovations can be effective as long as they are deliberately 
accepted by society. This does not mean that a constructivist approach 
towards social perception of innovations is in contrast with the fact that 
the society at large is a distinct player in the innovation process. 
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To a certain degree, tacit knowledge is embedded in social networks, and 
similarly NTI are interconnected with TI. It should be accepted that NTI 
and TI are not mutually exclusive but that they coexist in form of an in-
tersection or a superposition along a continuum of all possible innova-
tions. 
While there is enough evidence of the power of technologies and tech-
nological innovations, we presumably still cannot talk of unidirectional 
influence of technology on the adoption of relative NTI. In this respect, 
the principal question is how the existing socioeconomic structures and 
major social and cultural innovations shape the technological advances 
and what is their ability to foster breakthrough technologies? The shap-
ing of future technology through non-technology factors is one of the 
attributes of modern economic and technological foresight, intended as a 
deliberate action to construct the future. 
Foresight activities are based on social constructs and different percep-
tions of society and technology, such as the heroic view of society when 
social actions are considered as principally voluntary, and when technol-
ogies and their outcomes are both taken into consideration from a more 
general point of view of socioeconomic change2 (OECD 2001). For ex-
ample, business models, organizational and market structures, as well as 
corporate culture, are heavily influenced by trunk innovations in tele-
communications; many of the possible social implications of new tech-
nologies in this field have been generally considered since the inception 
of the relative policies (OECD 1999). This means that setting of priori-
ties in modern societies is not entirely preconditioned by the technologi-
cal state of the art, nor are the technological or economical factors the 
only determinant ones. 
Perhaps we have to take lightly the prognostic capabilities of technology 
foresight in complex and undetermined environments, such as a “triple-
helix” one. Nevertheless, two things cannot be underestimated: the in-
fluence of various constructs on minds, which are an essential part of 
any foresight activity and objective purposes for action, existing in com-
plex environments and determined by many “givens,” that can be lan-
guage or technical jargon, based on tacit understanding, corporate cul-
ture or leadership qualities of top management and their ability to con-
vince and motivate people. 
The example of policy priority setting in the case of the transition to-
wards the so-called “hydrogen economy” is also indicative. Basic tech-
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nologies and processes that are used in fuel cells were known many dec-
ades and even centuries ago, but these technologies were not emphasized 
until the last two decades. Only a few years ago the role and the signifi-
cance of these technologies for society was rediscovered with the intro-
duction of policies for “sustainable development.” In parallel, govern-
ments have become increasingly involved in research of alternative ener-
gy sources and “green technologies.” 
Recognizing the importance of NTI, the OECD has included the con-
cepts of marketing and organizational innovation in its methodological 
guidelines (OECD 2005, cf. also the below list). Marketing innovation is 
defined as a new marketing method for product placement and product 
pricing, including consumer-oriented changes in design and branding 
strategies. Organizational innovation is defined as a new organizational 
method, involving significant changes in business processes, workspace 
organization, organizational structure or its external relations. In this re-
lation the broader definition of innovation is as follows: 
 
An innovation is the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or 
process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, workplace 
organization, or external relations. 
 
In this definition there are no “good” or “bad” innovations, although in 
practice innovation is often synonymous with an improvement in terms 
of a personal judgment. Russian official documents, for example, explic-
itly stress that innovations in technology, organization of labor or man-
agement should be based on some improvements and some break-
through advances (Source: adapted from OECD 2005): 
 
Marketing innovations  
– Consistently new consumer-oriented marketing methods developed/adopted 
by the innovating firm with the principal objective of increasing the firm’s 
sales of new/existing products: 
Product placement 
– Introduction of new sales methods, such as a franchising system, direct selling 
or exclusive retailing, product licensing 
– Use of new concepts for the presentation of products, such as salesrooms for 
furniture 
Product design (e.g. changes in the packaging of food) 
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Product pricing 
– New methods for varying the price of a good or service according to variables 
such as demand or business support schemes in telecom (with the exception 
of or seasonal, regular and other routine changes or methods whose sole pur-
pose is to differentiate prices by customer segments). 
– Interactive methods, for example allowing customers to choose desired prod-
uct specifications on the firm’s Web site. 
 
Branding strategies 
– The development and introduction of a fundamentally new brand symbol (as 
distinguished from a regular update of the brand’s appearance), which is in-
tended to position the firm’s product on a new market or give the product a 
new image 
Product promotion 
– The first use of a significantly different media or technique—such as product 
placement in movies or television programs, or the use of celebrity endorse-
ments 
– Introduction of a personalized information system, e.g. obtained from loyalty 
cards 
Organizational innovations  
– Consistently new organizational methods (in business processes, workspace 
organization, organizational structure or organization’s external relations) de-
veloped/adopted by the innovating firm on the basis of strategic decisions 
taken by management with the principal objective of increasing the a firm’s 
performance by reducing administrative costs or transaction costs, improving 
workplace satisfaction (and thus labor productivity), gaining access to non-
tradable assets (such as non-codified external knowledge) or reducing costs of 
supplies: 
Business processes 
– Processes, involving learning and knowledge sharing within the firm: a) the 
first implementation of methods for codifying knowledge, e.g. establishing 
databases of best practices, so that they are more easily accessible to others; b) 
the first implementation of practices for employee development and improv-
ing worker retention, e.g. education and training systems 
– The first introduction of management systems for general production or sup-
ply operations, such as supply chain management systems, business reengi-
neering, quality-management systems 
Workspace organization 
– New methods for distributing responsibilities and decision making among 
employees for the division of work within and between firm activities (and 
organizational units): a) a new organizational model that gives the firm’s em-
ployees greater autonomy, e.g. through the decentralization of group activity 
and management control or the establishment of formal or informal work 
teams in which individual workers have more flexible job responsibilities; b) a 
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new organizational model involving the centralization of activity and greater 
accountability for decision making, e.g. the integration of sales and produc-
tion or the integration of engineering with production. 
Organization’s external relations 
– New ways of organizing relations with other firms or public institutions, such 
as the establishment of new types of collaborations with research organiza-
tions or customers, new methods of integration with suppliers, and the out-
sourcing of business activities 
Productivity-enhancing ICT 
For example, the use of new software for documenting and communicating in-
formation in order to encourage knowledge codification and knowledge sharing 
within the firm 
 
The OECD concept of NTI includes the adoption of productivity-
enhancing ICT (OECD 2005). The application of new ICT can have var-
ious effects on the decision-making process of a company. For example, 
the following phases can be observed: firstly, ICT (e.g. data bases and 
warehouses, client management systems, decision-supporting tools, se-
mantic crawlers, web tools and other means) are implemented and 
adapted to become functional and useful for the personnel; secondly, 
such innovations start to function as distinct environments and retroac-
tively modify the decision-making process and communications they 
were intended to support. The positive role of ICT consists of the reduc-
tion of low-profile and routine operations, while they help to put into 
evidence high-profile processes in organizations, requiring additional ef-
forts in order to achieve a solution. 
To better understand the relation of NTI to technological innovations, 
we can rely on contemporary confirmation of the existence of long cy-
cles of technology, which involve latent cycles of science and technology 
advances preconditioning the major scientific outbreaks, basic inventions 
and technology revolutions, explicit cycles of innovation development 
taking the form of trunk innovations and finally cycles of economic, 
governmental and societal reaction. One theoretical explanation for such 
technology cycles was proposed by Kondratiev and received further the-
oretical elaboration by Schumpeter (Hirooka 2003). 
In principle, the Kondratiev cycles exhibit a unidirectional succession of 
evolutionary steps similar to those describing the life-cycle of a single 
technology. A Kondratiev cycle starts with a set of initial conditions, giv-
en by the previous cycle, proceeds through the recovery of scientific ad-
vances during the upswing stage, and reaches its boom stage accompa-
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nied by stagnation and followed by depression and downswing. A sche-
matic trajectory of a single technology life-cycle in the context of the 
broader Kondratiev cycles is shown in Figure 1. In this schematic illus-
tration, four phases of the technology life-cycle are shown: the recovery 
phase, the boom phase, the phase of stagnation, and the phase of tech-
nology implementation. Often strong technological and market expecta-
tions are inflated by scientific input, thus triggering the development of a 
new branch of technology, but after unsuccessful implementations such 
expectations quickly decrease and leave space for a more pragmatic ap-
proach towards a few remaining low visibility technologies. One reason 
for such a scenario is the long-term character of many discoveries, re-
quiring much more time for the achievement of technical feasibility and 
for the introduction of the relatively short-term innovations than it is 
generally expected by industry and market-led science. 
 
Figure 1: Schematic illustration of a single branch of a technology life-cycle in 
relation to scientific input and market opportunities 
 
In reality the Kondratiev cycles are subject to more complex relations, as 
they are combined with many other dynamical wave processes. Some of 
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them were specified by Schumpeter, who pointed out the relation be-
tween Kondratiev long cycles and minor Juglar cycles (Hirooka 2003) 
and associated them with the appearance of major clusters of innovation 
(Freeman 1979). 
The different effects of technological innovations on the economy and 
on the society can be understood better if we distinguish between incre-
mental innovations, radical (breakthrough) innovations and trunk (fun-
damental) innovations. Trunk innovations represent a principal link be-
tween scientific advances and the economy at large, which can be ex-
pressed in geographical terms as new practices of communications, can-
celling space and time limits. Radical innovation is true innovation as it 
was defined by Merton with the use of the Durkheimian concept of an-
omie. They are the achievement of (socially) significant goals in (socially) 
unaccepted ways. Incremental innovations are much closer to passive 
adaptation, although they cannot be underestimated because of the great 
role that life-styles and fashion play in modern societies. All these kinds 
of innovations exercise a substantially different influence upon the econ-
omy and society (Table 2). 
 
Incremental innovation Radical innovation Trunk innovation 
New design, new model 
“platforms,” small incre-
mental changes of tech-
nical characteristics of 
products, etc. 
 
For example, innovations with-
in Sony Walkman product 
family, introduced gradually 
from 1980 to 1991 
New markets, ranging 
from niche markets to 
global markets, new value 
chains. Radical innovations 
redefine industries and 
industry sectors. 
For example, Affymetrix 
GeneChip Systems, introduced 
in 1994 
Pervasive impact on the 
economy. Trunk innova-
tions induce many subse-
quent technological and 
non-technological innova-
tions 
For example, railways during 
the upswing occurring between 
1846 and 1872 
Incremental innovations 
are dispersed and rely on 
customers’ expectations 
Radical innovations are 
spread along industry 
branches and different 
markets and are concen-
trated along a minor num-
ber of organizations and 
networks with superior 
human capital and market 
penetration rates 
Trunk innovations are 
concentrated in the field of 
energy, transportation, and 
communications and they 
require access to internal 
or external basic resources 
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Incremental innovation Radical innovation Trunk innovation 
Incremental innovations 
sustain existing networking 
structures 
Radical innovations pro-
duce networks on industry 
and market level 
Trunk innovations set in-
frastructures and networks 
beyond industries  
Incremental innovations 
are firstly related to new 
fashion and life-styles dif-
fusion, assimilation and 
acceptance, they closely 
related to a broad category 
of marketing innovations, 
which includes economical 
and non-economical inno-
vations [19] 
Radical innovations are 
related to social capital 
development, knowledge 
transfer activities [18] and 
to marketing and branding 
strategies. Radical innova-
tions influence and are 
influenced by organiza-
tional structure and corpo-
rate culture [20] 
Trunk innovations deter-
mine directions of subse-
quent scientific advances 
and cause revolutions in 
organizations and value 
creation systems of busi-
nesses. NTI determine the 
extent and the resolution 
of the application of trunk 
innovations. Governments 
are involved in foresight 
and planning activities, 
delimiting the range of 
future outcomes, which are 
themselves undetermined. 
Many chaotic non-linear 
dynamics are part of these 
relations from the begin-
ning. 
Table 2: Different types of technological innovations, their effects, and their relation 
to NTI 
 
The degree to which the Kondratiev cycles are influenced by feedback 
reactions of social and governmental regulation and acceptance is un-
clear. While this concept can be used for long-term predictions, its heu-
ristic value is limited to the time span of changes at the meso-level and 
totally underestimates the changes at the micro-level. The predictability 
of long wave processes, such as the Kondratiev cycles, relies on the fact 
that in each moment and in each discontinuous fraction of time the sys-
tem is in quasi-statistical equilibrium. Nevertheless, the initial conditions 
of each cycle can vary substantially and it is impossible to exclude the 
possibility of “chaotic” deviations, fluctuations, and discontinuities, giv-
en by wars, social, ecological, or economic crises and other unexpected 
factors. When we consider some other factors that function in modern 
societies, serious doubts can arise about the deterministic view of tech-
nological and economical innovations, which attempts to explain eco-
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nomic disturbances and crashes in terms of an overheated economy in-
duced through innovation diffusion (Hirooka 2003). 
The non-linearity of innovation diffusion may be an indication of the 
reaction produced by non-technological and non-market factors at me-
so- and micro-levels. Consideration of these factors can give us infor-
mation about the irregularities of macro-economic models relying on 
technology forecasts. Many apparent aspects of the causal relation be-
tween technological innovations and economic development can proba-
bly be resolved by adopting a comprehensive vision on the role of socie-
ty and NTI in delimiting the future of technological development. This is 
possible in the case of proactive involvement and consideration of socie-
ty and social mechanisms in priority setting and technology governance. 
If society and socioeconomic structural changes are taken into account 
as an underestimated source of variation and a missing link between 
technology development and technology application in industry, re-
search, and state regulation, it will be possible to define the respective 
non-technological and non-market aspects of change as taking the form 
of NTI. The feedback reaction provided by NTI is partially explained by 
the concepts of “triple-helix” and “Mode-2” science and the ever-
evolving Polanyi’s concepts of “non-market trade” and codified/non-
codified knowledge. 
It can be supposed that the influence of non-technological innovations 
increased over time since the exploitation of the steam engine during the 
first Kondratiev upswing in 1790 (Kondratiev 1926). At that time the 
principal preoccupation about society consisted in swaying public opin-
ion through the regulatory measures adopted by English authorities. This 
was a typical “top-down” approach to the management of risk percep-
tion of technological innovation. Today many other aspects of NTI have 
emerged, involving more complex approaches to (de)regulation and new 
networking techniques, such as expert communities, NGOs, human 
rights observatories, etc. 
Current technologies are based on those major scientific discoveries and 
outbreaks of the past that were successful in triggering waves of inven-
tion and led to the recognition of big investment opportunities. After a 
technology upswing, the diversification and maturation of single tech-
nologies could be triggered by other mechanisms3. In the paradigm of 
“normal” science the mature phases of a technology life-cycle are subject 
to strong pressures of demand-led invention and cost reduction through 
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process improvement (Freeman 1979). The paradigm of “post-normal” 
science is focused on societal aspects of mature technologies and their 
impact on socioeconomic change. In this paradigm the technology 
communities, governments and societies joined their efforts to accom-
plish relevant non-technological innovations with the aim of consolidat-
ing technological trends and agreeing upon the future of technologies. 
The manifestations of the so-called ‘Mode 2’ are more typical than is 
generally thought (Weingart 1997). Cyclical shift from ‘Mode 1’ to ‘Mode 
2’ science and vice versa happens along a continuum of possible inter-
mediate states and is related to the relative shift of foresight horizons 
along a continuum of definite and indefinite states. When causal relations 
become less obvious and expectations of changes can be evaluated only 
ex-post (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000), the system might be in prox-
imity to a new turn of evolution—that is, a new technology upswing. 
The ‘Mode 2’ method of production of scientific knowledge is character-
ized by a transition towards trans-disciplinary approaches in science and 
a growing influence of mediating environments, such as the service sector of 
the economy, transnational organizations, associations, and technology 
transfer institutions. 
The relation between TI and NTI is, in many respects, similar to the rela-
tion between natural geography and artificially established infrastructures 
of spatial economy (Fujita et al. 1999). Drawing this kind of parallel, we 
can say that TI are more similar to available natural resources. These can 
in turn be concentrated and regulated by NTI, playing the role of artifi-
cially organized infrastructures. 
Successful TI does not always lead to relevant changes in NTI. Often 
NTI in form of a more organized patent legislation or a more liberal in-
novation infrastructure can be a strong incentive for successful TI. For 
example, many technological innovations in biotechnology were con-
strained in Russia in the 1990s despite its advantageous positions in 
many fields at the forefront of medicine, chemistry, and biology. At the 
same time, the favorable conditions for biotechnology that existed in 
other countries, for example in the United States, provided a background 
for the introduction of numerous significant innovations (e.g. Russian 
researcher Mirzabekov and his team commercialized the technology of 
DNA micro arrays in the USA for this reason). 
In the same manner, knowledge-intensive services can be located far 
from the site of principal knowledge flows while exercising remote influ-
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ence on them (Leydesdorff, Dolfsma and van der Panne 2006). One im-
portant implication of spatial economy is that locations of vital concen-
tration of knowledge-based processes, such as Silicon Valley, are unique 
and cannot be duplicated easily in other regions. Spatial factors of inno-
vation processes also include non-trade markets’ interdependencies, the 
territorial locations of the knowledge networks’ centers, social and cul-
tural context of such networks’ locations (Coenen 2007). 
 
Organizational and Managerial Innovations as a Category 
of NTI 
 
Organizational and managerial innovations (OMI) represent organiza-
tional behaviors and their transformationd into business operations that 
are new to the whole organization. Core values of organizational innova-
tions are the leadership and charisma of top managers, their ability to 
inspire the entire work force, to appraise the value of people, and to or-
ganize knowledge management as the critical capabilities of an organiza-
tion to produce, accumulate, and acquire knowledge (Wong and Chin 
2007). 
Next, the different types of organizational and managerial innovations 
will be discussed. They include business model innovations, strategy or 
value innovations, collaborative innovations (including “open-market 
innovation”), knowledge management innovations, and some minor 
types of managerial innovations. The aim of this section consists in dis-
tinguishing between OMI as slow and predictable adaptive changes and 
radical innovations as deliberate and pro-active actions. Some dynamical 
aspects of OMI will be discussed from the point of view of the impact of 
one type of OMI on another and their effect as a whole; the impact of 
the company environment on the OMI and the reflection of OMI on 
corporate culture and the decision-making process. 
Some OMI are more radical than others (Table 3). Intentionally per-
formed organizational innovations seem to be different from those 
achieved adaptively. For example, Kristian Moller and Senja Svahn 
(2006) postulate the importance of deliberate (intentional) action in es-
tablishing radical or future-oriented business nets (e.g. emerging mobile 
services). From this point of view, we can suppose that one of the prin-
cipal distinctions between slow adaptive change and radical innovation 
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consists in a deliberate (intentional) action, lying at the basis of every rad-
ical innovation. 
 
Adaptive organizational and 
managerial innovations 
Radical organizational and 
managerial innovations 
Organizational innovations 
Business model innovations, such as 
shared services, outsourcing of functions, 
using of a third-party operating utility, 
redistribution of human resources, 
management of distribution channels, 
branding strategies, linking innovation 
process to demand, with an accent on 
market-led applications, deployment of 
ICT-assisted organizational innovations, 
etc. 
Strategy or value innovations, such as 
changes in the financial model of 
business, new values for the clients, new 
value creation models (e.g. business nets), 
etc. 
 
Collaborative innovations (including 
“open-market innovation”), such as 
establishment of networks of 
collaborative alliances and alliances with 
academia; strategic mergers and 
acquisitions, bringing the partners into a 
single ownership structure with 
consistent changes in overall 
organizational processes and strategies; 
acquisition and integration of diversified 
assets, e.g. smaller companies with a 
relevant knowledge base, high flexibility, 
etc. 
 
Knowledge management innovations: 
development of social capital of the firm 
and proactive acquisition of external 
technological knowledge 
Managerial innovations 
Management of business processes, 
emulation of a determined organizational 
culture, etc. 
Innovation of corporate culture through 
leadership and trust 
Table 3: Organizational and managerial innovations along a continuum of adaptive 
and radical innovations 
 
Another important aspect of radical innovation consists in its strategic 
relevance for the actors involved in the process of innovation. The re-
sults of such an innovation are regarded as strategically crucial improve-
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ments ex ante. In contrast, adaptive change consists of a relatively slow 
and a relatively passive adoption of transformations undertaken with the 
aim of corresponding to the existing state-of-the-art in a determinate 
field or to adjust some critical processes that are lacking efficiency. 
Other innovations take form of rather adaptive emulation of a deter-
mined organizational culture and belief. For example, the work of crea-
tive groups in public relations firms is entirely based on the emulation of 
some general key values, such as collective tasks and responsibilities, 
open exchange of information, and democratic ethical rules. 
Innovations, related to the management of business processes are gener-
ally adaptive. They include designing new business processes, BSC and 
KPI elaboration, TQM, and conformity with international standards. 
Such innovations generally occur as a result of the need to clarify the 
value creation chain, rather than to invention a new one. 
Radical organizational innovations in high-tech companies are oriented 
to on new radical technologies and new markets entry through radical 
improvements in old value systems or through creation of new value sys-
tems. The linear market dynamics are focused on the understanding of 
an organization’s leading positions and on the forecasting of future cus-
tomer needs. Different organizational strategies and business models on 
this way include branding strategies, linking innovation process to de-
mand, with an accent on mass-market and market-led applications. More 
complex marketing strategies have to be oriented on market strategies, 
which can significantly diversify or even change the whole company’s 
business. 
Organizational innovations in multinational companies can be matched 
against different cultures and habits of personnel. To ensure that the 
basic values of corporations will be complement the values and habits of 
people, and vice versa, it is important to shift local values or to create 
symbiotic values. Redistribution of human resources competences and 
accountabilities, internal rotation, training, and seminars are only a few 
methods to deal with this question. For example, in the Russian branch 
of the German company VEKA, the managers of local projects are ac-
countable directly to the board of directors, while senior management of 
VEKA Rus clarifies and defines operational goals. In this way the local 
hierarchical culture is mitigated by matrix organizational approaches of 
the “mother” company. 
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Strategy or value innovations are applied strategies that are driven not by 
competition on the existing markets, but, on the contrary, by the pursuit 
of new values and markets (Chan Kim 1999). Strategy innovation can 
take the form of reorganization, brand innovation, new pricing and new 
positioning, or the recombination of services (e.g. Cirque du Soleil), and 
other forms of radical changes. 
Value innovations in production industries are almost always linked to 
some kind of disruptive technological innovation. For example, Seagate, 
the major manufacturer of 5.25 inch hard discs in the late 1980s, did not 
recognize the value of new 3.5 inch discs and continued to introduce 
new complex technologies to the already established market. At the same 
time newly established small companies, such as Conner and Quantum 
first occupied a niche market and, by trial and error, introduced value 
innovations for the emerging global market of PCs and laptops, which 
caused Seagate to fail on this new market4 (Christensen 2004). 
Strategic management of disruptive innovations includes organizational 
independence, thorough revaluation of the client base, orientation on 
relatively small customers, a destructive approach towards old rules and 
standards, and a strong orientation to new and emerging markets. Value 
innovation and strategic decisions are a prerequisite for the successful 
commercialization of the majority of disruptive innovations. In addition 
to strategic decisions, there has to be an overall understanding that many 
failures will be inevitable and useful. 
Many times, the outcomes of a strategic decision will remain unclear for 
a long period even for the authors of this decision. For instance, when 
Intel decided to develop, to protect, and to commercialize its first mi-
croprocessor for calculators in the 1960s, the company was fully concen-
trated on the market of DRAM integrated circuits and nobody could 
predict at that time that apparently useless microprocessors would be-
come the core of the company business in the 1990s. 
Value innovation can rely on the culture and expectations of the clients. 
An example of successful value innovation for the clients is IKEA furni-
ture. IKEA’s production is not based on pre-made products and on 
marketing of buyer’s preferences, but on a radically new value system, in 
which the buyer himself is a creative architecture of his own design and 
furniture style. 
Considering organizational and managerial innovations, it is possible to 
name at least five dimensions of change. The dimension of knowledge 
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dynamics includes organizational changes in knowledge transfer proce-
dures, secrecy policies, strategies devoted to social and human capital of 
a firm, and other processes, which can take form of organization of a 
corporate university. 
The second dimension includes changes in the organization itself, related 
to the specialization of labor functions, reform of organizational struc-
ture and the establishment of networks of organizations. One of the 
most important innovations in this field is the design of new organiza-
tions on the interfaces of industry–government–academia environments, 
such as investment banks and foundations in the case of venture capital. 
The third dimension is given by local and overall societal changes in Fu-
kuyama’s terms of “high-trust” and “low-trust” societies (Trofimov 
1999). Trust economies and trust societies are related to ideal types, em-
bedded in culture, history and economic traditions of non-market trade 
and redistribution of basic goods, favored by highly specialized and indi-
vidualistic social capital. 
The fourth dimension of change can be reduced to the interaction at the 
interfaces of an organization’s selective environments along a continuum 
of endogenous and exogenous changes. In this case the development of 
new technology can be considered as an endogenous source of change, 
while the adoption of a new technology from outside is an example of 
relatively passive adaptation. 
Finally, the fifth dimension can be described by the geography of organi-
zations, the spatial distribution of peripheries (e.g. supply-sides) and cen-
ters (e.g. headquarters) and the degree of virtualization of resources. 
Proactive acquisition of external technological knowledge (know-how, 
know-what and know-why) is crucial for every innovative organization. 
It requires a high degree of technological competence of human re-
sources and a good interaction with marketing capability, understood 
first of all in terms of links between R&D, production, and marketing. In 
turn marketing capability relies on social capital of the firm and on many 
organizational innovations, such as management of distribution channels 
(Poon and MacPherson 2005). 
The social capital of a company can be measured as the number of func-
tional contacts of its employees and it is assumed that it influences com-
pany performance. The non-linear aspect of this relation must be con-
sidered. For example, in R&D-intensive environments, which are en-
dowed with highly developed human and social capital, the overall eco-
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nomic benefits for the company can be quite different. This is the case in 
the service industry. R&D-intensive service firms with a highly devel-
oped social capital exhibit rather low nominal labor productivity. At the 
same time, lower profile service firms seem to benefit more in terms of 
their innovativeness from highly evolved social capital. Such firms have 
the strongest sales growth and the highest labor productivity and they are 
strongly oriented to cost-reduction and process innovation (Hollenstein 
2003). 
The Global CEO study performed by IBM in 2006 postulates the im-
portance of business model innovations, involving changes in the struc-
ture and financial model of the business (IBM 2006). This study con-
firmed that best performing enterprises dedicate more attention to busi-
ness model innovations. According to the study, business model innova-
tions can benefit enterprises principally in three ways: they can provide 
economic benefits (e.g. cost reduction), strategic flexibility, and the dis-
covery of new markets through a company’s portfolio diversification. 
While the economic benefits cannot be principally associated with non-
technological factors, the implications for strategy and decision-making 
are clearly non-technological. The CEOs rank improvements in strategic 
flexibility and strategic orientation on new markets as very important. 
The study accented the importance of collaborative innovations for the 
establishment of new or reshaped partnerships, especially in the field of 
R&D. At the same time, almost none of the CEOs (less than 3%) allud-
ed to the innovativeness of a company as a mere function of R&D man-
agement. This is an indication of a shift towards a more non-
technological perception of innovation process as a whole. At the same 
time, the importance of innovation culture and team-oriented environ-
ment of a firm is explicitly mentioned as a major internal source of inno-
vation. 
One type of collaborative innovation is the so-called “open-market in-
novation,” which includes tools such as licensing strategies, strategic 
partnerships and joint ventures. Open-market innovations help to ex-
ploit the benefits of free trade and knowledge transfer to burst internal 
innovativeness of a firm (Rigby and Zook 2002). The principal distinc-
tion of open-market innovations consists in their focus on collaborations 
that will not last long, that will outsource non-necessary R&D work, and 
that will generate many ideas and services for the company at low cost. 
Open-market innovations provide two effects: the diversification of 
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businesses and markets, especially when a company is engaged in highly 
volatile markets, and the saving of corporate R&D resources from vola-
tility. The slogan is: Think of new partnerships and networks, if a few peo-
ple working independently can produce innovations as good as or better than your cor-
porate R&D lab. Open-market innovations are good, when a company 
just cannot approve a strategic plan or a budget without talking about what is going 
on in the outside world. By answering the question “How many innovations 
burst on the scene from the periphery and surprised us?” the open-market innova-
tions keep focusing on low visibility technology innovations, rather than 
on the mainstream of technologies. 
 
The Most Important Hypotheses and Variables of 
Organizational and Managerial Innovations According to a 
Case Study of Large Russian Companies 
 
The case study was performed by the Russian Managers Association 
(AMR), a nationwide independent non-governmental organization en-
gaged in fostering the transition of Russian business community towards 
international standards of business organization. The key members of 
AMR are the most influential top-managers of large companies, actively 
working in Russia and representing virtually all sectors of industry and 
services. 
The results of this case study, which was conducted in collaboration with 
the Institute of Sociology of Russian Academy of Sciences, have been 
partially published in the report of AMR, titled “Organizational and 
Managerial Innovations: the development of knowledge-based econo-
my” (Russian Managers Association (AMR) 2008). 
The report stresses that today we cannot consider organizational and 
managerial innovations in Russia as an independent source of variation. 
On the contrary, such innovations are, in general, the result of involun-
tary overtaking actions, following or accompanying major process, prod-
uct or economical innovations. 
One of the reasons for the low rate of adoption of OMI in Russia is a 
relative weakness of the Russian higher education system in the field of 
business management. Many managers do not understand the function 
and the meaning of OMI in modern societies. They often underestimate 
the role of personal factors and the importance of deliberately taken 
OMI. As a result, there is a substantial lack of knowledge and know-how 
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required for successful implementation of OMI. Other reasons include 
specific historical conditions and the legacy of strong etatistic model of 
innovation that existed in the former Soviet Union. 
In brief, the methodology of this case-study is based on two principal 
activities: a semi-structured questionnaire and a semi-structured face-to-
face interview with key experts. In total, 120 organizations (Table 4) re-
sponded to a questionnaire previously disseminated via e-mail among all 
Russian and foreign organizations accessible to AMR. Twenty-four ques-
tions were divided into four blocks: prerequisites for OMI, implementa-
tion of OMI, the managers’ role during the implementation of OMI, and 
estimation of the results. After that, the respondents were asked to select 
key experts in the field and a “snowball” strategy was applied to select 
ten key experts, which took part in the interviews. Two group discus-
sions with the participation of interested top-managers were conducted 
with the aim of formulating and approving the questionnaire and one 
group discussion was held with the aim of resuming the results of the 
case study. 
 
 Size of enterprise 
 Small Medium Large 
Production    
Chemical industry and 
biotechnology 
  7 
IT   3 
Metallurgy   5 
Machinery and transport   12 
Energy   4 
Construction   6 
Telecom   7 
Food   4 
Other industries (low-tech)   5 
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 Size of enterprise 
 Small Medium Large 
Production    
Services    
IT-services  1 4 
Banks and investment groups   15 
Trade   4 
Education and training 1 5  
Insurance  1 2 
PR and media 3 2 2 
Consultancy, audit, leasing, HR 5 7 6 
Policy support  3  
Other services (low-profile) 5 1  
TOTAL 14 20 86 
Table 4: Distribution of questionnaire respondents according to institutional 
affiliation 
 
The report adopts the following definition of innovation (Russian Man-
agers Association (AMR) 2008, cf. Figure 2): 
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Figure 2: OMI in the framework of general classification of innovations (Source: 
Russian Managers Association 2008) 
 
An innovation is the profitable implementation of a new technology, or new 
product (good or service), or a new organizational, technical or socioeconomic 
solution, related to production, financing, commercialization, administration, or 
some other field of company’s activity. 
 
The definition of innovation in Russian legislation also includes the no-
tion of additional social benefit of a new product, process, service or organi-
zational form in comparison to the previous ones. The classification of 
major attributes of OMI is shown in Figure 4. 
The most widespread practices of motivation during the implementation 
of OMI in Russia include principally financial mechanisms: definition of 
a company’s salary grid on the bases of regrading of the managerial per-
sonnel, revaluation of KPI and development of a bonus system on the 
basis of KPI accomplishment, clarification of carrier paths. Team-
building activities and of personnel rotation are used more rarely. Finally, 
the role of moral rewards and moral stimuli is usually underestimated. 
This disproportion in many cases leads to misunderstanding and in some 
cases even to a failure of the foreseen practices of motivation. For ex-
ample, clearly defined bonuses and KPIs from one side and the intoler-
ance of diversification and new projects are a good means to cut off 
many profitable projects, trying to reduce costs and to optimize risks. 
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Figure 3: The shares of companies (%) which have implemented at least one OMI, 
by types of OMI (as proposed in own questionnaire). Note: The estimation is based 
on the overall number of responses by the respondents (Source: Russian Managers 
Association AMR 2008). 
 
Only 3% of respondents believe that there is no necessity for OMI in 
their companies; 42% believe that OMI are needed but not urgently 
enough to start them right now. The remaining 55% affirm that a high 
sense of urgency prevails in their companies regarding the immediate 
implementation of specific OMI. 
Despite such a strong interest, organizational and managerial innovations 
in Russia are generally performed centrally and based on hierarchical 
governance. The individuality of the innovation process in Russia is gen-
erally related to a high degree of institutional isomorphism, taking the 
form of a widespread diffusion of regulatory measures “from above.” 
One example is given by the establishment of the so-called “special eco-
nomic zones,” which are similar to Italian innovation districts, providing 
some juridical and economical incentives and a better investment and 
infrastructural environment for the business. 
The Russian firms try to escape the high degree of uncertainty by simply 
rejecting all innovations that involve complex networking or completely 
new organizational solutions, especially if these actions are not supported 
by the state. 
The vast majority of Russian large enterprises are passively engaged in 
the implementation of OMI. They adopt a relatively higher share of 
adaptive strategies rather than pure radical innovations. This can be de-
duced from the overview of the principal sources of OMI mentioned by 
the respondents. Such sources are subdivided in two categories: innova-
tions of “outer impulse” and innovations of “inherent impulse.” Both 
innovation sources are intended as some kind of critical situation within 
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a company or within its economic markets. Both of them are mostly fo-
cused on crisis-proof management, rather than on organization im-
provement. Innovations of “outer impulse” are relatively few and take 
form of OMI, influenced by unpredictable (for the company) and thus 
sudden market changes, almost always negatively influencing the compa-
ny’s performance. Innovations of “inherent impulse” are predominant 
ones and are generally the result of top-management discontent with the 
present internal situation. 
The case study was originally intended to formulate some general hy-
potheses that can be reassessed and valuated empirically in the following 
studies. One principal question consists in the specification of system of 
reference for data collection. Key definitions need to be further ex-
plained and evaluated from the point of view of measurable indicators 
and variables. 
 
 
Figure 4: Classification of major objects and attributes of OMI (Source: Russian 
Managers Association AMR 2008). 
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Hypothesis 1: OMI in the system of management are positively related to the competi-
tiveness of the company and to the achievement of predefined strategic goals. 
In Russian companies OMI in the system of management are often in-
ternal radical changes, stimulated by crisis situations or other exogenous-
ly induced critical changes in organization strategy provoked by radical 
changes in the business environment. The dynamic aspects of such 
transformations include the overall effect on organizational structure, 
organization of business divisions, business processes, and marketing 
activities of the company, and the feedback effect on corporate culture 
and decision-making process. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: The generally accepted belief in the secondary function of OMI in rela-
tion to technological innovations restrains the diffusion and emulation of successful 
OMI. 
This hypothesis presupposes that technological innovations and OMI 
complement each other. One derivate sub-hypothesis postulates that 
OMI are more important at early stages of the life-cycle of an organiza-
tion, especially in venture organizations. Venture organizations and ven-
ture investors currently working in Russia underestimate the importance 
of OMI and rely almost entirely on technologies. The underestimation of 
OMI leads to lack of methods for evaluation of OMI impact, which in 
turn leads to the commercialization of successful OMI by a restricted 
number of consultancy firms that are capable of evaluating the positive 
changes resulting from OMI. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Companies in the service sector are more disposed and more susceptible 
to OMI. 
First of all, companies operating in the fields of trade, insurance and tel-
ecommunications (mobile services) are more prone to adopt or to emu-
late OMI. In contrast, banks are considered to be less prone to OMI. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Russian companies are oriented towards emulation of OMI, which have 
been generated abroad. 
Organizational and management innovations are unique and unrepeata-
ble to the extent that they represent a function of endogenous variation. 
It is not always possible to translate or to emulate the experience of oth-
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er organizations, especially if there are significant cultural and social dif-
ferences between respective local environments. In Russian context, all-
purpose one-size-fits-all solutions, proposed by consultancy firms are 
often a waste of money and time. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The intensity of the innovation conflict during the adoption of OMI is 
proportional to the effective (and not formal) changes within company. 
Russian top management is generally oriented towards short-term 
achievements and prefers to pursue tactical rather than strategic goals. 
One of the principal conflicts in this respect is supposed to be the con-
flict between top-management current goals and stakeholders’ expecta-
tions. One of the reasons of this conflict might be the consideration of 
OMI from the point of view of investments, rather than from the point 
of view of value innovation and corporate culture. 
 
Hypothesis 6: The principal obstacle for OMI is personnel’s resistance to change and 
sabotage. 
Sabotage by personnel is a direct consequence of the low level of partici-
pation of functional managers, R&D specialists, and other key persons in 
the decision-making process. The action “from above” encounters re-
sistance from personnel where there is an unclear system of motivation 
and reward. Creative companies in the service sector usually underesti-
mate the role of material motivation, while the high-technology industrial 
companies usually underestimate the role of moral motivation and moral 
reward. 
 
Hypothesis 7: The effect of OMI is reflected by the achievement of a company’s strate-
gic goals and on organizational innovation management. 
The principal effect is supposed to be an improved process of value cre-
ation and its contribution to the company’s capitalization growth, while 
other important direct or lateral effects (e.g. labor productivity, margin 
growth, or product/services diversification) are usually not considered. 
Russian companies normally use a linear system of evaluation of the ef-
fects of OMI. They define the managerial practices and decision-making 
processes, which can be affected by OMI. Afterwards they define key 
indicators (mostly economic) of change and the expected impact of OMI 
on these indicators. The ex post evaluation is performed form the point 
of view of the company’s capitalization growth. At the same time, many 
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respondents recognize that OMI do not have a direct influence on eco-
nomic indicators of organization’s performance and they agree that the 
estimations of lateral effects require special efforts and still can be ap-
proximate or imprecise. 
 
Hypothesis 8: Globalization and global competitiveness is the most important driver 
of OMI. 
Russian companies continue to use tactics of second-generation man-
agement, focused on the acquisition of new assets and on the restructur-
ing of the existing ones. They still don’t fully recognize their capabilities 
for change through the use of radical OMI. In this context, they are 
heavily influenced by changes coming from outside, especially by chang-
es on global markets. Trunk innovations, especially in the field of tele-
communications, are a major source of adaptive OMI. 
Many general variables influence the adoption and implementation of 
OMI in the Russian context. Some of them are too generic (such as na-
tional innovation system, national legislation, or national institutional 
framework) and some of them correspond to the global contexts. The 
most important variables directly related to an organization’s internal 
processes and its immediate environment can be represented as shown in 
Table 5. This structure of variables is based upon the results of the case-
study and takes into consideration the specific aspects of Russian reality, 
as they were mentioned in the answers of the respondents. 
 
Variables Specific factors Some implications 
Variables describing pro-active (strategic) approaches 
OMI management: 
– Restructuring of 
business (mergers and 
acquisitions, IPO 
strategies, assets re-
valuation) 
– Business-processes 
(changes in organiza-
tional structure, redis-
tribution of functions 
 
Russian companies are 
more influenced by 
trunk innovations, es-
pecially in the field of 
telecommunications 
and they put low em-
phasis on innovation 
culture and often ne-
glect the value of peo-
 
Overall effect on or-
ganizational structure, 
organization of busi-
ness divisions, business 
processes and market-
ing activities. As a re-
sult, product manage-
ment, licensing and se-
crecy strategies are also 
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and human resources, 
trainings and adapta-
tion) 
– Support mechanisms 
for decision making 
(e.g. ICT implementa-
tion) 
 
ple. affected. Companies at 
the early stages of their 
life-cycle are more flex-
ible and prone to diver-
sify their assets and 
products. 
Variables describing the organization’s capabilities  
Economic perfor-
mance  
Market and clients’ 
demand and expecta-
tions cost reduction, 
loyalty of constant cli-
ents 
The OMI are assessed 
from the point of view 
of economic perfor-
mance 
Social capital (external 
relations) 
Quality of informal re-
lations, visibility of 
formal relations 
Organization visibility 
and the ability to re-
ceive governmental 
funds are strong moti-
vations 
Variables describing retroactive (remedial) approaches 
Conformity to stand-
ards 
Russian companies are 
usually willing to adopt 
international standards 
and best practices, 
though often they do it 
retroactively 
Involvement of a large 
number of consultancy 
firms, outsourcing of 
unsuccessful activities, 
formal emulation of 
standards and best 
practices 
Crisis-proof manage-
ment (in cases of 
communication failure, 
process failure or mar-
ket failure) 
The failures cannot be 
foreseen because top 
management is concen-
trated on short-term 
objectives 
Reform of organiza-
tional structure, busi-
ness processes, and 
marketing activities 
Table 5: Variables that influence the adoption and implementation of OMI in Russia 
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Russian private companies are thoroughly engaged in the development 
of special strategies and measures for training their personnel. Some 
companies have already organized corporate universities or corporate 
branches within major state universities. New methods and organization-
al models for the attraction of talented youngsters in the natural and ap-
plied sciences are also in the phase of implementation across various in-
dustries, such as oil and telecommunications. For example, in 2003, JSC 
Severstal initiated a special education program called “Talent Pool” in its 
corporate university in collaboration with the University of Northum-
bria, in the United Kingdom. Some corporations (e.g. diversified finan-
cial corporation Sistema) have recently opened special faculties of busi-
ness administration in collaboration with Lomonosov Moscow State 
University, the leading and the largest institution in Russian higher edu-
cation. 
The study demonstrates that the respondents were generally aware of the 
motivation mechanisms provided by corporate innovation culture. Inno-
vation culture is understood as a dissemination system of key company 
values, determining a high level of innovation adoption, initiation, and 
accomplishment. 
Nevertheless, the functioning of this system is in many cases misunder-
stood. In 97% of cases the decisions on the adoption of an OMI were 
made by the company’s stakeholders or board of directors. Innovation 
culture is associated with organizational innovation management, inno-
vation policy measures, and their explanation to personnel. On the one 
hand, it is obvious that an effective leadership and charismatic qualities 
of top management can have a much bigger influence on corporate val-
ues than the mere adoption and explanation of these values “from 
above.” On the other, it is important to note that none of the respond-
ents explicitly mentioned such aspects of innovation culture as the ne-
cessity to overcome mistrust and fear of failed projects (which failed de-
spite being diligently orchestrated). 
As practice shows, in Russia all OMI have to be initiated “from above” 
to be functional and successful. But in some cases even innovations ac-
cepted on the level of top-management are destined to fail because the 
innovation culture is also deployed “from above. In this respect, it would 
be useful to consider a few examples of OMI implementation by Russian 
companies. 
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Example 1. A typical process of an OMI implementation by Russian large 
companies with all the relative advantages and disadvantages can be 
shown by the following example. JSC Stakeholding, a large group of 
companies in the glass industry, introduced an automated system for ac-
countancy and workflow management with parallel restructuring and re-
forming of the whole organization’s management. An IT consultancy 
firm was chosen as a provider of IT solution and an internal ad hoc group 
was formed with the aim of improving control over financial flows, to 
improve organizational discipline, and to facilitate operative access to 
financial and economic information for management of the company. In 
a preliminary phase, financial motivation mechanisms were proposed, 
the current business processes were described and analyzed, and person-
nel grading with the definition of relative functional plans for managers 
was performed. During the implementation phase, the company re-
sources were inventoried and new standards of work for the personnel 
were introduced in course of some training. In the exploitation phase, 
the results of system monitoring induced a further modification of the 
new business processes; at the same time the recruitment of personnel 
for automated work spaces was implemented. After that, a long process 
for rendering the system operational and functional began. As a result, 
the new IT system had become operational and the so-called “human 
element” was minimized in accountancy and workflow of the company 
at the expense of a huge HR churn rate and some operational expenses 
for the system’s maintenance. Considering this OMI, it is impossible to 
say whether the performance of the company will be improved and 
whether the current top managers will be able to take more clear-sighted 
decisions, as neither the organizational culture nor the company’s values 
or strategies have been changed. 
 
Example 2. This example describes a public–private partnership between 
a governmental agency, an enterprise, and a state research laboratory. A 
company (A) initiated a project for the development of a new technology 
and obtained 50% financing from a state agency. On the basis of new 
organizational structures (project teams) and bilateral agreements, a con-
sortium of state research laboratories (C) started to develop a technology 
for A. The innovation culture within project teams was good and many 
R&D people in A felt enthusiastic about the project and its possible out-
comes. Even if the project was complex and risky, all the juridical and 
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organizational innovations were well implemented. Little by little, project 
teams started to recognize that, despite project approval, linear managers 
in A did not understand the project and did not want to become project 
leaders. Moreover, the project results would probably mean a new mar-
ket entry for A and this posed new problems for A’s marketing strate-
gies. R&D people in A could not participate in the decision-making pro-
cess because they were not treated as peers and they effectively lacked 
for understanding of A’s marketing strategies. As a result, people from C 
adopted a passive approach towards the project results and financial mo-
tivation couldn’t stimulate them to produce valuable results and patents 
for A. Instead, they decided to use the results of the project to promote 
their scientific careers. Mangers from A became unhappy with the pro-
ject uncertainties as well, and tried to minimize project risks by cutting 
budgets. In this case we can see how a formal innovation culture can 
lead to the neglect of value of people and of organizational innovation 
opportunities. If there was a more functional innovation culture in A, the 
project could possibly be a failure all the same, but a new project could 
possibly produce valuable results on the basis of the previous coopera-
tion. But here the very organizational innovation was a failure. 
 
Example 3. A singular example of an OMI implementation by a Russian 
company is provided by JSC Sitronics. Together with Russian Academy 
of Sciences, JSC Sitronics has established “Sitronics Labs.” This newly 
established institution is responsible for the commercialization of R&D 
and functions as a corporate research center. The R&D results are going 
to be leveraged by other company’s business divisions. Furthermore, the 
center has started to attract high-quality human resources from academia 
and has deployed strategies for participating in standardization activities. 
Sitronics Labs possesses all the attributes of an important source of value 
creation for the rest of the company and respectively it can be consid-
ered as a future corporate “centre of excellence.” In fact Sitronics Labs is 
located in a strong business environment with good networking links to 
competence sources, while internal clients of Sitronics are not regarded 
as principal clients of the research laboratory a priori. Sitronics Labs is 
also favorably positioned to receive an investment of the parent firm, 
while the importance of the centrally performed coordination of the ac-
tivities of Sitronics Labs and the promotion of its interdependence from 
other business divisions are acknowledged. An important organizational 
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strategy consists in the establishment of a climate of high responsibility 
and high sense of urgency. 
Although the juridical status is that of an autonomous non-profit organi-
zation, the factual autonomy of Sitronics Labs is not considered to be an 
important function, since its role at the interfaces with academia and 
government rather presupposes strong coordination and interactivity. 
The operational autonomy of this center of excellence as an organiza-
tionally separate unit will derive from its self-organizing potential, di-
rected for the establishment of new and more functional links. In fact, 
the Sitronics Labs acts at two interfaces. It is not only an association at 
the interface with academia, nor only a high-technology institution for 
the management of corporate laboratories, but it is principally a labora-
tory, having two additional interfaces: an interface with Russian academia 
and an interface with institutions in the field of research governance and 
regulation. 
 
The first example describes a passive adaptive change, caused by some 
inherent organizational problems. The second example tells us about a 
radical innovation with all attributes of pro-active thinking implemented 
in an unsuitable environment. The third example is a radical innovation, 
which is undertaken in the right environment and in the right place with 
many probable feedback reactions on various levels of company’s activi-
ties: strategy, product portfolio, secrecy and licensing, standardization 
and intellectual property management, branding strategies and corporate 
image, new sources of knowledge acquisition. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Innovations perform the function of a nervous system of an organiza-
tion and they can be oriented more to an organization’s lability or stabil-
ity, its induced adaptation or self-organization. It is better for an organi-
zation to avoid system lability and passively induced adaptations, and to 
exploit its innovative potential for a greater stability and self-
organization. At the same time an adaptation to rapidly evolving envi-
ronments must include approaches for the development of a sort of ex-
ternal nervous system responsible for ad hoc strategies (such as network-
ing activities, value innovation or diversification of a company’s assets) 
with the aim of mitigating the chaotic effects of these environments. 
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Entrepreneurial activity can be enhanced through consolidation of social 
capital in networks and through promotion of excellence in research. To 
accomplish this goal, relevant social and organizational innovations 
might include the institution of new interfaces for the promotion of col-
laborative innovations as an invaluable source of knowledge, motivation, 
and human capital. Economic stimuli and economic outcomes are not 
necessarily essential in fostering the development of social capital, even if 
economic investments are necessary for the introduction of the majority 
of social or organizational innovations. 
Organizational and managerial innovations play an important role in all 
the processes mentioned above. The best non-technological innovations 
have multiple effects and feedback reactions, which go beyond the origi-
nal scope and that are not directly measurable in terms of economic per-
formance. Such innovations can help companies to deploy proactive 
strategies and to improve their technological leadership in the long term. 
 
Notes 
 
1 The concept of algorithmic randomness, which describes the changes with the 
largest algorithmic information content (RAND 1997), should be applied. In this case 
the word “random” as a probabilistic characteristic is a synonym for “unintelligi-
ble” and an antonym of “uncertain.” 
2 In contrast, a tragic view on society presupposes that the influence of technolo-
gies is total and that technocracy is the only outcome. 
3 For example, the Kyoto process involves scientists, policy makers, and enterpris-
es in a complex process of innovation, in which the “Mode 2” non-technological 
and non-market activities are the most evident. The function of this process con-
sists of a socially distributed knowledge, produced by constellations of concerned 
parties and only partially codified in conference proceedings and in disciplinary 
journals (Mueller 2003). 
4 Conner and Quantum started the promotion of 3.5 inch hard-disc technology 
and defined a completely new market relying on unusual customers: small com-
panies and startups, which appreciated more compact hard disks with lower 
technical characteristics. 
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Alexander Kesselring 
SOCIAL INNOVATION IN PRIVATE COMPANIES: AN EXPLOR-
ATORY EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The concept of social innovation (SI) is not established in social theory 
and still seems to be widely unknown outside the academic context 
(Aderhold and John 2005; Roth 2009; Müller, Roth, and Zak 2010). A 
common explanation for this neglect of SI is that the notion of innova-
tion is dominated by technical innovation, which is seen as the driving 
force behind far-ranging processes of economic and social change. This 
connection between technological innovation, economic performance, 
and social change has been formulated by very prominent and classic so-
ciologists and economists such as Karl Marx and Josef Schumpeter. 
Schumpeter thought of capitalism as a system constantly revolutionizing 
its very own foundations mainly through the introduction of new pro-
duction techniques and new forms of distribution and organization 
(Schumpeter 1993, 2005). The still influential macro-theory on long-term 
business cycles by Nikolai Kondratiev, which inspired Schumpeter, also 
proposed that basic technological innovations are responsible for social 
change. 
Even if the notion of social innovation is present in these early works, it 
is perceived as a secondary phenomenon that accompanies or follows 
technological and economic innovations on their path—a view that is 
still present in modern, economy-oriented innovation theory. Theoretical 
and empirical work in the field of social innovations in our understand-
ing has to look for consistent and empirically applicable definitions, 
which present social innovations as innovations in their own right. 
 
Defining Social Innovations 
 
Only a few sociologists have discussed social innovation. The German 
sociologist Zapf, who is most prominent for his research and theories on 
modernization, developed a basic and general understanding of SI in the 
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1990s (Zapf 1994). His short paper on social innovation is commonly 
referred to as an important initial point for further research. His defini-
tion of SI is at first glance simple: “Social innovations are new ways to 
reach aims, in particular new organizational forms, new regulations, new 
lifestyles, which alter the direction of social change and which solve 
problems better than former practices. They should be worth being imi-
tated and institutionalized” (Zapf 1994: 33, translation by the author). 
This definition is obviously formulated in a very general way and en-
compasses a multiplicity of different phenomena, such as new lifestyles, 
organizational change within companies, and new services. 
Zapf states that SI alters the direction of social change, which is certainly 
a very demanding and complicated criterion. We propose that this crite-
rion has to be relativized and that an additional criterion has to be intro-
duced, which may help to develop a more concise understanding of SI: 
intention. We emphasize that SI is an intended activity with a clear set of 
actors, methods and aims in contrast to social change, which is common-
ly perceived as an unintended result of involved social actions. “Intention” 
means that SI consists in activities that are manageable and do not trans-
cend the possibilities of rational planning, decision making, and imple-
mentation. 
Zapf does not explicitly refer to intentionality when discussing the rela-
tion between SI and social change. His listing of different types of SI 
comprises phenomena for which it is uncertain whether they always satis-
fy the criterion. Lifestyles, for example, may be regarded as intended in a 
rather instrumental, rationalized form, but beneath the rationalized sur-
face of a lifestyle one may suspect cultural and structural conditions that 
shape the actual behavior of an individual in a rather “unintended” and 
unconscious way. Thus, the criterion of intention would allow differenti-
ation between SI and those other forms of social practice that are to a 
larger extent based on cultural preconditions and the impact of far-
reaching social change on patterns of social behavior, rather than consti-
tuting a planned, project-like undertaking. 
 
Aligning Social Innovation with Technical Innovation 
 
Even when accepting intention as an additional criterion, we are still 
confronted with the connection Zapf proposes between SI and social 
change. If SI alters the direction of social change, how can this alteration 
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be identified and assessed or even measured? Social change may be ret-
rospectively reconstructed in a theoretical or historical approach but cur-
rent changes and tendencies are always difficult to identify. In particular 
the influence on current dynamics of change will not be captured easily. 
When we suppose that SI is a confined and manageable activity then the 
additional problem remains of relating this particulate activity to these 
far-reaching dynamics. Furthermore, many confined activities such as 
smaller projects and initiatives—even if they are inspired by great new 
ideas—will not have an immediately recognizable impact on social 
change and would fall out of the classification. 
SI may become a factor in social change, but they do not necessarily 
have to do this. The emphasis on confined and manageable, maybe par-
ticulate, forms of SI also helps to relate SI to technical innovation. Tech-
nical innovation results in a new product or a new production process, 
which is in some aspects superior to former products/processes, superi-
ority being measurable in terms of speed, quality, safety, etc. The “inven-
tion” or the idea behind a new product/process becomes an innovation 
after the market launch of the product or the implementation of the pro-
cess. This allows a relatively clear definition of technical innovation. 
Technical innovation is further characterized by a set of actors (develop-
ers, managers, users) and an institutional context (company, develop-
ment group, development network). The criteria of confinement and 
manageability that we proposed for SI also apply to technical innovation. 
Moreover, technical innovation, in most cases, consists of an improve-
ment and recombination of already known technologies or production 
processes, and is in this sense called incremental innovation in contrast 
to basic innovations. Basic innovations are new ground-breaking tech-
nologies such as the steam engine, the telegraph, or the computer, which 
revolutionize the way the economy is organized and therefore have a ma-
jor impact on society. 
It seems to be reasonable to align SI with incremental technical innova-
tion, thus underlining its practical, implementation-oriented and con-
fined character. Then SI becomes something we can “grasp” rather than 
a theoretical term with diffuse generality. Besides these basic common 
characteristics of social and technical innovation, there are of course cer-
tain specifics of SI. 
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Aspects of SI 
 
In the following we will discuss several aspects of SI drawn from the so-
ciological literature (Zapf 1994; Mumford 2002; Gillwald 2004; Aderhold 
and John 2005; Moulaert 2005; Lindhult 2008) and from our own empir-
ical research. These aspects are: 
 
– novelty 
– institutionalization 
– durability 
– model character 
– benefit/utility 
– value related 
– process oriented 
– actor oriented 
– cooperation 
– participation 
 
“Novelty” is, of course, a central criterion for innovation of any sort: 
“To intentionally produce change by introducing something new is the 
specific feature of innovation” (Lindhult 2008). However, the novelty of 
a social practice is difficult to assess and may even be irrelevant for the 
actors who may be oriented towards finding the solution to an existing 
problem rather than producing “novelty.” For us, “novelty” is a matter 
of the context in focus. In the case of private companies, and for our 
research purposes, SI should satisfy two criteria: it should be new within 
the context of the investigated firm and the activity should not be rou-
tine practice for comparable firms in terms of size and industry. 
With regard to SI there is also a tension between novelty and institution-
alization, which can be circumscribed by the question: “when does a new 
invention or idea become an innovation?” For technical innovation we 
proposed that the market entry is this significant distinction between in-
vention and innovation. For SI this has to be institutionalization. Social 
innovation therefore refers to a new but already institutionalized organiza-
tional form in terms of objectives, organizational structures, defined 
roles, and durability. Thus, a new social practice needs some time to de-
velop institutionalized structures before achieving the status of a SI. 
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“Benefit/utility” is a criterion that has been developed by the German 
sociologist Gillwald, who wrote a comprehensive paper on different as-
pects of SI (Gillwald 2004). In her view the benefit of SI refers to a cer-
tain area of society (economy, politics, social inclusion, culture, ecology), 
and the rationality that dominates this area, for example economic ra-
tionality, is dominated by the notion of efficiency, while culture is domi-
nated by the notion of meeting cultural needs. In producing benefits 
within one or more of these areas, SI can also lead to drawbacks within 
other areas. An emphasis on preserving natural goods might hinder the 
expansion of economic activity, to give a very simple example. Social in-
novation is therefore often controversial and not necessarily perceived as 
“good” by all involved parties. 
This leads us to the next criterion, “value related,” which says that SI is 
related to values in a much stronger sense than technical innovation. So-
cial innovation is driven by values, and it incorporates and expresses 
them. Values and more concrete aims are, of course, not absolute but are 
in fact a result of social processes. Different groups in society follow dif-
ferent interests and their social, economic and cultural resources decide 
whether they are able to win recognition for their interests and perspec-
tives or not. This “struggle for recognition,” as the prominent German 
sociologist Honneth called it, decides what is perceived as a problem and 
what is established as a legitimate aim (Honneth 2003). 
The “process-oriented” and “actor-oriented” criteria point out a differ-
ence between technical and social innovation (Lindhult 2008). Social in-
novation is essentially an ongoing social process whereas technical inno-
vation results in a product or a process of production. Social innovation 
is therefore more variable and may be more diffuse in its form. As an 
ongoing process SI depends on involved actors, their engagement, their 
values, and their (social) competences. While technical innovation in-
volves these elements rather in the phase of development, they are an 
integral part throughout the implementation of SI and have a crucial im-
pact on the definitive “character” and “quality” of SI. 
“Co-operation” with partner organizations (mostly third sector) is prob-
ably one of the most general characteristics of the projects investigated 
in our study. The partner organizations are not only supporters but often 
take the roles of initiators and advisers, which are involved in core tasks 
of project implementation, sharing their professional know-how and ex-
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perience with their traditional clientele. Companies seem to depend on 
this kind of input and support. 
The “benefit”, “value-related” and “co-operation” criteria point to the 
fact that SI often involves the combination or confrontation of different 
rationalities of functional systems (politics, economy, law, education, and 
so forth). The notion of SI is therefore connected to the major theoreti-
cal task of identifying the ways in which functional systems influence 
each other and how values and orientations can be transferred from one 
system to another. 
“Participation” is an additional criterion that we consider to be very im-
portant. Social innovation is based on the reflection of social processes 
and their potential for improvement or renewal. Sociology in its multi-
perspective approach to society teaches us that social processes will only 
be adequately understood if all relevant perspectives are taken into con-
sideration. In the case of private companies this refers in particular to 
employees and their possibilities for reflection on social processes and 
for participation in the conceptualization and implementation of new 
organizational forms. A one-sided, top–down approach will presumably 
fail to implement sustainable and effective organizational forms, which 
depend on the engagement of employees. 
Participation, of course, has many aspects. Many of the representatives 
were conscious about the importance of integrating employees from dif-
ferent hierarchic levels into the conceptualization and implementation of 
projects. Project coordination groups included production workers as 
well as heads of departments and managers. Another interesting method 
was internal multiplier trainings: a group of employees receives special 
training with external professionals and then independently passes the 
knowledge on to colleagues. This approach allowed a broad dissemina-
tion of knowledge relevant to the project. 
Informal and flexible forms of participation occurred, in particular in the 
small companies that we investigated. Employees were able to bring up 
their own ideas spontaneously within a culture of open and personal 
communication across all hierarchic levels and flexible operational roles. 
Social Innovation in Private Companies 
We defined SI in private companies as an intended development of new 
organizational forms (projects) directed at highly valued social aims or 
specific problems, which may address internal or external target groups. 
Following this definition, there is a wide range of internal areas of private 
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companies in which the implementation of SI is possible: the organiza-
tion of work and organizational restructuring, employee-employer rela-
tions, structures of communication, knowledge management, internal 
vocational training, trainee programs, safety and health programs, human 
resources development, social support for employees, and so forth. The-
se fields constitute basic and necessary structures and processes within a 
firm and are tightly connected to main economic interests. Besides these 
internal fields our definition also points to activities that reach beyond 
the borders of the private company and show a looser relation to main 
economic interests. These types of external engagements may consist in 
sponsoring activities, social support activities, projects that address local 
stakeholders (public dialogue between management and local stakehold-
ers), research/assessment activities (reports on the impact of business 
activities on local social structures), memberships in associations (CSR 
networks and associations, cooperation with labor unions) or founda-
tions. Sometimes this social engagement is more pronounced in the form 
of so-called philanthropy. Philanthropy is commonly understood as a 
systematic and long-term donation or “investment,” which aims to sup-
port a charitable cause. 
Within all these fields—internal or external—the initiation of new organ-
izational forms of social practice seems to be possible, some of these ac-
tivities actually constituting SI themselves—for example, a network of 
non-profit organizations sponsored by a philanthropist or a foundation 
with entrepreneurial background. 
 
Methodology 
 
The study followed a rather classic research design and included a theo-
retical discussion of the concept of SI, a presentation of companies and 
their projects, and an additional comparative analysis based on qualitative 
research methods. We conducted 24 face-to-face interviews with high-
level representatives of Austrian companies to investigate several aspects 
of internal and external projects that had already been implemented: con-
text, motives/objectives, initiation, implementation, responsible actors, 
participation, cooperation with external partners, and outcomes. The se-
lection of eligible projects and companies was oriented at nominations 
for national awards. The resulting sample consisted of 24 private com-
panies with similar proportions for three different categories of size: 
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large companies with more than 500 employees, middle companies with 
50 to 500 employees and small companies with up to 50 employees. 
We decided to focus on “projects” in private companies that had a social 
aspect to them in terms of supporting a specific target group (often with-
in the workforce) and addressing issues that are of concern for society in 
general: educational programs for elderly employees, diversity manage-
ment, programs for integrating persons with disabilities, support 
measures for women (maternity leave programs), projects supporting 
external target groups (persons without bank access), etc. 
We excluded the large field of organizational restructuring and organiza-
tion of work (change management, lean management, new forms of 
group work). These activities may be seen as SI since they meet all of the 
explicated criteria. It was simply methodologically necessary to narrow 
our focus. Otherwise the resulting heterogeneity of investigated projects 
would have rendered a comparative analysis nearly impossible. 
 
A Typology of SI in Private Companies 
 
A typology of SI in private companies was the main result of the com-
parative analysis. The typology comprises five different types, which 
combine characteristics of private companies as well as projects. The size 
of the companies was the most important comparative dimension be-
cause it is connected to other characteristics like internal differentiation, 
positions, and standardization of processes. 
A qualitative comparative analysis does not intend to deliver “representa-
tive” results, which can be generalized to a large population; rather, it 
focuses on showing the diversity of consistent types within a given field. 
This methodological approach follows the intent to explore a new field 
of research, which until now has not received much attention from aca-
demic or the applied sciences. We think that the typology provides a 
good first impression of what SI might mean and what types of SI can 
be expected to occur in the context of private companies, although it is 
certainly not comprehensive in a general perspective. 
 
Type One: Large Companies Implementing Innovative External Initiatives 
 
Type one refers to large companies, which are often the subject of inter-
national concerns. These companies are characterized by institutionalized 
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social policies (CSR). Our interviewees emphasized the importance not 
only of these institutionalized policies but also their personification 
through a charismatic leading figures (CEO level). 
An example for this type is the large Austrian bank Erste Bank with 
40,000 employees in Europe. The Erste Foundation is the main owner 
of Erste Bank and led by Erste Bank CEO, Andreas Treichl. The foun-
dation supports and implements initiatives in central and southeast Eu-
rope in the fields of social inclusion, culture and European integration, in 
cooperation with local organizations. In Austria, the Foundation initiated 
the project Zweite Sparkasse, which is a bank for “unbanked” people 
(persons who have no access to banking services due to debt). In close 
cooperation with the Austrian debtor advisory and a Catholic social aid 
organization, the Foundation managed to build a new banking infrastruc-
ture where clients of the partner organizations receive their own bank 
accounts and benefit from free additional services (assurance, building 
savings agreement, legal advice). The project aims at providing basic 
banking services to the clients to improve their social integration and oc-
cupational opportunities. Another interesting aspect is that the Zweite 
Sparkasse relies on the voluntary work of 170 employees of Erste Bank, 
which indicates the high potential for internal mobilization. 
The project meets further type one criteria. It is a long-term institution, 
which is directed at an external target group. It involves the main compe-
tences of the private company and builds on existing structures and re-
sources. It is furthermore promoted and advised at the CEO level. An 
important aspect is the close cooperation with partner organizations 
from the third sector, which were involved from the beginning in the 
conceptualization and the implementation of the project and still have an 
important function within the scope of the project (the allocation of cli-
ents, assessment). Implementation is characterized by institutionalized 
forms of project management and intensive planning processes in the 
run-up to the project. 
 
Type Two: Large Companies Implementing Innovative Solutions for Internal 
Problems 
 
The second type also consists of large companies with the main differ-
ence that the initiation of projects does not follow a social policy in first 
place, but is rather a reaction to an unsatisfying situation or unsolved 
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problem within the firm, which is approached with rather unconvention-
al methods. 
A good example is the international concern ISS Facility Services, one of 
the largest employers in Europe, with 450,000 employees. The concern 
certainly possesses a social policy but the local companies are relatively 
independent and only have to meet minimum standards defined at an 
international level. The concern traditionally employs a high proportion 
of migrant workers with a wide range of different ethnic backgrounds, 
languages and nationalities. When these differences led to serious prob-
lems of internal communication, cooperation, and coordination, the Aus-
trian company decided upon a unique measure—a theater project. De-
partments that face the above problems are visited by a human resources 
manager who conducts interviews with employees on problematic situa-
tions at work. The problematic situations identified in the interview are 
then incorporated into a staged play by professional actors. Employees, 
heads of department, and managers come together to watch the perfor-
mance and afterwards sit together in small groups to reflect on the prob-
lems and develop possible solutions. 
Projects of this type show a rather instrumental approach but include a 
clear orientation towards the needs of employees and emphasize the im-
portance of participation in contrast to top-down decision making and 
implementation. The project depends on the social competence and sen-
sitivity of the responsible actors–—in the case of ISS, the head of the 
human resources department. 
 
Type Three: Small Companies with a Highly Developed Organizational Culture, a 
Non-Discriminatory Approach to Employees and Social Support for Employees 
 
With type three we change the context from large international compa-
nies to small companies (up to 50 employees) with only local business 
activities. The character of what we called “projects” also changes drasti-
cally. In small companies one will hardly find institutionalized structures 
of project management, implementation plans, or social policies. Our 
immediate impression of these small companies points to a specific lead-
ing and working culture with the authentic appreciation of a rather small 
team of employees at the center. Owner-managers and their specific ed-
ucational and occupational background as well as their understanding of 
economic success are often the main factors behind internal activities. 
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Sometimes these activities also emerge from close interactions between 
employer and employees through dense informal structures of commu-
nication and participation. 
An example is the small cable production company Deakon Degen, 
founded by a charismatic female worker who had experienced discrimi-
natory practices against women in the labor market. The support of 
women, in particular women with children, was a main concern. Howev-
er, providing occupational opportunities to mothers and women with 
disabilities was just the beginning; the activities were extended and now 
include such features as a free fitness program for workers. 
From a theoretical point of view these simple measures are far from a 
more demanding definition of SI. From a practical point of view they 
mark a significant difference between conventional small companies and 
small companies which actively support social inclusion led by owner-
managers who develop a sharp consciousness of social problems. The 
activities of the small companies of this type show a tendency of consol-
idation and in some cases become public trademarks which help these 
small companies develop an attractive public profile as employers. A fur-
ther result is that these companies gain access to new networks—for ex-
ample, companies are visited by local politicians, managers are invited to 
conferences, and third-sector organizations support the companies in 
finding personnel. 
 
Type Four: Small Companies Implementing Innovative External Projects 
 
Type four again consists of small private companies but in this case the 
social engagement goes beyond the borders of the company. These pri-
vate companies approach external social problems with their activities. 
A very interesting case is the private company Waldviertler Werkstätten, 
which is part of a network of three small companies under the same 
owner-manager. The company started as a social project offering work 
to disadvantaged groups in a region that is known for its structural eco-
nomic weakness since the decline of the regional textile industry. For 
several years the company has been independent in terms of economic 
performance and output, but the original philosophy is still alive, empha-
sizing a close and active relationship with the local economic and social 
environment. The company, for example, initiated the development of a 
local currency system that aims to avoid an outward flow of money, 
 
 
164
which is often a problem for peripheral regions, and stimulating the cir-
culation of money within the region. The company helped to build up a 
network of local public and private partner organizations and private 
companies, which supports the currency system. The Waldviertler 
Werkstätten also shows an original approach to internal organization and 
employee-related activities. For example, positions and responsibilities 
are not clearly defined, employees change from production to admin-
istration or vice versa, and the highest wages are at maximum 1.5 times 
the lowest. 
This type certainly consists of companies that are very different in their 
structure, apart from being small companies, and show different and 
very original approaches to social problems. However, they have in 
common the fact that their social activities are strongly linked to their 
economic activities and have a great impact on the internal and external 
company profile. This type shows the possibilities of smaller companies 
in initiating SI, which by no means has to remain on a small scale and 
can also reach out to larger target groups. 
 
Type Five: Middle-Sized Companies Implementing Systematic Human Resources 
Management Systems 
 
The last type refers to middle-sized companies (from 50 to 500 employ-
ees). The middle-sized companies in our sample were in some way trans-
formational companies in terms of adapting their internal structures to a 
larger number of employees and expanded business activities. The inter-
nal projects of these companies relate to the introduction of a profes-
sional human resources management. The projects show what is possible 
on the basis of a systematic and socially engaged approach towards em-
ployees. The concepts have in common that they guide employees from 
their entrance into the firm until they leave, but not in an instrumental or 
controlling way. The concepts aim to secure fair and equal conditions 
and quality for all employees, and include systematic surveys, in-depth 
and discussion-oriented appraisal interviews, and a transparent structure 
of internal educational training and internal career opportunities. 
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Conclusions 
 
In the study discussed, we set out to explore different types of SI in pri-
vate companies. The study had an exploratory character and cannot de-
liver an in-depth analysis of SI in private companies. The identification 
and assessment of SI calls for a closer look and will not easily be 
achieved. The context of the study did not allow us to do more than one 
interview for every company, which is certainly problematic. There was 
no chance to confront the views of HR managers and CEOs with the 
actual perceptions of employees. 
We regard participation as an important feature of SI, so the possibilities 
of employees participating in projects should be a major focus (Roth, 
Kaivo-oja, and Hirschmann 2013). Another challenging issue is the elab-
oration of a consistent and at the same time practicable definition of SI. 
A definition that is too general will not support the attempt to strength-
en awareness of the potential of SI as creative and new organizational 
forms and institutionalized social practices that are able to improve the 
way in which major social problems are addressed, as well as particular 
problems of certain organizations and social areas. 
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Jens Aderhold 
RATIONALITIES OF INNOVATION 
 
Introduction 
 
Innovations fascinate us. They often appear to be something they are 
not, due to the fact that they bring us very close to the action and things 
going on around us. Distance and space are decisive for being able to 
understand how novelty turns into innovation and under what condi-
tions innovations arise. In this article, it will therefore be analyzed which 
long-term historical factors and social processes of transformation influ-
ence innovations. The way in which innovations operate depends on 
macro-social conditions that should be made evident. This text will 
therefore try to identify the patterns of rationality that accompany long-
term and current processes of transformation. At the same time, though, 
innovation also depends on micro-social conditions. Here a change of 
social support structures is observed, away from the lonely inventor to-
ward a complex network of structures. Hence, the last part of this chap-
ter deals with the consequences for innovation functions that are related 
to these new structures. 
 
Suggestions and Simplifications 
 
Innovations are in vogue. That which is already familiar, through the use 
of semantics, can be designated as progressive and trend setting. The 
public is confronted with a constant stream of semantically laden distinc-
tions based on subject and time. We do not know what moved the mar-
keting strategists of, for example, some automobile companies to rein-
force their messages with the label “innovative,” or to add “dynamics,” 
“efficiency,” and “innovation” in parentheses. Perhaps they were caught 
up in the promising trail of success left by promotional hype. Perhaps 
they also realized that the strategy of trying to enhance the advertising 
message by presenting sporty themes in an ideal world of green harmony 
and environmental protection is not very convincing. Instead they con-
sidered it worthwhile to connect athleticism, driving dynamics and envi-
ronmentally friendly energy recovery: more acceleration, better braking 
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for turning corners, and more kinetic energy returning to the car battery. 
What an extraordinary innovation: acceleration and braking as an envi-
ronmentally friendly means of driving fun! A different approach would 
be more intelligent here—an approach that places less emphasis on the 
meaningfulness of a technically abstract ability. Instead, the innovation 
can only take hold as an innovation after distribution and when an actu-
al, significant impact is made on, for example, braking, efficiency, air-
drag reduction, and the balancing of vehicle distance. 
As may be easily discerned, modern mass communication operates quite 
cleverly. With its subtly calculated metaphorical language, we are intro-
duced to a single, functional detail with unbelievable, novel characteris-
tics. We are amazed and quickly convinced by the effectiveness of the 
innovation presented to us. In another example, the argument is com-
posed even more subtly. In this case it is not about the obvious, individ-
ual parameter, which, under closer consideration, can possibly be dis-
tracting. The interaction between individual technical factors and general 
utilization becomes the center of attention here, which then systematical-
ly evokes the desired innovative effects—here those that are resource- 
and environmentally friendly. Whether this form of calculation adds up 
in reality remains an open question. The question of whether these and 
other advertisements actually deal with innovations or whether they are 
diversionary maneuvers meant to present their own strategic decisions, 
such as focusing on traditional drive systems as innovatively fertile and 
efficient, will likewise remain unanswered. 
Other aspects are even more interesting: the attempt to persuade the au-
dience with naïve semantics about innovation suitable for everyday use is 
obvious. Discrepancies, oddities or even inconsistencies stand out only 
at second glance. Yet arguably even more serious is the fact that the 
messages can hardly be persuasive in the long run, and, to stay with this 
example, is it even possible to still speak of innovation if everyone is us-
ing it? Do mass distribution and the novelty of utilization even go to-
gether; and is every little variation or improvement, at the same time, an 
innovation, or can it pass as one? 
It is incredibly difficult to specify when an innovation can actually be re-
ferred to as such according to academic criteria, or using precise termi-
nology. Virtually every issue can appear to be an innovation as long as it 
has some aspect of novelty. Improvements are easily equated with inno-
vation in a world communicated by mass media although it is frequently 
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unclear where the attribute “novelty” actually comes from or which 
standpoint or social position is at the base of the claim that something is 
novel. Daily communication blurs the difference between novelty and 
innovation. Under these circumstances, is it even possible to establish 
appropriate criteria with regard to the innovativeness of a point of view, 
a process, or an object? It is necessary to ask what innovation is. Howev-
er, this is not just a conceptual problem that can be disposed of with a 
simple definition. 
There is a further related problem: who should supply the criteria regard-
ing what constitutes an innovation? Those involved or the actual objects 
are often wrongly identified as the place of origin of an innovation—
which would not be so problematic if innovation was able to develop 
from a single place of origin. This unsatisfactory but largely uninvestigat-
ed perception is incorporated into most of the theoretically and concep-
tually based reflections and suggestions for design. It deals with techni-
cally variable components, with the creative individual who is meant to 
be motivated, with continually newer versions of creative techniques to 
be practiced within group and organizational work, or with the introduc-
tion of management and reorganization concepts. 
At this point, it is also worthwhile recalling the examples presented pre-
viously. It is often not the new technological variations that are evoked, 
but rather the related effects. Their innovative meaning is not displayed 
in the automobile or in the driver or his or her wallet or image, but ra-
ther in a different, systematic connection. The question of innovation is 
linked to system relevance. In this case, novelty must prove itself, and 
the effects that it triggers or avoids, as innovations in the ecosystem. 
Even more important are the observers themselves (who are usually left 
out). Expectations, as social structures, limit the span of possible points 
of access. They are built on security. They also reduce the burden of in-
security and complexity.1 In dealing with structure formation and self-
regulation, systems create (social and personal) meta-rules that determine 
the contact with change, with disruption, or with discrepancies that oc-
cur (see Luhmann 1994: 138f.). The formation of expectations allows for 
a certain degree of reliability or security in an otherwise uncertain world. 
Do society and its subsystems thus provide the criteria and the justifica-
tions? Are there social processes of attribution that determine what can 
be considered an innovation, which forms of innovation are likely or 
even possible, and in which respects the innovations appears as innova-
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tions (see Aderhold 2005a)? This would mean that the characteristics of 
the innovation vary with the structures of the respective systems and that 
their logic and manners of functioning are transformed with social situa-
tions as well. 
 
Understanding Innovations and Incorporating them 
Historically 
 
Virtually every issue can appear to be an innovation as long as it involves 
some element of improvement. Innovation is equated with improvement 
although it is frequently unclear where the “novelty” actually comes from 
or which standpoint or social position this assertion is based on. Does 
the consideration that an object or an issue is new suffice? Does the fact 
that something was not there before suffice as a criterion? 
Is everything ultimately a question for the observer? Can the decision to 
determine one or more criteria, with the implication that an observer is 
yet to be identified, be carried out, even theoretically—particularly con-
sidering that there are many observers? Or is a conceptual change neces-
sary? Can criteria be provided to differentiate between legitimate and 
non-legitimate claims about the innovativeness of a point of view, a pro-
cess or an object? 
As always, a typology based on general knowledge and concreteness 
comes easily. A useful classification2 goes back to Harvey Brooks (1982), 
who differentiated between virtually pure technical innovation (e.g. new 
materials), socio-technical innovations (e.g. infrastructure for private au-
to-mobility) and social innovations. Within social innovation, the sub-
types of market innovation (e.g. leasing), management innovation (e.g. 
new work schedule policies), political innovation (e.g. summit meetings) 
and institutional innovation (e.g. self-help groups) are possible (Zapf 
1994). These classifications, as useful as they might be in some regards, 
reveal little about the substantial core of the innovation phenomenon—
about its effectiveness, the related dynamic patterns of rationality and 
their social incorporation. 
Let us begin with the relation between newness and innovative: if inno-
vation is being referred to, then an inference is usually made about im-
provement, novelty. Improvements are discontinuities. If something that 
did not used to exist is characterized, then a novelty is referred to 
(Nowotny 1997: 33). Novelty is therefore not identical to innovation. 
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In addition, equating innovation with improvement overlooks the fact 
that the term “novelty” includes problematic aspects itself. In other 
words, it is “an ontological absurdity: something that is, although or pre-
cisely because, it is not anything that existed until now” (Luhmann 
1995a: 323). The term “novelty” is founded in an assumed or ascertained 
similarity with and, at the same time, distinction of the observed object 
or event in relation to a given predecessor. Consequently, it can be noted 
that the object itself does not provide the application or attribution of a 
“novelty” nor does it occur without context. However, this does not on-
ly include the social context in which the novelty is registered as a factor. 
The decision about something being new or not is influenced by collec-
tive and individual (pre)structures alike— by expectations and experienc-
es. Therefore, the designation of novelty implies that the observer is in a 
social context that designates an irregularity as an improvement, based 
on context specific structures of expectation (Luhmann 1994: 216). 
So who is the observer or the expert who decides what is innovative and 
how it becomes so? Both business studies and the experts operating in 
the channel of innovation management understand the original (first-
time) use of (technical, production or process oriented) improvement by 
a business as a case of innovation, although the concept of “improve-
ment” already implies originality (Luhmann 1991: 388). Is it hence the 
duplication of the novelty through which an innovation is created? 
Such simplifications must perhaps be avoided. Instead, the suggestion is 
made here to ask how disruptions in social systems are continued, that is 
how “contingency is normalized.” Somewhat more generally stated, in-
novation can be understood as a contra-inductive decision-making pro-
cess “that decides differently than would be expected, thereby changing 
expectations” (Luhmann 1991: 373). Hence, it is about system struc-
tures—how arrangements are made and provided and whether the re-
sults fall into the spectrum of the accompanying arrangements—that is, 
in the range of familiar alternatives. Innovation should therefore only be 
referred to when the results do not lie within the range of familiar alter-
natives at large; that is, when the finalized arrangements do not take hold 
and the variation consequently transforms previous structures of expec-
tation in a surprising way. 
An adequate understanding of innovation can only be developed when 
relevant structures of expectation are distinguished on the one hand, and 
on the other communicatively structured processes of observation of 
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which the individual and collective participants3 are part. Due to many 
failed attempts to define innovation according to objective criteria not 
related to social factors and differences among observers, a concept that 
is consequently asserting itself is that it is not so much the nature or the 
notion of an improvement that counts. This view moves away from the 
designation of factual (technical) criteria for the observation of social 
processes of communication that (co)decide on what is to be viewed as 
an innovation in society, where factual aspects can arise again in the 
communicative designation, but under the conditions of social structures 
of expectation. 
Hence, improvements are not innovations in general, nor are the efforts 
of research institutes or the R&D departments of businesses. Based on 
the considerations that refer to events, participants, and objects as social 
processes of construction, something can be referred to as an innovation 
when specific criteria are met (Baitsch et al. 2000; Schulz et al. 2000; 
Aderhold and Richter 2006). Our proposal is the following: to conceive 
of innovations as surprising improvements that, due to social ac-
ceptance4 and collective attribution, are characterized as a novelty5. This 
means that the attribute “innovation” is assigned in retrospect—after a 
product, a process, or a transformation has become established. Thus, 
innovation is the result of a “surprising” social decision made a posterio-
ri. Although the attribution occurs in a system that is distinguishable 
from the system generating innovations, the innovation still creates 
structurally meaningful effects in both systems (creative and utilization). 
Innovations can only be meaningfully referred to when the direction of 
social development is lastingly influenced at the same time by the acti-
vated transformations. 
The quest for an adequate criterion for a concept of innovation that is 
usable by social science could turn into the claim that innovation in 
terms of initial innovation can only be understood as a structural trans-
formation with a broad effect for transforming the entire society or its 
subsystems (economy, politics, law, etc.). In this regard it is now worth-
while to take a brief look at some almost forgotten insights from struc-
tural functionalism. 
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Innovation as Part of Social Change 
 
Parsons’ (1971: 35) examines the problems that need to be solved so that 
a social system (e.g. a society) can be stable and so that it can exist (in the 
long run). He not only examines the functional preconditions of a socie-
ty, but the processes and mechanisms that are particularly momentous 
for the social processes of transformation as well. Alongside these con-
siderations is the question of a society’s capacity for adaptation. This can 
be intensified through the “invention” of specific structural components. 
A prerequisite for this structural adaptation is the development of evolu-
tionary universalities.6 Parsons understands this as “every development 
or invention that is organized in itself and so important for further evo-
lution that they do not only arise at one point but rather, more than like-
ly, that several systems create this invention under very different circum-
stances” (Parsons 1969: 55). It is within these evolutional universalities7 
that he sees the preconditions for social processes of development.8 
The question of which improvements can become evolutionary univer-
salities and hence innovations remains unanswered. In social evolution, 
many accomplishments may be found that can claim such a status (agri-
culture, script, bureaucratic organization, the printing press, money, 
steam engines, landing on the moon, etc). Luhmann (1985: 17) is of as-
sistance here, with his suggestion of the criterion “centralized interde-
pendence,” which indicates that one structural change makes the way 
for, triggers or influences other structural changes. We should not let 
ourselves be impressed by this, however. As will be seen, different inven-
tions and their related patterns and logics of innovation can be identified 
according to time relation. 
 
A Long Look Back 
 
Within the last 10,000 years seven major technological improvements9 
(innovations) and their underlying patterns of rationality can be identi-
fied based on a co-evolution of technology and social development (see 
Popitz 1995). These improvements seem to become more complex, 
longer and more laden with prerequisites. Society’s dependence on the 
technically feasible becomes greater. 
Innovation should only be claimed in the case of a “fundamental tech-
nology.” Technology can only be referred to when two aspects are taken 
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into consideration at the same time: the comprehensive character10 of the 
transformation, and the social incorporation of technological develop-
ment. Thus, the design of the tool that was developed during the period 
of the human settlement12 highlights the fact that it is possible to pro-
duce objects for the processing of other objects in a new manner. In this 
sense, tools are capital goods.  
These ideas contribute to the thesis that within human history (social de-
velopment), certain decisions (technological innovations) can be identi-
fied that have lastingly influenced the relationship between humans and 
nature14 and society15 as a whole (Popitz 1995: 7). The distinctiveness of 
technological innovation lies within the new ideas of production—in the 
transformation of what is given into something useful. Not only original-
ity is conceived of and produced. A new level of feasibility is made ac-
cessible, which does not mean something technical in a materialist sense 
but instead results in the co-production of cognitive processes and the 
creation of social structures. At the same time the position of humans in 
the world changes. Every technological innovation is also connected 
with the creation or transformation of an alternative, artificial nature 
(with the alteration of social order). The new feasibility or new technolo-
gy means that there is a greater deviation, which means that further 
reaching methods of dealing with deviation are necessary in order to 
produce a product or to carry out a service.16  
The idea that innovation is about deviations is still cultivated today. With 
industrialization and the incipient processes of modernization, the spec-
trum becomes even broader, though. In particular, the cycle theory, the 
“long waves” introduced by Schumpeter and later built upon by other 
authors refers to the dependency of social development and innovations 
on related cycles and barriers. Initial technical and economic innova-
tions17 are identified as the activators of the short-term cycles18 of eco-
nomic and, in particular, social development in relation to the technolog-
ical eras referred to by Popitz. The initial assumption of this innovation 
theory based on cycles postulates a causal relationship: structural trans-
formations in the economy and in society are continually created by 
technically based innovations, namely by initial innovation.19 
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A Brief Look at Past Rhythms of Innovation 
 
The most well known innovation approach20 for modern characteriza-
tion is most likely the “Kondratieff cycles” theory of Joseph A. Schum-
peter (1961; originally 1939). Here it is assumed that social development, 
especially in technology and the economy, is characterized by long-term 
cyclical periods of growth and regression. 
What can be said about the Kondratieff cycles themselves is that a con-
crete connection between economy, technology and society21 is implied. 
The development is always supported by an initial innovation, which in 
turn always affects three important levels: 
The technological level: cycles are always characterized by a batch of tightly 
linked technologies; this network determines the direction and pace of 
the events of innovation. 
The economic level: in the course of technical development a new market 
generally emerges (or new markets and business types emerge). The vol-
ume to be gained on the markets ultimately determines the growth or 
stagnation of the global economy. 
The social level: technical and economic developments trigger or are ac-
companied by social transformation. 
The theory of “long waves” attempts to join the development of tech-
nical and economic possibilities to the transformation of institutional 
innovation. Social development is viewed positively. Even when phases 
of growth and regression are taken into consideration, overall a continual 
upward trend of technical, economical, and ultimately social develop-
ment can be assumed. 
The reported hypotheses depend too much on “historical generalization” 
for a comprehensive theory of social transformation to be provided 
(Zapf 1986: 167). Among other things, stagnation of growth cannot only 
be explained in economic terms, but also in terms of the interdepend-
ence of socio-economic and institutional-political elements. It is possible 
to overlook the fact that the social transformation of institutions22 itself 
can trigger or hinder an industrial impulse. Moreover, this innovation 
theory misconceives the interdependence of the societal subsystems23 
that accompany the social differentiation of society (Luhmann 1997). 
Ignoring these objections, the theory favors optimistic long-term predic-
tions that seem much too short-term and condensed in the light of 
Popitz’s guidelines. According to this, it could be theoretically and em-
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pirically interesting to identify mechanisms that refer to modernity: “the 
long waves and their individual phases determine for example the de-
pressions that until now have occurred in each of the waves” (Zapf 
1986: 167). In addition, physical mechanisms can be reconstructed that 
show when and why certain ideas, inventions, and improvements are fit-
ting and adaptable while others are not. Not too much should be ex-
pected from this point of view, however: the conditions and mechanisms 
that determine whether innovation is possible change with social rela-
tions. 
 
A Look at the Fleeting Present 
 
In present society, often described as an information or knowledge soci-
ety, large fundamental or initial innovations are no longer dominant. Ra-
ther, the fields and players within the sciences, research, and develop-
ment are considered innovative impulses in industry, economy and socie-
ty. Codified theoretical knowledge becomes a source for innovation and 
is therefore a motor for social transformation. The decisive step in be-
coming an information society does not take place until the society-wide 
implementation of computer technology.24 Manuel Castells (2000: 5f) 
continues the ideas of a post-industrial society in his theory of the net-
work society. The dawning information age is also influenced by the mi-
cro-electronic based information and communication technologies as 
well as gene technology. For Castells (2001: 425ff.) however, not only 
the informational basis of society is changing, but, more importantly, the 
cultural basis is changing as well. Although technological achievements 
do not (or should not) determine25 historical evolution and social change, 
they can accelerate social transformation (modernization), as they are 
able to impede or restrict development when expansion is inadequate 
(Castells 2001: 7). Like the theory of the “long waves,” Castells views 
these technologies as the basis of transformation, but in his view the ac-
tual adaptation occurs through contact with information and knowledge. 
Castells (2001: 34) also suggests that these cumulatively designed feed-
back spirals of innovation and application, found in almost every field, 
are key to the present information and knowledge society. Somewhat 
more simply put, a circularly designed process of social development is 
found in which the application of technology creates new knowledge 
that turns into innovation and advances social and technological change. 
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This newly created practice activates, in turn, a search for more innova-
tion-relevant knowledge. At this point, a perpetual motion machine with-
in the social micro-domain is encountered. Are there consequences or 
parallels at the macro-level? 
 
The Premises of Deviation and Their Consequences 
 
It is obvious that modern society has developed a fondness for novelty 
(Luhmann 1995a: 9), and it is striking that extremely different kinds of 
innovative dynamics have developed in the social subsystems. Originality 
is called for in art but not every suggestion based on deviation and the 
creation of unprecedented images finds artistic acceptance. 
The news in the mass media is oriented on the value of novelty, which 
the media create themselves and which then appears on the screen as 
information worthy to be reported. The piece of information is only 
broadcast as long as it can be assumed that the news is considered a 
piece of information, that is, something new, by the non-informed and 
interested public. The constant craving for actuality and attention be-
comes the merciless criterion of selection. 
In politics it is vitally important for political actors to recognize the polit-
ically relevant topics in time (before the elections) in order to transfer 
them to the respective decision makers. This increasingly involves the 
use of new techniques of presentation, as well as communicating deci-
sions and the meaning behind them appropriately and in a way that ap-
peals to the public. 
Since production processes in the economy face shortages, it is increas-
ingly important for enterprises that their products distinguish themselves 
sufficiently from products of other vendors. But it is not only in the so-
cial subsystems mentioned above that the search for novelty and innova-
tion grows important. 
The expectation of constant change is becoming very important in socie-
ty and the consequences of this development are not yet foreseen. This 
preference for novelty is directly related to the functional differentiation 
of modern society. 
This analysis suggests that modernization amounts to separate rationali-
zation processes of particular subsystems. The combination of variables 
that are the schemata for absorbing changes, for example markets, or-
ganization theories, models, concepts, or art styles, are leading to far-
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reaching learning potentials (Luhmann 1975: 58), which, in turn, coincide 
with ambivalent effects. In order to show the changes on the one hand, 
as well as the accompanying uncertainties on the other, these effects will 
be sketched out with the help of the examples of two social subsys-
tems—art and science. 
(1) Art: Before art can emerge as a special form of social communication, 
art itself must provide for sufficient, distinguishably relevant, indica-
tions26. Hence, the norm that all pieces of art must be new if they are to 
be appreciated took root early (Luhmann 1995b: 70). Consequently, and 
functionally, artistic communication adapts to the refusal of or deviation 
from past forms and styles27 (Hauser 1988: 436ff.). To make matters 
more complicated, art is produced for unknown consumers—that is, for 
an unknown market. Art does not only have to be new but also appeal-
ing. In addition to the development of art, ranging from trivial art to ar-
tistic craftwork, there is enough space for provocative themes that are 
meant to question existing pieces of art and art as such. The emphatic 
refusal of tradition displays manifests itself in the provocative choice of 
subject and by new stylistic devices. But if artistic communication puts 
increasing emphasis on deviation and provocation, a problem arises in 
that these signs of deviation must be able to show people with no artistic 
knowledge the new aspect. In addition to that, it must ensure that the 
observer can draw bits of information from it that are useful and rele-
vant to him. 
Artistic communication presumes that the observed works of art can be 
understood, too, and that they can be accepted.28 Hardly any attention is 
given to this condition, which is necessary for art. The new functional 
problems of the current art system are especially apparent in this respect. 
Consequently, the circle of people who can comprehensively take part in 
artistic communication, which is permanently based on deviation and 
innovation, grows smaller. Most exhibitions of (post)modern works of 
art that are based on irritation and provocation tend to overstrain the 
viewer. But then the socially differentiated functional system of art runs 
the risk of subjecting its own functionality to negotiations due to an ex-
cessive norm of deviation. 
(2) Science: While Early Modern science29 mainly dealt with the detection 
and preparation of existing knowledge, modern science has to adapt to a 
new form of processing knowledge (Stichweh 1996). With grave conse-
quences, the normative expectation has developed that deviation should 
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be preferred and distinguished at the same time from that which is 
known. The expectation of novelty becomes a scientific norm. It is cer-
tainly difficult to put into practice when traditional wisdom is opposed 
while novelties are promoted. As a consequence, science has developed 
(and institutionally reinforced) empirical and theoretical criteria that indi-
cate why a new argument or a deviating concept should be accepted. 
Even though the differentiation of science allows for new re-
combinations with regard to interdisciplinary research, it is obvious that 
science increasingly tries to preserve the truth. The differentiation of dis-
ciplines, the problem of increasing complexity, as well as the milieu-
establishing and reinforcing combination of institutionalized job offers, 
reputation, citing circles and traditionalized knowledge has led to the es-
tablishment of existing knowledge which makes further scientific insight 
more difficult due to successful scientific operations. Science that has a 
fixation on searching for the truth is about to become increasingly una-
ble to grow and be innovative (as mentioned in Kuhn 1973). 
(3) Individualization: Functional differentiation allows and calls for the 
multi-functional inclusion of individuals who eventually have to cope 
with the different system references and demands of the functional sub-
systems. By breaking away from their traditional bonds and social posi-
tions, individuals gain more room to organize and determine their lives 
on the one hand, but the new freedom is high in price. 
The break-up of traditional bonds is related to the pressure to individual-
ize (Beck 1986). Individuals are constrained to obtain system-specific 
and multi-system social addresses that make the desired inclusion more 
likely. However, working on one’s own individual address is anything but 
simple (Giddens 1991).  
In order to stand out, a person’s individuality must at least show through 
the address meant to be communicated. Trying to establish an individual 
address can quickly end up in a paradox: the address has to be compati-
ble; in other words, it must be based on recognition and thus on self-
imitation. At the same time, the addressing must contain novelties, in the 
sense of irritation through individuality. The individual is only able to 
cope with that paradox by dints of oscillation, that is, by integrating time. 
Biographization is one way to cope with this paradox in the long run. On 
the social level the paradox occurs in the normalization of deviations; the 
individual paradox of self-fabrication is socialized. 
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Deviation becomes the norm in work and free time. It should be carried 
out taking individual risks into consideration. Thus, it comes as no sur-
prise that deviant careers of socialization become more likely in today’s 
complex societies (Luhmann 1993: 202). This manifests itself in the in-
creasing and dynamic pressure to “be different from others.” 
To sum up briefly, going beyond this list of structural effects that could 
be extended easily, it can be shown that problems relevant in society 
mainly appear at places where the rapidness of cognitive structures meets 
the slowness and leisureliness of normative structures. 
The forced change of particular subsystems towards deviation leads to 
stabilizing and preserving effects on the one hand. On the other, it trig-
gers a self-reinforcing dynamic of novelty and deviation with unforesee-
able consequences. It can be established that society has shifted its struc-
tures to novelty. In addition, we have to deal with rhythms of time, with 
specific cyclical conditions and sub-systematic patterns of innovation. 
But it is not only the social contexts including innovation that change, 
but also, above all, those social structures where innovations are trig-
gered, elaborated and injected into the social process of diffusion. Some 
serious changes are also found here. 
 
Unintended Restructuring of Innovative Institutions 
 
Innovation is not due to a single inventor or mind-boggling master-
stroke, as was assumed in Schumpeter’s time. The development of new 
products or procedures takes place in cooperation30, be it in organiza-
tions or in arranged social contexts that go beyond organizations (Tuomi 
1999; Duschek 2002; Aderhold 2004). The new challenge is not so much 
about technical novelties but about “the change of (inter)organizational 
processes, fields of forces, and the importance of actors” (Radel 1997: 
112). Innovation is not a linear process; innovations invariably distin-
guish themselves by “numerous feedback loops, iterations and overlaps 
during all stages of innovation” (Asdonk et al. 1991: 291). Above all the 
concurring processes of development, construction, manufacturing, and 
sales planning are affected by different parts of rationality31, which are 
embedded in the internal and external structures of cooperation. 
Complex structures of relationships, their insufficiently developed scope, 
as well as the accompanying processes of information gain and infor-
mation exchange come to the fore (Roehl 2000). Innovation takes place 
 	  
	  
181 
in parallel worlds. We are facing the simultaneousness of dependence 
and the accrued chances of cooperation and networks (Sydow and Win-
deler 1998; Sydow 1999). 
In brief, the development of new products and procedures increasingly 
takes place in cooperation (Nowotny et al. 2001). The border of the par-
ticular company organization is crossed and, thus, changed. Thus, the 
scope and the dependencies that the particular companies face, change 
unavoidably. 
The combination of innovation and the chosen means of network em-
bedding become factors that can hardly be neglected any more (cf. 
Weyer 1997: 136 ff.). The step from the development stage up to the 
functioning stage, product and market maturity is successful if one suc-
ceeds in stabilizing and extending the technical innovation in a social 
core network at least temporarily. 
Strategic actors who build up the ability to negotiate and to enter a 
commitment among each other are necessary (Wetzel et al. 2001; Ader-
hold 2005b; Duschek et al. 2005). Social networks build the basis for the 
stabilization of technical innovations (Weyer 1997: 138). These changes 
of the innovation-producing social infrastructure have an impact on in-
novation as such. 
The contextually structured search space becomes heavily restricted. The 
network as supporter of the innovation reduces the disturbing potential 
by setting outward boundaries. The process of closure has a double ef-
fect. The transition from functioning maturity to commercial use is ac-
companied by a change of the support networks in most cases. Either 
the initial network is opened for commercial interests or “completely dif-
ferent networks, that wish to operate with new visions of use or to sup-
plant or replace the old networks, enter the scene” (Weyer 1997: 141). 
In addition to that, regional groups and networks already accompany the 
worldwide differentiation of markets and competition. The new role of 
regional groups33 expresses a trend that redefines participation in innova-
tion-creating processes (Roth, Kaivo-oja, and Hirschmann 2013). It is 
more than obvious at this point that the economic exchange of goods 
and finances has already reached a cross-regional and trans­national di-
mension. 
The operating areas are subdivided into profit centers or into separate 
processes that are constantly called into question. In companies, much 
value is placed on centers of core competences, project teams or decen-
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tralized manufacturing facilities. The interaction of uncertainty and dy-
namics of the market stands in opposition to the flexible units within the 
companies. 
The effects of the necessary cooperation and networks go so far that, in 
some cases, the borders of the company within the company are hardly 
perceived as such (cf. Wetzel et al. 2008). Outgoing contacts increasingly 
resemble the internal ones, which, among other things, concern the se-
lection criteria of the choice of partners or decisions concerning loca-
tions. 
Networking and cooperation are increasingly important in this context, 
especially when conducting research and development, gaining access to 
new markets, or defining the frame and the standard of economic ac-
tions. What single companies cannot accomplish alone might be possible 
in a network (Sabel 1989; Schienstock 1997: 79). 
Global competition is not only about the skills of the company any 
more. The importance of regionally different forms of embedding is not 
to be underestimated (Grabher 1993; Giddens 1995; Diller 2002). To a 
certain extent, the success of the company is dependent on the condi-
tions of competition in its region (Heidenreich 1997; Cooke 1998). 
The manner of using knowledge that is available worldwide, as well as 
internationally organized research and sales facilities (integration into 
global structures), produce varying potential for competition. This also 
depends on the concentration of the regionally available know-how in 
research departments, labor forces, institutions of higher and continuing 
education and advisors. The competitiveness of companies is linked with 
the competitive power of their surrounding regions in many respects, 
and the region is conversely dependent on the competitive power of the 
resident companies. 
Consequently, companies and regions are confronted with an apparently 
paradox in the context of global competition (Heidenreich 1997: 501). 
Worldwide competitive advantages and disadvantages “can accrue from 
the way economic processes are embedded regionally.” On the national 
and regional level as well, the combination of decisive factors, which can 
hardly be influenced by the individual actors anymore, thus determines 
the competitive power of the companies (Porter 1996: 146ff.; see also 
Heidenreich 1997: 503).34 
The nationally or regionally established concentration of different indus-
trial clusters35 leads to a process that might in some cases result in a bun-
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dling of interests (Porter 1996: 156). The “atmosphere” in the economic 
surroundings is of vital importance with regard to the innovative and 
competitive performance of the company. Thus, the structures of a 
company as well as direct contact with the customer and with the market 
are influential determinants. Of almost equal importance is the embed-
ding in the “economic surrounding, which distinguishes itself by efficient 
providers and service companies, by innovative competitors and by qual-
ified labor and venturesome customers” (Heidenreich 1997: 503). With 
the establishment of a global “network economy,” companies are not 
dependent on technology, the market, and the industry alone, but also on 
the networks they are integrated in or excluded from (Aderhold 2004). 
The success of an enterprise not only depends on the quality of an idea 
or a goal but is also dependent on the conditions for creating social ac-
ceptance on institutionally available structures of sponsorship, on histor-
ical constraints as well as on the development of expectation structures 
(which can only be influenced to a limited extent) in the particular social 
systems. As a result, the innovator’s point of view is not sufficient by a 
long shot. 
But there is more to it: within the scope of innovation projects there are 
a lot more very specific problems that can hardly be solved by classical 
means. It is hardly to be expected, for example, that the desired market 
success of a still unknown product can be caused by research and devel-
opment investments or by investing in the production of high-quality 
products. An efficient combination of “generating knowledge and down-
stream activities of value creation as called for by production and mar-
keting/distribution” is claimed (Gerybadze et al. 1997: 153).  (Keine An-
gaben in der Literaur, schade für de Georgier) 
 
Conclusions: Paradoxes and Other Entanglements in 
Connection with the Management of Innovation 
 
Considering the problem of connecting the fields of the supply chain, an 
innovation dilemma that adjusts basic research and commercialization 
should be preferred to (Rammert 1988). Difficulties unavoidably arise in 
dealing with uncertainties of research and innovation processes. Differ-
ent “logics” of science, technology, and product orientation, interests of 
capital appropriation and cultural patterns of organization encounter 
each other. One is unavoidably confronted with procedural and material 
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divergences and incoherencies that demand special, organizational an-
swers, especially as far as dealing and coping with uncertainties, impon-
derableness, and permanent sense shifts, are concerned. 
From an organizational point of view, the question arises of how the 
problem of connecting business demands with the scientific-technical 
orientation can be dealt with. 
Innovation processes distinguish themselves from other work processes, 
above all by the combination of particular uncertainties. The following 
uncertainties may be considered (Rammert 1988: 33): 
 
– Factual uncertainties: tasks are less standardized. Research and develop-
ment projects are characterized by open tasks. 
– Temporary unpredictability: the process of finding ideas and solving prob-
lems can hardly be temporarily structured and formalized. 
– Personal uncontrollability: innovation processes are distinguished by 
broader action scope. Requirements for functioning are trust and self-
control. 
– Economic unpredictability: it is hard to tell at the early stage of develop-
ment what kind of economic successes will be achieved in future times. 
One usually draws on evidence-related and indirect strategies of econ-
omization. 
 
Organizations and managers have to cope with two problems as a result. 
First, there is a dilemma as the economic reality tends to hamper innova-
tion while “technical rationality” prefers the utilization-slowing diversity 
of technical solutions (Rammert 1988: 101). Second, it is unclear how to 
gain an understanding of the market of a product that does not yet exist 
(Lynn et al. 1996). There are no customers who can answer questions for 
the company and manager representatives, whose worldview requires 
facts, and without objectifying the tangible surrounding, which is, of 
course, impossible. 
Entrepreneurial and research decisions as well as decisions on economic-
political grounds face tensions between the logic of development and the 
logic of commercialization: 
 
– Marketing managers have recognized this problem and emphasize that 
innovative projects may not only amount to research and development, 
but also have to provide for a combination of R&D and marketing ac-
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tivities. This changes when the results of promoted projects are about 
to be transferred into fields of application and commercialization. In 
particular, major international enterprises operating in different places 
make extensive use of the (internally established) transfer of knowledge 
(cf. Stichweh 1999). To put it simply, knowledge about R&D is gener-
ated locally to be commercialized in global dimensions. The tender 
spot of national technology politics36 expresses itself in the fact that it 
hardly succeeds in creating new markets as the prerequisite for success 
of the innovations (Weyer 1997: 145)—especially if the emphasis on 
promotion is only limited to the transition from the invention to the 
functional maturity of the technology. 
– Another peculiarity that may also be called an obstacle is the generation 
of innovation. The launch of new products does not take place in line-
ar or sequential single steps, any more—basic research, applied re-
search, predevelopment, production, distribution and customer service 
(Hauschildt et al. 1993: 18). The actual resource does not consist of the 
process of perfecting particular single steps but is rather the ability to 
link up and connect the individual processes37 on the part of the man-
agement. 
 
As shall become apparent, innovation does not amount to a step-by-step 
improvement of traditional products over a long period. What is decisive 
is “opening up new markets for products and services that have yet to be 
developed” (Baethge 1995: 35). The uncertainty of economic success is 
accompanied by another uncertainty: the economic-political and entre-
preneurial shift to innovation calls established structures into question. 
The production model characterized as fordist38, which affected post-war 
Germany in particular, is beginning to disappear. While the social mod-
ernization of the 1960s was person-orientated in respect to the extension 
of “educational institutions, vocational training and manpower mobility,” 
“innovation-orientated modernization” is primarily based on struc-
tures—that is, it creates uncertainties by closing and reducing familiar 
institutions (Baethge 1995: 38). However, there are hardly any organiza-
tional or instructional solutions for this. 
Innovations are structured paradoxically in various respects. As indicated 
above, innovations are dependent on (social) (pre)conditions, “which can-
not be met at the time of the innovation because this is the production of something 
new” (Sauer 1999: 14). Thus, the conditions that are necessary for innova-
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tion must be discovered, developed, tried and changed in the course of 
the innovation as well. This is a fact that is mentioned now and then but 
to which little attention is paid. 
We have come across other peculiarities above, which will be summa-
rized very briefly. We have emphasized that novelties turn into an inno-
vation only after the fact. At first glance this is a rather unspectacular 
statement. Thinking a little further, though, this also means that as soon 
as a novelty is labeled as an innovation (and people make extensive use 
of this) it is not an innovation any more because then it is ever present. 
It has asserted itself; many people know and use it but precisely at that 
point it is not new any longer, or it is only new for a very short period.  
Another paradox concerns the management of innovations (Baecker 
1993: 14). The innovative enterprise must be constantly integrated into 
the organization, by reintroducing the concepts of success and failure 
into a successful enterprise/organization. A new goal is set whenever the 
success that has just been achieved will be considered a failure in the fu-
ture. It is common knowledge that successful changes that are brought in 
today may not exist tomorrow. It seems that organizations react irration-
ally. They create uncertainty instead of—as would be expected according 
to March and Simon—absorbing it.  
Innovations are risky in many respects (Roth 2014a; Roth 2014b). It may 
be risky to dispense with innovations. Demand goes down one day or 
other and the realization that it was wrong to dispense with innovations 
and stick with colorful brochures and hollow promises comes too late. 
The horse has bolted. The train has left the station. 
Hence, we come across particular uncertainties when dealing with inno-
vations: 
 
– Basically, innovation is factually undetermined, dependent on time but 
unpredictable, uncontrollable in personal respects, and incalculable in 
economic respects. 
– Innovation cannot be processed in sequential steps (along a supposed 
supply chain). The ability to connect, to link up, to coordinate commu-
nicatively, to think recursively, to plan, and to act is necessary. 
– It takes at least two to play the innovation game.. 
– During the innovation process, contradictory and incompatible logics 
encounter each other (e.g. the logic of development versus the logic of 
application). 
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An innovations leads to a paradigm shift. It does not necessarily have to 
be the newest and best invention or solution to be successful on the 
market. A market and business strategy grows important if it not only 
focuses on obvious solutions and customer demands but also considers 
the relevant but multitudinous functioning requirements of complex sys-
tems. Thus, innovation puts traditional company structures, management 
concepts, and in this context also traditional worldviews and experiences 
into question. Now the question is “Which advice should we take?” In-
novation, pretence innovation or non-innovation? Our answer is unam-
biguous and clear: of course all of the three strategies are still in the run-
ning but it remains to be seen which one will be successful in the end 
and for whom. 
 
Notes 
 
1 The creation of expectation allows for continuity in a world of changing events. 
One is not only prepared for that which can be calculated in advance but also in 
the case that something unexpected will happen, that surprises or disappointment 
will occur. Possibilities for action or damage limitation in the case of disappoint-
ment are included with the structures of expectation (Luhmann 1994: 136). 
2 Business studies, however, differentiate between product, process, and social in-
novation, whereupon the criterion that provokes the separation is strangely 
vague, since the fact that only an evaluation adjustment carried out on an interac-
tive or communicative basis by several people is capable of generating a product 
innovation, which logically applies to the case of the process innovation, remains 
completely obscure. 
3 For organizations, one problem, among others, consists of the fact that this al-
ternative consciousness itself becomes subject matter for decision-based program 
decisions and therefore gets caught up in the invincible borders of planning ca-
pacities. 
4 Diffusion research (among others Attenwell 1992; Rogers 1995; Schenk et al. 
1997) is, however, only one address in the scientific world that deals with this 
question in-depth. 
5 The success of a plan (that describes itself as an innovation) consequently de-
pends not only on the quality of an idea or a goal, but rather is dependent on the 
conditions of the creation of social acceptance (above all in other social systems) 
as well as on the development (which can only be influenced to a limited extent) 
of structures of expectations in the respective social areas. Consequently, this 
perspective, originating from those who generate innovations, does not quite take 
hold. A perspective that is capable of including the social reference systems and 
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coherencies should at least supplement it. Innovation research would conse-
quently be required to consider questions, possibilities and the incorporation of 
communicative processes, social acceptance as well as comprehensive diffusion 
requirements. 
6 Parsons (1969) makes reference to six modern evolutionary universalities: social 
stratification, cultural legitimization, administration bureaucracy, finance and 
market organization, general universal norms, and democratic associations. 
7 Subsequent to Parsons, the classical theory of modernization views modern soci-
eties (countries) in the West to be characterized by four basic institutions (Zapf 
1990): competitive democracy, market economy, an affluent society with mass 
consumption as well as a welfare state. Societies in which these institutions “ap-
pear are more successful, more capable of adapting, that is more modern than 
those that do not adapt” (Zapf 1990: 34). 
8 Thus, in 1964 Parsons dared to make the following prognosis, based on the polit-
ical system of communist societies, namely: “that the communist societal organi-
zations will prove instable and will either adapt in the direction of electoral de-
mocracy and a pluralist party system or will ‘degrade’ into less developed and po-
litically less effective forms of organization” (Parsons 1969: 71). Wolfgang Zapf 
joins in with the indication “that no society can escape developing such structures 
[universal principles of development; J. A.] if it wants to remain survivable and 
autonomous” (Zapf 1975: 217). 
9 The seven technologies are: tool technology, agricultural technology, technology 
of fire development, technology of urban development, technology of the ma-
chine, chemical technology, and electrical technology. 
10 When technology is referred to, the entire span of production is meant and in-
cludes “the basic production idea, the means and methods of production and the 
type of produced artifact” (Popitz 1995: 13). 
11 At this point it might be worthwhile to consider further the figure of the observ-
er, who has to recognize the new option and communicate or implement it. 
12 The social entities created by the process of settlement allow for continuity in the 
social structure (continuity of work, lineage, and the social attachment to cultivat-
ed land) that occurs through the accumulation of property. 
13 With the invention of the technology of agriculture, humans themselves became 
the producers of their food. The land became an extensive production facility 
and was cultivated just as plants are. All of nature became a potential candidate 
for production. The idea of this technology results in the fact that nature works 
for humans, in the sense of a selection and enhancement of processes of nature 
(Popitz 1995: 22). Nature serves as a tool for humans. Foreign processes are con-
trolled by human use. 
14 Two strategies are meaningful in the process of artification: (1) The transfor-
mation of nature for human purposes. Humans interfere with the processes of 
nature by controlling them. (2) The alienation of humans from the natural envi-
ronment. Tools had created distance between the hand and nature; weapons in-
creased this distance to animals through hunting. The question as to how much, 
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and how, nature should be incorporated into the city is increasingly a matter for 
discussion in urban development. 
15 The unity of lifetime occupation is lost. People no longer live in small groups, but 
instead in large associations with one another. Social structures that promise con-
tinuity and orientations are necessary in order to maintain these agglomerations 
(structures of power). 
16 The interdependencies are manifold. Technical innovations are always accompa-
nied by other changes. For one, social innovations are necessary conditions for 
technical innovations. For example, the development in a society of a division of 
labor is a prerequisite for the development of new forms of production (metal-
lurgy). One further interdependency is related to the systematical invariance of 
technology. The ramifications of the combination of new products to be used 
outlast the innovation period of the individual technologies; for example, as long 
as the mechanical production has been achieved it can enforce certain social 
forms of organization (disciplinary action). 
17 One further concept that describes the transformation or stagnation of industrial 
society through various innovations advances the thesis that the entire Western 
process of modernization is a result of four “logistical revolutions. 
18 From an historical perspective, the cyclical “long waves” portray long-term phas-
es of economic or social development. The cycles are composed of different sub-
phases: sub-phases with a tendency for growing economic development. Schum-
peter (1961: 159) himself distinguished four phases: two negative, recession and 
depression, and two positive, recovery and prosperity. 
19 Initial innovations have diverse, long-lasting impulse effects for national econo-
mies or for the global economy as a whole (see Nefiodow 1996). Empirical evi-
dence is supplied through price indexes, wage indexes, interest rates, security flo-
tations, and the volume of investments and employment. 
20 There are, of course, other prominent candidates (Fourastié 1954; Clark 1957). 
(in Literatur steht Clark 1940) 
21 The movement of the “long waves” requires a society that structurally rewards 
added value. The question therefore is what happens when preferences change. 
22 Mancur Olson (1982) also addresses the problem of social innovation with his 
critique of the theory of “long waves.” His theory of stagnation points out that 
specific social processes of power accumulation can affect the economic cycle of 
innovation. If these sort of social regimentations, as well as others, are accounted 
for, than an automatism of the “theory of long waves” can hardly be deduced an-
ymore. Stagnation can be triggered through most different social processes, for 
example when industrial power is consolidated. This can lead to innovative de-
velopment turning into stagnation, for instance when businesses are no longer 
required to be innovative (monopoly) or when the side effects of economic ac-
tion are neglected (environmental costs) and if further costs (education, black 
coal) are passed on to the general public, then the externalized profits can be 
pocketed, but with the consequence that personal endeavors will be omitted in 
the future. In addition, an increasing retreat from reality has a negative effect on 
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the manner of innovation since a condition for innovation is, on the one hand, 
the connection to reality and on the other hand acceptance from customers or 
the public. 
23 Every capitalistic development has its characteristic “accumulation regime.” Eco-
nomic processes are integrated per se in institutionalized processes of regulation. 
The economy regulates itself ultimately through institutionally secured laws of the 
market and is incorporated through state legislation, tax law, tariff provisions, and 
so forth. 
24 The third technical revolution introduced with the computer does not remain 
restricted to a select few fields, but rather “a series of change is implied that pene-
trates and revolutionizes past circumstances” (Steinbicker 2001: 66). 
25 See the critical appraisal from Stehr (2003). 
26 Different descriptions of art have been tried in the art system. If art was consid-
ered to be the fine arts, the ideal display of spirituality in the works was in the 
foreground. In the display of spirituality people saw the beauty, which is to be 
seized as a model. 
27 The particular difficulty in the questioning of the manner of this transformation, 
of the meaning of continuity and discontinuity at the transfer from one style to 
the other, results from the circumstance that the break with the past and the tie 
to it that development and advancement play a role in art and are supported by 
other factors than otherwise within cultural history, namely by science and tech-
nology. Hence, the process of history is basically continuous and progressive, but 
in art it is abrupt, absurd, and in regards to the quality of service, incompatible 
with the concept of advancement. 
28 For an example of rejected demands of innovation and their consequences for art 
organizations exemplified by the Berliner Schaubühne see John (2005). 
29 Cf. Stichweh (1996). 
30 “Innovational strategies seem to prefer collective pathways. The conviction that 
manifold potentials can only be tapped by cooperation with (possible) competi-
tors manifests itself in the trend of establishing horizontal networks, which are 
meant to represent a frame for innovation” (Radel 1997: 123). 
31 Thus, the relevance of developments on the part of the practitioners, in other 
words, the empirical-practical rationality, opposes the FuE-rationality of techni-
cians and constructors, or the theoretical-scientific rationality. 
32 Further consideration on the difference between network and cooperation can be 
found in Aderhold (2004, 2005b). 
33 The creation of regional clusters is related to the following preconditions 
(Schienstock 1997: S. 81): trust as a basis for vertical and horizontal processes of 
exchange; vertical exchange: technology transfer, interdependent services are 
provided (organizational consultation, training in and development of technolo-
gy, qualified workers and technological know-how.) 
34 Heidenreich (1997) mentions the following factors, among others. (1) Production 
determinants: these include the educational level of the labor force, regional mar-
kets, and infrastructure. (2) Conditions of demand: these include the domestic 
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demand in particular industries. Despite the existence of global markets, domestic 
demand is still important. These regional markets can function as trial markets 
for launching and testing new products. (3) Related industries and supply indus-
tries: if there are domestic supply industries, this has a positive effect as cheap 
and high-quality services can be used. In addition, “a constant exchange of ideas 
and innovations” (Porter 1996: 151) develops in the course of close collabora-
tion. The tempo of perceived innovations in the surroundings, in particular, has 
consequences for the business-minded observer. (4) Entrepreneurial strategies 
and structures: national differences accrue, in particular, from the way companies 
are structured and run by the management. The design and implementation of in-
ternationally effective company and management concepts is realized in very dif-
ferent ways. 
35 An industrial cluster can be understood as a “place bound constellation of simi-
lar, mutually dependent or complementary companies, which collaborate closely 
and which intercommunicate and exchange information intensely” (Schienstock 
1997: 80). The cluster-forming companies “use a specialized infrastructure to-
gether, they share opportunities and they face the same threats” (Schienstock 
1997: 80). 
36 “Technical design takes place in social networks, in which, by negotiations and 
mutual coordination, actors create results that are vital for the course of technol-
ogy development. Alternatives can only accrue from changes or extensions of so-
cial networks—that is, when further players with different interests join in. The 
success of alternative strategies, however, depends on whether alternative net-
works can be closed operationally and socially” (Weyer 1997: 147). 
37 What kinds of processes are involved here, in particular, is controversial. A sug-
gestion from Hauschildt et al. (1993) is worth considering. The authors plead for 
a “concomitance model”. They distinguish three relevant strings of innovation—
the creative string, the productive string, and the distributive string—but it is 
about finding a form of cooperation that ensures the functioning of the three 
process strings by providing for a cross-procedural attendance (promoters for ex-
ample), so that the results in one field also have effects on the other processes at 
the same time. 
38 “Fordism not only amounts in the dyad of mass production and mass consump-
tion, but also represents a broad social model of organization and regulation: Its 
main elements were a strongly Taylorized differentiation of labor, centralized de-
cisions in dominant enterprises und an appropriately polarized social structure” 
(Baethge 1995: 33). In the Federal Republic of Germany, strong trade unions and 
extended rights of co-determination must be taken into account. 
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PART III 
THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF NON-TECHNOLOGICAL AND 
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Jari Kaivo-oja 
INTEGRATING INNOVATION AND FORESIGHT RESEARCH 
ACTIVITIES: KEY MODELS AND CHALLENGES IN NON-
TECHNICAL AND NON-ECONOMIC INNOVATION ACTIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
Innovation, creativity, and design are among the most frequently used 
words in business and society today. Most innovation studies focus on 
markets and the technical road mapping of future innovations. Less at-
tention is paid to non-economic and non-technical innovations (Roth 
2009a; Roth 2009b; Müller, Roth, and Zak 2010; Roth, Wetzel, and Mül-
ler 2011; Scheiber, Roth, and Reichel 2011). 
Contrary to common trends, this article focuses on non-technical and 
non-economic innovations. Furthermore, in this article we will discuss 
key models of non-economic and non-technical innovation. This paper 
is not a fully comprehensive survey, but just focuses on four important 
models of modern innovation studies, which should be a part of the re-
search agenda in the field of research on non-technical and non-
economic innovations. 
In this chapter, my aim is to add a non-economic element to traditional 
innovation models. In this fashion, I will try to build up a new theory of 
NMI. 
 
Integrating Innovation and Foresight Research 
 
According to Kaivo-oja (2006), we can connect foresight systems and 
innovation systems in seven alternative ways, which are non-linear rather 
than the conventional linear models (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995) - see 
details in Figures 1–14. We present seven theoretical alternative interac-
tion models, which all are possible in modern firms and corporations. 
We consider that foresight systems can play and often do play an im-
portant part in relation to innovation systems. 
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Figure 1: Model I: Innovation–foresight–other processes (IFO) model 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Model II: Foresight–innovation–other processes (FIO) model 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Model III: Other industrial processes–foresight–innovation  
(OFI) model 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Model IV: other industrial processes–innovation–foresight (OIF) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Model V: foresight–other industrial processes–innovation (FOI) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Model VI: innovation–other industrial processes–foresight (IOF) 
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Figure 7: Model VII: interactive simulative process model (ISP) 
 
All these innovation models include an economic element, production, 
and marketing. One way to extend these models to non-economic 
innovation models is just to add further social systems. In this way we 
have seven novel interaction models of innovation process. These 
models are non-economic social systems models. 
 
Figure 8: Model VIII: innovation–foresight–social systems (IFSS) model 
 
 
Figure 9: Model IX: foresight–innovation–social systems (FISS) model 
 
 
Figure 10: Model X: social systems–foresight–innovation (SSFI) model 
 
 
Figure 11: Model XI: social systems–innovation–foresight (SSIF) 
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Figure 12: Model XII: foresight–social systems–innovation (FOI) 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Model XIII: innovation–social systems–foresight (ISSF) 
 
 
Figure 14: Model XIV: interactive simulative process model (ISSP)] 
 
One important research question concerning non-economic and non-
technical innovations is how foresight systems handle these kinds of in-
novations. One thing is sure: there is increasing complexity in the inno-
vation field. In particular, there are many interesting trade-offs between 
non-economic innovations and economic innovations. We can also ex-
pect that the nature of trade-offs between non-economic innovations 
and economic innovations depends on the nature of economic innova-
tions. This question is analyzed in the next chapter. 
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Key Innovation Models and Reflections 
 
In this section we discuss four different innovation models/theories and 
their relevance in relation to non-economic innovations. We also discuss 
some important aspects of non-technological innovations. 
 
Open Innovation Model 
 
Growing attention has recently been devoted to the concept of “open 
innovation,” both in academia and in practice. Chesbrough, who coined 
the term “open innovation,” describes in his book Open Innovation: The 
New Imperative for Creating and Profiting from Technology (Chesbrough 2003) 
how organizations have shifted from so-called closed innovation pro-
cesses towards a more open way of innovating (De Breantani 1991; 
Sundbo and Gallouj 1998, 2000; Chesbrough 2003; De Jong et al. 2003; 
Roth, Kaivo-oja, and Hirschmann 2013). 
Traditionally, new business development processes and the marketing of 
new products have taken place within the firm boundaries (Figure 15). 
The open innovation model is a very relevant new concept for non-
economic innovations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Closed innovation paradigm (Chesbrough 2003: xxii) 
 
Several factors have led to the erosion of closed innovation. First of all, 
the mobility and availability of highly educated people has increased over 
the years. As a result, large amounts of knowledge exist outside the re-
search laboratories of large organizations. In addition to that, when em-
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ployees change jobs, they take their knowledge with them, resulting in 
increasing knowledge flows between firms. Secondly, the availability of 
venture capital has recently increased significantly, which makes it possi-
ble for good and promising ideas and technologies to be further devel-
oped outside the business organization. Opportunities for further devel-
oping ideas and technologies outside the organization are growing, for 
instance, in the form of spinoffs or through licensing agreements. Final-
ly, other organizations in the supply chain, for example suppliers, play an 
increasingly important role in the innovation process. 
As a result, organizations have started to look for other ways to increase 
the efficiency and effectiveness of their innovation processes, for in-
stance through active search for new technologies and ideas outside of 
the firm, but also through cooperation with suppliers and competitors in 
order to create customer value. Another important aspect is the further 
development or out-licensing of ideas and technologies that do not fit 
the strategy of the organization. Some good ideas can also be distributed 
to non-economic purposes.  
 
 
Figure 16: Open innovation paradigm (Chesbrough (2003 xxv) 
 
Open innovation can thus be described as combining internal and exter-
nal ideas as well as internal and external paths to market to advance the 
development of new technologies (Figures 4 and 5).  
One interesting aspect of Chesbrough’s (2003) open innovation model is 
that it does not take non-economic innovations into consideration. New 
markets are described as potential places where innovations are out-
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sourced (see Figure 16). This issue is analyzed more in the context of the 
innovation category model. Accordingly we can conclude that the open 
innovation model could be developed towards also taking non-economic 
innovations into consideration. 
 
Figure 17: Open innovation paradigm with non-economic innovations (Source: Chesbrough 2003) 
 
The existence of the open innovation model implies that, in the first 
place, the shift described above means that organizations have to be-
come aware of the increasing importance of open innovation.  
 
Closed innovation principles Open innovation principles 
The smart people in the field work for us. Not all the smart people in the field work for 
us. We need to work with smart people 
inside and outside the company. 
To profit from R&D, we must discover it, 
develop it, and ship it ourselves. 
External R&D can create significant value; 
internal R&D is needed to claim some 
portion of that value. 
If we discover it ourselves, we will get it to 
the market first. 
We don’t have to originate the research to 
profit from it. 
The company that gets an innovation to the 
market first will win. 
Building a better business model is better 
than getting to the market first. 
If we create the most and the best ideas in If we make the best use of internal and 
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Closed innovation principles Open innovation principles 
the industry, we will win. external ideas, we will win. 
We should control our IP, so that our 
competitors don’t profit from our ideas. 
We should profit from others’ use of our IP, 
and we should buy others’ IP whenever it 
advances our business model. 
Table 1: Closed and open innovation principles (Source: Chesbrough 2003: xxvi) 
Not all good ideas are developed within the business organizations, and 
not all ideas should necessarily be further developed within the business 
organization’s boundaries. Table 1 further illustrates this fact. 
This means that, within the business organization, a shift should take 
place in the way people look at the company and its environment. In-
volving other parties when developing new products and technologies 
can be of great added value. For instance, think about cooperation with 
other organizations in your sector, with suppliers, universities, and, of 
course, end-users. The essential point is thus that, in open-innovation 
operations, experts are found and they constitute the key operators. An 
open-innovation strategy can also connected to the Blue Ocean strategy 
(Roth 2014a) and actor-network theory, which are both very relevant ap-
proaches to European companies. 
 
Innovation Category Model 
 
The following innovation models are inspired by the innovation category 
model of von Stamm (2003: 49). Her model divides innovations to in-
cremental and radical innovations and to existing market and new market 
innovations. To understand the new role of non-economic innovation 
we can add non-economical innovations to her model. In this reshaped 
innovation category model there are six innovation categories (A, B, C, 
D, E, and F). Figure 18 presents conventional trends in markets and so-
ciety. According to this approach, in the long-run innovations tend to 
develop towards incremental and existing market system. These conven-
tional trends are linked to the closed innovation model, not to the open 
innovation model.  
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Figure 18: Innovation category model: typical processes 
 
Figure 19 presents non-conventional, countervailing trends in markets 
and society. According to this alternative approach, innovations can also 
develop new markets and towards non-economic systems. These non-
conventional trends are linked to the open innovation model, not to the 
closed innovation model. 
 
Schumpeterian Tradition of Innovation Research 
 
A theoretical framework for dynamic competition and firm dynamics can 
be found in Schumpeter’s notion of “creative destruction.” Dynamic 
competition is a process in which innovators with new technology enter 
a market and compete with incumbents with conventional technology. If 
the innovation is successful, the entrants will be able to replace the in-
cumbents. If not, they will fail to survive. Indeed, such dynamic competi-
tion “from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of 
supply, the new type of organizations” strikes “not at the margins of the 
profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and 
their very lives” (Schumpeter 1934). 
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Figure 19: Innovation category model: countervailing open innovation processes 
 
In the Schumpeterian tradition, many empirical studies focused on the 
relationship between firm size and innovation. Some arguments for a posi-
tive effect of firm size on innovation are given in Figure 19 (Cohen et al. 
1987; Symeonidis 1996). 
 
− The returns from R&D are higher where the innovator has a large vol-
ume of sales over which to spread the fixed costs of innovation (econ-
omies of scale in R&D). 
− Large, diversified firms can benefit from positive spillovers between 
the various research programs (economies of scope in R&D). 
− Large firms can undertake many projects at once and hence diversify 
the risks of R&D. 
− Large firms with market power have an advantage in securing finance 
for risky R&D because size and market power can increase the availa-
bility and stability of external and internal funds. 
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But one can also find counter-arguments in the spirit of Schumpeter 
(1934), namely, the bureaucratization of inventive activity (Cohen et al. 
1997): 
 
− As firms grow large, efficiency in R&D is undermined through loss of 
managerial control. 
− As firms grow large, the incentives of individual scientists and entre-
preneurs become attenuated as their ability to capture the benefits from 
their efforts diminishes. 
 
In the Schumpeterian research tradition, less attention is paid to large 
social systems, which have large innovation potential. For example, edu-
cational and university systems create new innovation potential, but they 
are not necessarily monopolies in existing or new markets. 
In many empirical studies, Schumpeter’s claim that large firms in concen-
trated markets have an advantage in innovation was interpreted as a 
proposition that innovative activity increases proportionately more than 
firm size (Cohen 1995). Other studies examined the relationship between 
market concentration and innovative activities measured by innovative 
inputs (R&D expenditure, R&D employment, and so forth) or by inno-
vative outputs (patent counts, and so forth). However, it was also point-
ed out that Schumpeter had never claimed a continuous relationship be-
tween R&D and firm size. What Schumpeter focused on is said to be the 
qualitative differences between small, entrepreneurial enterprises and 
large, modern corporations in their innovative activities. 
Innovation is a concept where there is considerable variance in individual 
observers’ definitions; both between common sense—or laymen think-
ing—understanding and analytical approaches, and between different 
analytical or theoretical approaches. One element common to all these 
approaches is that market introduction is a crucial aspect of innovation. This is 
what distinguishes innovation from invention; the concepts are incompa-
rable in the sense that invention is a technical concept and innovation an 
economic concept. But they are not wholly unrelated; technical feasibility 
is a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic feasibility. For 
service innovations, social or cultural feasibility is also a very necessary 
condition for economic feasibility. 
Since the concept of innovation involves at least novelty to the firm, the 
change in market characteristics is related to a change in firm characteris-
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tics. Joseph Schumpeter (1934, 1987, 1994) pointed out that the simpli-
fied picture of profit-maximizing price-competing firms, with price as 
the main information carrier between the actors on the market, was too 
simple to explain the development of market systems. In addition to 
price competition there is an even more important technological compe-
tition; with firms competing on qualitative characteristics of products 
and processes. Schumpeter identified five classes of innovation that were 
important determinants of economic outcomes. The first two, technological 
product and process innovation, have almost exclusively been focused on in 
the innovation literature and research. In a way non-technical and non-
economic innovations have been neglected because Schumpeter’s two 
first innovation categories have attracted so much research attention and 
activity. As Schumpeter’s focus was primarily on industry level and not 
on firm level, an innovation was something that was new to the world—
it was new to the industry, not new to the society. Hence he regarded also his 
third category—organizational innovations—as the appearance of new gen-
eral organizational modes transferable to and applicable in a wide variety 
of firms, as well as restructuring on the industry level. The industry per-
spective excludes adjustment and imitation processes of the original in-
dustry-level innovation, as well as other local, “new-to–the-firm” innova-
tions. Local re-organizations of business firms that are highly specific to 
the individual firm are thus excluded from his perspective. His two last 
categories of innovation were the conquering of a new source of input or 
raw material, which we would probably not consider an innovation to-
day, and the opening of new markets. Generally, we can note that 
Schumpeter did not pay so much attention to service innovations and 
business models. 
To sum up, Schumpeter introduced five categories of innovation: (1) 
The introduction of a new good (with which consumers are not yet fa-
miliar) or of a new quality of a good; (2) the introduction of a new meth-
od of production, which need not be founded upon a scientifically new 
discovery; (3) the opening of a new market into which the particular 
branch of manufacture of the country in question has not previously en-
tered, whether or not this market has existed before; (4) the conquest of 
a new source of supply of raw materials or half-manufactured goods; and 
finally (5) the carrying out of the new organization of any industry, like 
the creation of monopoly position or breaking up of a monopoly posi-
tion. 
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Nevertheless, the ultimate effects of innovations as economic phenome-
na are related to the commercial effects on the markets that the innova-
tor is supplying. This makes it correct to state that innovation is a sup-
ply-side phenomenon, but this is different from characterizing driving 
mechanisms of innovation processes, whether they are pushed by suppli-
ers or pulled by customers. Market introduction presupposes the exist-
ence of a market. The process of introducing innovations into the econ-
omy may, however, in several instances be considered as the creation or 
opening of new markets. For services, it is claimed that it is necessary to 
include a new class of innovations into this spectrum—delivery innova-
tions (Miles et al. 1995). Delivery innovations are described as innova-
tions in the delivery system or medium of the service provider, such as 
ICT-based service provision. 
The current focus on innovation processes differs somewhat from the 
original perspective of Joseph Schumpeter (1987, 1994). First of all, the 
OECD “Oslo Manual” on innovation surveys (OECD 1992), as well as 
the many innovation studies based on it, focus on firm-level innovation. A 
firm-level approach makes innovation and diffusion complementary, ra-
ther than dichotomous, concepts. The intra-industrial diffusion process 
is considered an integrated part of innovation processes. The level of in-
novative activity differs quite considerably according to whether the 
analysis is restricted to “new–to-the-industry” innovations or includes 
“new-to-the firm” innovations. The critical ratio between them can dis-
play distinct industry-specific patterns. There are no immediate reasons 
to believe that this picture differs qualitatively between manufacturing 
and services industries. It is often claimed, however, that the innovator’s 
appropriation of benefits from the innovation is more difficult in ser-
vices as service innovations are easy to copy. 
Schumpeter’s focus on innovation is reflected in neo-Schumpeterian 
economics, developed by researchers like Christopher Freeman (1982) 
and Giovanni Dosi (1982). 
 
The Triple Helix Model and Non-Technical and Non-
Economic Innovations 
 
The active role of universities in relation to society has been gaining em-
phasis in conjunction to, for instance, defining the so-called third task of 
the universities. Besides the roles of information node, transmitter, and 
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networker, the concrete tasks of universities would include the produc-
tion of new openings based on foresight research and information as 
well as catalyzing various innovations that cross borders. The functional 
tasks of universities in relation to society can in principle be classified 
into two basic categories: the classical model and the interactive model. 
The first one describes the universities’ traditional tasks in transmitting 
information and producing new ideas and innovations. The idea that re-
search results could be directly applicable faces many practical challeng-
es. 
Typical examples of the classical model are the training of experts for the 
needs of businesses, contracted research, theses, and students’ practical 
training periods. This is much of what is desired of higher education in-
stitutions. These operations are quite important and significant from the 
point of the region and the individuals. From the point of the develop-
ment of different operators and operations, the interactive model focus-
es on the dynamic and intimate role of universities in the development 
of, for instance, a region. A successful, innovative network is often a 
community where actors from academia, the cultural sector, and busi-
nesses meet one another in a fruitful way. 
There are many kinds of models to describe collaboration between uni-
versities and other actors. The triple helix is a result of Henry Etz-
kowitz’s (Etzkowitz 2006, 2008; Etzkowitz et al. 2007) analysis of the 
change in scientific information production and universities in the in-
formation society. According to Etzkowitz, information production has 
moved from universities to university-government-industry interaction. 
For this area he has given the name “triple helix,” which has become a 
popular concept in the field of higher education research and some other 
fields, such as innovation research. 
The triple helix is a model for understanding and guiding interactions in 
university-industry-government relations. Each actor within the triple 
helix has its own task. Universities produce research, industries manufac-
tures, and the government secures certain stability for maintaining ex-
change and interaction. 
 
The triple helix regime operates on these complex dynamics of inno-
vation as a recursive overlay of interactions and negotiations among 
the three institutional spheres. The different partners engage in collab-
orations and competitions as they calibrate their strategic direction and 
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niche positions. The “triple helix” denotes that this social world is 
more complex than the natural one. 
 
We can show three alternative models (Figures 20, 21 and 22) of the tri-
ple helix model. These models can also be seen as future option frame-
works for the European innovation policy. 
 
 
Figure 20: An etatistic model of university-industry-government relations 
 
Figure 21: A “laissez-faire” model of university–industry–government relations 
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Figure 22: The triple helix model of university–industry–government relations] 
 
The very special feature of triple helix model idea is that, in a specific 
way, it emphasizes the role of non-economic factors in innovation poli-
cy. However, on the other hand, one important logical aspect of the tri-
ple helix model is that industrial (wealth-generation) and economic fac-
tors are always in some way involved in innovation processes. In this 
way the triple helix model is not taking non-economic factors into con-
sideration seriously (Roth 2014b). The triple helix model includes policy 
institutions and academia as special factors. When two selection envi-
ronments operate upon each other, mutual shaping in a co-evolution 
along a particular trajectory is one possible outcome. When three selec-
tion environments are involved, more complex dynamics can be ex-
pected as a result of interactions involving bilateral and trilateral rela-
tions. Three selection environments are specified in the triple helix mod-
el: (1) wealth generation (industry); (2) novelty production (academia) 
and (3) public control (government). Furthermore, the triple helix model 
somewhat reduces the complexity by using university-industry-
government relations for the specification of the historical conditions of 
the non-linear dynamics. 
We can add non-economic aspects (Roth 2014a; Roth 2014c; Roth 
2014d) to the triple helix when system dynamics of innovation process 
can be seen to be more complex (see Figure 23). We can conclude that if 
we take non-economic factors seriously, we must develop the triple helix 
model, which actually goes beyond the triple helix. 
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Figure 23: Non-economic aspects and the triple helix] 
 
 
Conclusions and Reflections 
 
One way to analyze non-economic innovations is to present new ver-
sions of traditional innovation theories and models (Jokinen, Malaska, 
and Kaivo-oja 1998; Kaivo-oja, Katko, and Seppälä 2004; Kaivo-oja 
2012). This chapter has focused on four interesting innovation models: 
(1) the open innovation model; (2) the innovation category model; (3) 
Schumpeter’s classical innovation theory, and (4) the triple helix model. 
Firstly, in this chapter I added the non-market sector to the open innova-
tion model. In this way it is possible to understand that the innovation 
in-process and the innovation out-process can also be connected to non-
economic systems and market organizations. This additional element 
gives a new perspective to the open innovation model and associated 
open innovation processes. 
Secondly, in this chapter I also make a new extension to the traditional 
innovation category model of von Stamm. I added non-economic sec-
tors to her model, where incremental and radical innovations can also 
emerge. I also discussed conventional trade-offs between different inno-
vation types and added countervailing trade-offs. 
Thirdly, I discussed Schumpeter’s classical definitions of alternative in-
novations. I noted that Schumpeter’s model did not pay much attention 
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to non-economic elements of innovation, although he paid minor atten-
tion to some. 
Fourthly, I presented three alternative triple helix models and a fourth 
model of new triple helix, which includes non-economic systems. I noted 
that non-economic systems probably make triple helix model more 
complex to understand and it probably changes our view about the in-
novation dynamics associated with the triple helix model. 
One general conclusion is that all these models do not include the 
framework of non-economic innovation. They are based on the funda-
mental economic ideas of market organizations, industries, and markets. 
In this chapter I have added a non-economic element to these models. 
In this way I have tried to build up a new theory framework of NEI. 
Less attention is given to non-technical innovations in this chapter (NTI, 
thus social and service innovations). 
If we analyze the sphere of NEI and NTI, we can outline four new in-
novation research field categories. This kind of innovation categorization 
helps us to identify four critical research topics of innovation studies. We 
can say that both NEI and NTI analyses inspire us to build up four in-
novation research programs, which have specific background aspects. In 
this way NEI and NTI analyses and discussions can shift the paradigm 
of innovation research in interesting new directions. 
 
 
Non-technical 
innovations 
A. Social innovations 
(NTI) in markets (EI) 
B. Social innovations 
(NTI) in NEI social 
systems and 
environments 
Technical 
innovations 
C. Technical market 
(TI) innovations (EI) 
D. Technical 
innovations in NEI 
social systems and 
environments 
 Economic 
innovations 
Non-economic 
innovations 
Table 2: Four new innovation categories inspired by NTI and NEI analyses 
 
In this chapter I have outlined a new, broader innovation theory for 
boxes B and D. Box B is explained mostly by conventional innovation 
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theories. A new dynamic research field is service innovation studies. It is 
important to understand that there are many service innovations which 
are outside markets. We can also say that limits between different inno-
vation types are not very clear. Often there is trade-off between econom-
ic and non-economic innovations, and social and technical innovations. 
 
Non-technical 
innovations 
A. Incremental social 
innovations (NTI)  
B. Radical social 
innovations (NTI)  
Technical 
innovations 
C. Incremental 
technical market (TI) 
innovations (EI) 
D. Radical technical 
innovations 
 Incremental 
innovations 
Radical innovations 
Table 3: Four new innovation categories inspired by NTI and conventional incremental/radical 
innovation analyses 
 
From Table 3 one can see that this clarification between technical and 
non-technical innovations is important. It is possible to have both in-
cremental and radical social innovations, which are non-economic inno-
vations. 
 
References 
 
1. Chesbrough, H. (2003). Open Innovation: The New Imperative 
for Creating and Profiting from Technology. Boston, MA: Har-
vard Business School Press. 
2. Cohen, W. M. (1995). Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity. 
In: P. Stoneman (Eds.): Handbook of the Economics of Innova-
tion and Technological Change. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
pp. 182–264. 
3. Cohen, W. M., Levin, R. C. and Mowery, D. C. (1987). Firm Size 
and R&D Intensity: A Reexamination. Journal of Industrial Eco-
nomics, 35, pp. 543–563. 
4. De Jong, J. P. J., Bruins, A., Dolfsma, W. and Meijgaard, J. 
(2003). Innovation in Service Firms Explored: What, How and 
Why? Strategic Study B200205. Zoetermeer, Holland: EIM Busi-
ness and Policy Research.  
 
 
220
5. De Brentani, U. (1991). Success Factors in Developing New 
Business Services. European Journal of Marketing, 25, pp. 33–59.  
6. Dosi, G. (1982). Technological Paradigms and Technological Tra-
jectories. Research Policy, 11/3, pp. 147–162. 
7. Etzkowitz, H. (2006). The New Visible Hand: An Assisted Linear 
Model of Science and Innovation Policy. Science and Public Poli-
cy 33/5, pp. 310–320. 
8. Etzkowitz, H. (2008). The Triple Helix: University-Industry-
Government Innovation in Action. London: Routledge. 
9. Etzkowitz, H., Dzisah, J., Ranga, M. and Zhou, C. (2007). The 
Triple Helix Model for Innovation: The University–Industry–
Government Interaction. Asia Pacific Tech Monitor 24/1, 
pp. 14–23. 
10. Freeman, C. (1982). The Economics of Industrial Innovation. 
London: Frances Pinter. 
11. Jokinen, P., Malaska, P., Kaivo-oja, J. (1998) The environment in 
an information society: A transition stage towards more sustaina-
ble development?, Futures, 30/6, pp. 485-498. 
12. Kaivo-oja, J., Katko, T. and Seppälä, O. (2004) Seeking conver-
gence between history and futures research, Futures, 36/5, pp. 
527-547. 
13. Kaivo-oja, J. (2006). Towards Integration of Innovation Systems 
and Foresight Research in Firms and Corporations. The Classical 
Takeuchi-Nonaka Model Reconsidered and Reformulated. Fin-
land Futures Research Centre. Turku School of Economics. Tur-
ku: FFRC-Publications. 
14. Kaivo-oja, J. (2012) Weak signals analysis, knowledge manage-
ment theory and systemic socio-cultural transitions, Futures, 
44/3, pp. 206-217. 
15. Miles, I., Kastrinos, N., Bilderbeek, R. H. and den Hertog, P. 
(1995). Knowledge-Intensive Business Services—Users, Carriers 
and Sources of Innovation. Brussels: EIMS Publications. 
16. Müller, K., Roth, S. and Zák, M. (2010) The social dimension of 
innovation. Prague: Linde. 
17. Nonaka, I. and Takeuchi, H. (1995). The Knowledge-Creating 
Company—How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamic of 
Innovation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 	  
	  
221 
18. OECD (1992). OECD Proposed Guidelines for Collecting and 
Interpreting Technological Innovation Data (“Oslo Manual”). 
GD 92 (26). Paris: OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology 
and Industry. 
19. Roth, S. (2009a), New for whom? Initial images from the social 
dimension of innovation, International Journal of Innovation and 
Sustainable Development, 4/4, pp. 231-252. 
20. Roth, S. (2009b) Non-technological and non-economic innova-
tions: Contributions to a theory of robust innovation. Bern: Peter 
Lang. 
21. Roth, S. (2014a) Booties, bounties, business models. A map to 
the next red oceans, International Journal of Entrepreneurship 
and Small Business, 22/4, pp. 439-448. 
22. Roth, S. (2014b) Ten systems: Toward a canon of function sys-
tems, Cognitive Social Science eJournal, 6/134. 
23. Roth, S. (2014c) The multifunctional organization: Two cases for 
a critical update for research programs in management and organ-
ization, Tamara: Journal for Critical Organization Inquiry, 12/3, 
pp. 37-54. 
24. Roth, S. (2014d) Fashionable functions. A Google ngram view of 
trends in functional differentiation (1800-2000), International 
Journal of Technology and Human Interaction, 10/2, pp. 34-58. 
25. Roth, S., Kaivo-oja, J. and Hirschmann, T. (2013) Smart regions. 
Two cases of crowdsourcing for regional develop-
ment, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Busi-
ness, 20/3, pp. 272-285. 
26. Roth, S., Wetzel, R. and Müller, K. (2011) Editorial: Going be-
yond the hard core of innovation, International Journal of Inno-
vation and Regional Development, 3/1: 5-8. 
27. Scheiber, L., Roth, S. and Reichel, A. (2011), The technology of 
innovation, International Journal of Innovation and Sustainable 
Development, 5/2-3, pp. 101-104. 
28. Schumpeter, J. A. (1934). The Theory of Economic Develop-
ment; An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the 
Business Cycle. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
29. Schumpeter, J. A. (1987). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 
London: Unwin. 
 
 
222
30. Schumpeter, J.  A. (1994). History of Economic Analysis. Lon-
don: Routledge. 
31. Sundbo, J. and Gallouj, F. (1998). Innovation in Services. SI4S 
Project synthesis Work package 3/4, SI4S Synthesis Paper S2. 
Oslo: STEP Group. 
32. Sundbo, J. and Gallouj, F. (2000). Innovation in Loosely Coupled 
System in Services. International Journal of Services Technology 
and Management, 1, pp. 15–36. 
33. Symeonidis, G. (1996). Innovation, Firm Size and Market Struc-
ture: Schumpeterian Hypotheses and Some New Themes. Paris: 
OECD Economic Studies. 
34. Von Stamm, B. (2003). Managing Innovation, Design and Crea-
tivity. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
  
 	  
	  
223 
Hugues Jeannerat and Olivier Crevoisier 
FROM PROXIMITY TO MULTI-LOCATION TERRITORIAL 
KNOWLEDGE DYNAMICS:  THE CASE OF THE SWISS WATCH 
INDUSTRY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent decades, territorial approaches have played an important role in 
the economy of innovation (Roth, Kaivo-oja and Hirschmann 2013). 
They have given rise to a vast array of literature on conceptual models 
such as innovative milieus, technopoles, industrial districts, or more gen-
erally clusters which have been synthesized by Moulaert and Sekia (2003) 
under the generic name of Territorial Innovation Models (TIMs). One the 
one hand, these models have been able to explain the role of technology 
and “diffuse focused” learning within geographical proximity as innova-
tion drivers. On the other, they presented the evolution of local produc-
tion systems as a specialization process in the global economy. 
Nowadays, learning and innovation are not intermittent or occasional, as 
in traditional industry, but are ongoing processes. New theories on the 
knowledge economy indicate that, in new innovation processes, 
knowledge is mobilized more systematically, more permanently, and at 
longer distance. Furthermore, work on cultural resources, cultural clus-
ters or creative cities, for instance, has shown that numerous innovations 
today take place more frequently via socio-cultural dynamics than tech-
no-scientific ones. Production–consumption systems have changed and 
the traditional regional networks have scattered within space. 
The case of the Swiss watch industry can be related to this conceptual 
change. Having led the international watch market, new technological 
and structural changes have forced the Swiss watchmaking companies to 
mobilize new strategies since the late 1970s. Non-technological innova-
tion provided new resources for differentiation and competitiveness. The 
traditional regional know-how of watchmakers has also been combined 
with new activities dedicated to authenticity and image creation from 
other territories. 
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From that perspective, new theoretical questions have appeared. What 
kind of new relations have developed between watch brands and con-
sumers? In what ways are the authenticity and the image of the watches 
controlled? What is the new role of technology in such processes? What 
kind of knowledge do firms mobilize in order to generate, legitimize, and 
support the symbolic value of their product? What are the new territorial 
stakes and the new role of the local scale in such processes? 
This chapter tries, in the first section, to develop theoretical considera-
tions about knowledge economy and territory in relation to traditional 
literature about innovation and territorial models. The concept of territo-
rial knowledge dynamics (TKDs) is proposed to explain new economic and 
territorial stakes. 
The second section focuses on the case of the Swiss watch industry. The 
role of non-technological added value and the rise of new activities relat-
ed to the traditional watch industry is analyzed. The new socio-economic 
dynamics between the watch industry and the consumer are also ob-
served in order to understand the way watch brands construct their im-
age and authenticity through narration and emotional experiences, and 
how integrated the system of production-consumption has become. In particu-
lar, diffusion and legitimization processes are central for the creation and 
economic valorization of image and authenticity. Finally, the role of the 
location in the global economy is reconsidered by proposing a conceptu-
al approach based on multi-location TKDs. 
 
From Technology, Innovation, and Proximity to 
Combinatorial and Multi-Location Territorial Knowledge 
Dynamics 
 
The Traditional Paradigm Based on Technological Trajectories, Territorial 
Innovation Models, and Cumulative Knowledge Dynamic 
 
In an industrial approach to economics, Nelson and Winter (1982) dis-
tinguish between radical innovations and technological trajectories. Radi-
cal innovations (for example organic chemistry) appear as exceptional 
phenomena. Their origin is exogenous to the system and they open up 
new development characterized by the succession of innovations that 
mobilize the basic techno-scientific principles of radical innovation. In-
novation therefore takes place along new trajectories that appear inter-
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mittently. Each phase leads to refining new techniques or products that 
are then implemented over a certain period. The dynamics of using and 
generating knowledge emerge during this trajectory, increasing the division 
of labor within the industry. Thus, sectors of activity and companies de-
velop that are distinct from one another in terms of their technologies 
and products. The knowledge dynamic is mostly cumulative. 
Geographical proximity favors the cumulative dynamics of using and 
generating knowledge. These theories, but also theories on communica-
tion, all—in one way or another—place the emphasis on the fact that 
rich interaction producing creative learning requires, to a considerable 
extent, geographical proximity. 
To do so, it is necessary to differentiate between two degrees of learning 
(Planque 1991; Maskell et al. 2006). On the one hand, there is mono-
functional (Planque, 1991) or strong focused learning (Maskell et al. 2006), 
whose objectives are clearly identified from the outset and within which 
the division of labor among the various participants is clearly established. 
This rather fine-tuned or targeted mono-functional knowledge dynamic 
reduces uncertainty or restricts it to calculable risks. The cognitive divi-
sion of labor is organized and stable. The external effects are principally 
known, anticipated, and sought after by the organization (through a net-
work or via intra-company projects). Such learning can overcome the 
barriers represented by distance or by the absence of a common past, 
since the said organization and convergence of interests makes up for 
those aspects. 
On the other hand, there is multi-functional or diffused focused learning, 
which applies to several dimensions at once and in which the partici-
pants’ contributions are not clearly established at the outset. Conse-
quently, this type of knowledge dynamic is characterized by complexity 
and considerable uncertainty. It can only take place to the extent that as-
surances regarding relations between the actors exist (trust, commonly 
respected rules on competition/co-operation, relational capital, common 
language, and so forth) (Grossetti and Godart 2007). Since the cognitive 
division of labor is not stabilized and the external effects among the 
partners can take many forms, such learning usually traverses a lengthy 
socialization process that is, in principle, only possible within the frame-
work of physical proximity or at least by means of prior sharing of rich 
experiences typical of a milieu. 
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Multi-functional learning requiring proximity, associated with a mono-
functional opening to increasingly open markets and technologies that 
are developed elsewhere, led to widely recognized theories on regional 
development. Benko and Lipietz (1992) offered a panorama of these ap-
proaches (industrial districts, science parks, etc.). We should also men-
tion the GREMI research program, which, as of 1985, progressively 
drew up and documented the concept of the innovative milieu (Camagni 
and Maillat 2006). A presentation of the history of these territorial innova-
tion models (TIMs) has recently been completed by Moulaert and Sekia 
(2003). All of them assume that local innovative dynamics permit a re-
gion to become part of an increasingly global economic environment. 
This relation has always been perceived as a two-way phenomenon. Re-
gions that come under pressure because of the increase in competing 
producers or technologies are supposed to adapt thanks to a local dy-
namic of appropriating the new technologies or of organizational 
change. Conversely, the regions that produce radical innovations locally 
achieve penetration of a global market and modify the market’s charac-
teristics. 
Innovative regions are those that are capable of imagining their local 
production system within a global environment by means of a develop-
ment process that is above all endogenous. In other words, in order to 
be innovative a region must be capable of matching its dynamics of the use 
and the generation of knowledge. However, traditional literature on TIMs fo-
cuses on innovation processes rather than on knowledge dynamics. It is 
only with the emergence, towards the end of the 1990s, of theories on 
learning regions that knowledge was considered as a resource for local in-
novation (Lundvall 1992; Florida 1995; Maillart and Kebir 1999). 
It should be noted that these models once again strongly reflect the idea 
that industry is the driving activity in innovative regions. Fundamentally, 
production and innovation take place at the scale of a differentiated re-
gion and are sold in an undifferentiated global market (“think globally, 
act locally”). Moreover, it should be noted that innovation is most fre-
quently technological, and that efforts are made to organize space 
around this reality (in the form of technopoles). 
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Critical Recent Socio-Economical Changes 
 
Some important recent changes have affected the traditional theoretical 
paradigm presented above. Three of them seem to be crucial in order to 
build a more complete understanding of new conceptual stakes within 
our current society. 
The first of the changes to the conditions for innovation is that numer-
ous recent technologies, such as information technology or the Internet, 
have become highly decompartmentalized since they have been brought 
into—and perfected within—an extremely large number of activities and 
have also been combined with other technologies. Antonelli (2006) 
speaks of fungible knowledge that has become increasingly flexible and 
configurational, i.e. it can be adapted to the needs and ideas that develop 
in many sectors. 
Secondly, the unprecedented increase in the mobility of goods, services, 
capital but above all of information and the labor force has strongly af-
fected the flow of long-distance exchange. New multimedia technolo-
gies, the development transports, and political or institutional creations 
such as the European Union or the World Trade Organization are all 
leading to a massive increase in information and knowledge exchange 
and are thus opening up an extraordinary potential for innovation and 
competition. This increase in mobility has loosened spatial and temporal 
constraints, and the issues at stake are of a new kind. The distinction be-
tween rich (multi-functional) learning requiring physical proximity and 
more finite (mono-functional) learning that can take place at distance 
seems to have become more relative today. 
Thirdly, numerous innovations today take place more frequently via so-
cio-cultural dynamics than techno-scientific ones. In fact, changes to so-
ciety’s values and practices are currently responsible for changes to 
products and services. This phenomenon takes various forms, and has 
been the subject of many research projects (Cooke and Lazeretti 2008). 
First of all, and on a fairly trivial level, the growth of the cultural indus-
tries (media, entertainment sport, tourism and leisure, cinema, video 
games, etc.) requires, above all, socio-cultural knowledge. Secondly, the 
incorporation of cultural and aesthetic aspects etc. within products is tak-
ing on increasing importance within the components thereof. Clothing, 
watchmaking, the automobile industry, and so forth, are examples of 
traditional industries whose products are increasingly evolving according 
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to fashion, aesthetic trends or society’s ethics. Finally, we see the signifi-
cant development of “the experience economy” (Pine and Gilmore 
1999), which consists of creating a high level of added value to a classical 
good or service by incorporating various types of experience related to 
the consumer’s participation or emotions (branding, events, coaching, 
and so forth). 
Thus, the incorporation of knowledge into economic processes no long-
er takes place in a sporadic manner but one that is systematic and per-
manent (Ascher 2001; Foray 2004). Today, innovation is thus radically 
different from the traditional model of the industrial society, and in 
many ways (Colletis-Wahl et al. 2008). Notions of industrial sectors and 
areas have lost their coherence. Knowledge dynamics are at present ar-
ticulated in a cross-sectoral manner, around composite entities such as 
health, communication or tourism (Cooke et al. 2007). The increase in 
mobility has loosened spatial and temporal constraints, and the issues at 
stake are of a new kind. The distinction between rich (multi-functional) 
learning requiring physical proximity and more finite (mono-functional) 
learning that can take place at distance seems to have become more rela-
tive today. The renewed importance of the socio-cultural component of 
products and services thus highlights, to a greater extent than in the past, 
the value of symbolic knowledge (Cooke et al. 2007). This trend results in 
taking learning that arises from relations with consumers into account to 
a greater extent. 
Reflection regarding the new spatial forms that rich learning is taking on 
clearly shows the justification for taking territory into account within the 
analysis of current economic phenomena. A genuine research program 
on territorial economies consists of exploring these new forms and un-
derstanding how they influence economic processes. The broader terri-
torial paradigm that we propose sees knowledge as a cognitive process 
that is shared among humans and that is generated and used within so-
cial interaction, in various contexts. The paradigm attempts to go beyond 
the traditional one of innovation and proximity with a view to develop-
ing an approach constructed around the concept of territorial knowledge 
dynamics (TKDs). 
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Non-Technological Innovations, Combinatorial and Multi-Located Knowledge 
Dynamics 
 
At present, economic actors have easier access to numerous spatially 
dispersed areas of knowledge. Their problem is one of identifying and 
mobilizing these resources within a coherent business model. Research 
highlights the combination of analytical (science-based) knowledge, syn-
thetic (engineering) knowledge and symbolic (branding, design, advertis-
ing) knowledge, which all augment one another within industrial pro-
cesses. Technological knowledge has thus simply become one of the 
types of knowledge that are combined within economic production. 
Nowadays, non-technological innovations (NTI) are as important as tra-
ditional technical innovation. By moving to more cultural resource and 
NTI, the role of consumer has also increased a lot. Production and con-
sumption systems are partially integrated from now on. 
If we base our hypothesis on the idea that numerous possibilities for 
learning and innovation via the combination of knowledge exist today at 
various external locations, the central question is that of the modalities 
by which this knowledge can be mobilized. Within composite logic, mak-
ing use of knowledge takes place by ad hoc use, strongly conditioned by 
knowledge that has already been generated upstream. The project becomes 
increasingly structuring. In other words, it is to a lesser extent the enter-
prise, the sector or the technology that shapes the economic processes 
and to a greater one the ad hoc combination thereof around a produc-
tion/consumption system with a fairly short lifespan. Today, it is no 
longer simply a question of accumulating knowledge along a trajectory 
but to an increasing extent one of articulating it with knowledge from 
the exterior. 
For Doz et al. (2001), it is necessary today to go beyond traditional theo-
ries of the spatial division of labor resulting from low-cost production 
strategies, and to develop new concepts based on the capacity to draw up 
strategies or projects in a meta-national knowledge network. It is no longer 
sufficient for an enterprise to establish a good global production or dis-
tribution network. The most competitive enterprises today are those that 
take the most rapid decisions regarding how they will act globally, and 
that combine various types of knowledge that exist elsewhere. It is no 
longer a question of simply going out to find the appropriate competen-
cies where they are the least expensive, but one of imagining new pro-
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jects based on competencies that are currently accessible. The availability 
of competencies precedes and drives innovation. The development of 
new, knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) should be placed in 
relation to this new state of affairs (Strambach 2001; Simmie and Stram-
bach 2006). 
Furthermore, in this new conceptual paradigm, the traditional articula-
tion between the local and the global scale has to be reconsidered. Gen-
eration and use of knowledge are now dynamics that take place at differ-
ent scales and between different places, neither within a single region nor 
within an undifferentiated global environment. This is the case for tech-
nological dynamics either within the same sector (for example, rich inter-
action between Toulouse and Hamburg for aircraft engineering) or be-
tween different sectors (for example, interaction between local Japanese 
capabilities for miniaturization and a Finnish firm focused on mobile te-
lephony competencies). 
But this phenomenon also appears for non-technological knowledge dy-
namics at two levels. First, at the level of the production system, some 
territories for fashion or lifestyle in Paris or Milan have become non-
technological knowledge producers. They combine, for instance, with 
the Swiss watch industry in order to innovate in the field of luxury. Se-
cond, as non-technological knowledge dynamics are more often con-
nected to consumption contexts, multi-location dynamics develop within 
production-consumption system.  
In this proposed paradigm, based on combinatorial and multi-location 
TKDs, the role regions are changing; this is especially the case for cities. 
On the one hand, work on creative cities (Landry 2000; Cooke and Lazz-
eretti 2008) reveals that certain cities are becoming central in the process 
of cultural and non-technological knowledge generation. Those cities, 
such as Paris, London, or New York, have long been aware of and have 
used this phenomenon. Today, however, traditionally industrial cities 
such as, Bilbao, Barcelona and Hamburg are making use of cultural dy-
namism in order to retain their positioning. Industrial cities that have not 
been capable of carrying out a conversion in the direction of more sym-
bolic knowledge dynamics have in many cases lost some of their im-
portance over recent years. On the other hand, cities have developed a 
strong capacity to combine and use long-distance knowledge. As Gas-
chet and Lacour (2007) have observed, cities have become “clusties” 
since they are no longer just a specific knowledge system (a “cluster in 
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the city”) but are also becoming a central element within wider territorial 
dynamics by means of activities that permit the anchoring of mobile 
knowledge (a “cluster by the city”). Here, for example, knowledge-
intensive business services play an overriding role (Simmie and Stram-
bach 2006). 
In the second part of this chapter, the new conceptual paradigm de-
scribed above is approached through the case of the Swiss watch indus-
try and its recent development. Possible new stakes are observed in the 
field of non-technological innovation, knowledge economy and territori-
al economy. 
 
The Case of the Swiss Watch Industry 
 
The case of the Swiss watch industry, principally in the Jura Arc, gives a 
good example of this evolution. Until the middle of the 1970s, the Jura 
Arc was competitive on the global watch market due to its technical 
know-how implemented by geographical proximity learning. After that 
time, the development of new technologies such as quartz watches 
changed the whole production system of the watch industry. In order to 
remain competitive, the Swiss manufacturers developed a new business 
strategy using culture as a new resource for innovation. First with design 
and later with branding in general, the Swiss watch industry developed 
desirable product and narrations where high technology has become the ma-
terial base. To do so, the importance of non-technological activities has 
increased within the traditional watchmaking firms as well as out of 
them. New places have also gained in importance in that complex pro-
duction-consumption system. 
 
The Traditional Watch Production System 
 
Until the 1970s the Swiss watch industry presents many characteristics of 
the traditional paradigm described previously. Through specific and lo-
calized technical competences, the Swiss watch manufactories in the Jura 
Arc and in the city of Geneva are leaders in the international watch mar-
ket. 
This development is driven by cumulative knowledge dynamics (empiri-
cal improvement of the production system). Innovation processes most-
ly take place within the region, which concentrates a large range of small 
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suppliers and subcontractors as well as high-level technical schools. This 
proximity of actors facilitates multi-functional learning, which enables 
the adaptation or the development of new products (for example, the 
first mechanical wristwatch, and the first quartz wristwatch) and compet-
itive industrial processes of increase productivity and standardization. 
Over that time, the international demand for watches is higher than the 
global supply. The Swiss watch industry is leader on the market but los-
ing leadership. Watch manufacturers mainly develop strategies of indus-
trial production and focus their advertisement on the product (Künzi 
2007). Non-technological innovations are low and the production (at the 
local scale) and consumption (at the global scale) processes remain 
strongly autonomous. 
With the fast drop in production costs of the quartz technology in the 
1970s and with the appearance of the international competition, the tra-
ditional Swiss manufactures experienced a crisis. Between 1970 and 
1984, the number of employees within the sector fell from about 90,000 
to about 30,000 and the number of enterprises from about 1,600 to 
about 600 (Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry FH, 1997–2008). To 
resolve this crisis, the Swiss watch industry made two fundamental 
changes (Crevoisier 2007). On the one hand, a strong valorization of 
non-technological innovations such as design, jewelry decoration or fash-
ion was developed in order to place the Swiss watches in a growing so-
cio-economical trend of moving closer to the distinction of consumers. 
On the other, concentration of activities within larger firms, standardiza-
tion and productivity developments applied to electronic modules result-
ed in a drop of production costs. The role of technology changed and 
territorial knowledge dynamics became more complex. 
 
Non-Technological Innovation, Customization and Combinatorial Knowledge 
Dynamics 
 
In the 1980s, in order to be competitive on the international market, the 
production of watch modules was mostly standardized by the concentra-
tion of production activities within larger companies on the one hand. 
On the other, watchmaking firms differentiated their product through 
design and fashion components. Progressively, Swiss watchmaking com-
panies focused their strategy of differentiation on the creation of emo-
tion related to the brand and the visible part of the watch (the most fa-
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mous example is the Swatch watch). New actors such as foreign firms 
specialized in luxury and fashion (Cartier, Bulgari) implement in the Jura 
Arc and started to produce watches. Communication strategies and 
products became more oriented towards social distinctions among con-
sumers (sport, business, popular . . .). 
This situation stabilized until the late 1990s but there was a new devel-
opment in the 2000s with the growth of the luxury sector (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Knowledge Dynamics and Market Strategies in the Swiss Watch Making 
Sector (Source: Jeannerat and Crevoisier 2008)  
 
According to the theory of technological trajectories (Nelson and Winter 
1982), traditional mechanical watches should have disappeared after hav-
ing been replaced by a more competitive technology, in this case quartz 
technology. However, Swiss mechanical watch production has increased 
constantly since the late 1990s. The global value of exports has trebled 
over the ten last years and exceeds the global export value of electronic 
watches since 2001 (Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry FH, 1997–
2007. Differentiation is still created through design but with the demand 
for luxury, emotional components of the product have increased. Con-
sumers are also increasingly personally integrated within this creation 
process. Unlike the traditional advertising strategy mainly based on the 
product, Swiss watchmaking firms have established a coherent produc-
tion system of image, emotion, authenticity and experience related to 
their brands. Künzi (2007) speaks of the creation of idealized universes. The 
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Swiss watch industry is no more constituted of watch production com-
panies but of brands in competition. 
This phenomenon can be regarded as a whole non-technological innova-
tion system because technology is no longer the central driving force. 
Knowledge dynamics are not only articulated in a cumulative way but 
combine with diversified knowledge. Knowledge interactions have de-
veloped out of traditional watchmaking activities towards complemen-
tary activities such as medias, events, tourism, film production, architec-
ture, and interior design. The creation of institutions by watch manufac-
turers (Rolex Institute and the Fondation de la Haute Horlogerie), which 
are responsible for organizing events, promoting watchmaking history or 
culture in general, is a good example of this situation. 
Combinatorial knowledge dynamics take place inside and outside 
watchmaking firms (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Combinatorial knowledge dynamics within the valorization process of the 
Swiss watchmaking industry (Source: Jeannerat and Crevoisier 2008) 
 
More and more firms employ people from human sciences or the arts 
for event organization, communication, museum or exhibition creation, 
and design. Brand headquarters are now increasingly artistic buildings 
designed by famous international architects (Le Corbusier’s Turkish Villa 
or the site of Plan-les-Ouates, where many traditional watch manufac-
tures have built sophisticated and artistic buildings) and stages were built 
where clients can experience the traditional fabrication of watches (they 
have the opportunity to see watchmakers at work), and learn about the 
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history of the firm. However, the most relevant development is charac-
terized by the creation or reinforcement of activities that were not tradi-
tionally connected to the watch industry sector. Some film production 
companies dedicate part of their work to the promotion of watch 
brands. Web-TV, auction enterprises, exhibition and creation companies 
as well as communication and multi-media firms specialized in the field 
of watches have appeared. We can also observe some strategic coopera-
tion between media activities, events organization and tourism, which 
valorize each other. 
In the present watchmaking system, new economic opportunities exist 
for non-watchmaking activities. The interdependence of new-media, 
media, fashion and events in the development of emotion and experi-
ence is also very strong. A good example of this phenomenon is the cre-
ation by an important Swiss press group (Edipresse Group) of a special 
entity (Edipresse Luxes) specializing in watches and luxury. This enter-
prise brings together different knowledge and territories (Swiss watch 
magazines, a fashion magazine from Paris, a watch-lifestyle magazine 
from Singapore but also an international center for watch documenta-
tion, a specialized website for actuality in the watch world and a famous 
award for watches implemented in Geneva). 
The evolution of the world watch and jewelry show, Baselworld, also 
demonstrates the transformation towards a symbolic valorization of 
watches. Exhibition halls are no longer simple show rooms but are stages 
where clients have emotional experiences and experience fantasy worlds 
(the name of the halls explicate this idea: hall of emotion, hall of experi-
ence, hall of dreams, and so forth). Rather than just connecting produc-
ers and clients/consumers, the event brings together media (a special day 
and special place only for journalists) and multi-media (live video-
diffusion of auctions happening at the same time in Geneva). 
Although the sale of a part of the magazines or entry tickets at 
Baselworld provide a partial financial income from these complementary 
activities, this complex system of socio-economic exploitation and crea-
tion of non-technologically based added value is economically dependent 
on the watch industry (sponsoring, advertising, sub-contracts or man-
dates). The global business model remains mainly centered on one main 
source of income: watch selling. Swiss watch manufactures, in competi-
tion with each other on the international market, work together at the 
point where their business strategies intersect, and they strongly seek to 
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control the whole system. Complementary knowledge and activities have 
become crucial for the co-creation, stabilization, diffusion, and legitimat-
ing of the emotional universes sold by brands. Interdependencies are 
strong and territorial relations have changed. 
 
The Production-Consumption System: The Need for 
Diffusion and Legitimating of the Brand 
 
In a traditional paradigm of industrial and technological product selling, 
distribution channels and quality certification are the keys to competi-
tiveness on the global market. This was the case of the watch industry 
before the 1980s. Watchmaking enterprises were concentrating on con-
trolling the technical quality of the industrial chain. Outside the firm, 
general trading agents or independent shops were selling watches from 
different brands without really distinguishing the different brands from 
each other. In the late 19th century, autonomous laboratories were estab-
lished in Switzerland in order to control the precision and technical qual-
ity of watches. Since 1973, the COSC (in French, Contrôle Officiel 
Suisse des Chronomètres)—a non-profit association created by public 
authorities (several cantons where watch industry is important) with the 
Federation of the Swiss Watch Industry—has encompassed these tradi-
tional institutions. Also, the FH was in charge of the promotion of the 
Swiss watch image. 
With the development of strategies of differentiation through the valori-
zation of emotions and authenticity, the production system of watch-
making has changed. However, while technological quality can easily be 
certificated through functional characteristics (such as punctuality and 
waterproofing), non-technological value branding—as is the case here 
for watches—needs more complex processes of authentification. More 
generally, the new territorial relations for the watch industry are defined 
by a complication of the production system of authenticity and experi-
ence as well as by a deep integration of the production and consumption 
systems. 
With the commercialization of non-technologically based added value 
and with the customization of personal emotions and experiences, Swiss 
watchmaking firms need a more complex system of distribution and cer-
tification as well as control of the whole production-consumption system 
of emotion and experiences that they sell. 
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Firstly, watch brands today need to do more than simply distribute their 
watches. They need to diffuse the emotion or authenticity that is an inte-
grated part of their product. Internally, many of them have developed 
mono-brand shops in most central cities in the world or have specific 
local managers or subsidiaries, which are responsible for the right diffu-
sion of the brand emotions. Websites of enterprises have also become 
multi-media shows where the diffusion of emotions is more important 
than real and practical information about the watchmaking company. 
Outside the firms, complementary activities diffuse and co-produce these 
emotions. The remaining multi-brand shops have developed new mar-
keting strategies (for example, “the highest watch shop” on top of the 
Matterhorn mountain), magazines have developed special channels dif-
fusing fashion, lifestyle, and so forth, in relation to watches, film produc-
ers or web-television create documentaries or movies to be diffused all 
around the world, and so forth. Still, watchmaking firms have a strong 
influence on these complementary activities because they provide the 
main financial income for them. It is crucial for firms that no incon-
sistent message distracts from the image they have created. Although 
such activities have strengthened, watchmaking firms are staying in the 
center of the system and try to control it. 
Secondly, certification of the technical quality of watches is not enough; 
watch brands also need an external legitimation of the emotion they pro-
duce. In this field, as it already was the case with the COSC, independ-
ence of legitimizing third parties is crucial. Independent journalists are sup-
posed to provide a neutral voice about the coherence of the brand and 
the quality of product. Auctions enterprises are meant to select and pro-
pose worth-selling watches and award events such as the Geneva 
Watchmaking Grand Prix are not supposed to be sponsored by watch-
making companies (as it is the case for the watch award of Geneva). 
However, this independence is not perfect and companies can partly in-
fluence it by selecting the journalists who are allowed to take part at an 
event, by buying their own watches at an auction or by mandating the 
film producers they want to deal with. Nevertheless, independence has 
to be respected, at least formally because customers are disposed to pay 
for emotions but are hard to please. They need an external legitimation 
of what they buy. 
Because the non-technological added value in the Swiss watch industry 
requires a more complex construction of quality, the traditional manufac-
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tures as well as the complementary activities described above innovate 
together by combining knowledge, including more and more the con-
sumer’s aspirations. As they combine, territorial knowledge dynamics are 
affected and local socio-economical stakes are changing. 
 
Territorial and Institutional Consideration 
 
The development of non-technological innovations in the Swiss watch 
industry has raised the need of combinatorial knowledge dynamics on a 
more differentiated market. In this context, territorial relations have also 
evolved through the need of production of authenticity, co-production 
of image and diffusion (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Multi-location TKDs of the valorization process of the Swiss watchmaking system 
(Source: Jeannerat and Crevoisier 2007) 
 
While watch fabrication competences remain strongly embedded in the 
traditional Swiss watchmaking region, this tradition has become a re-
source for the authenticity of the image production. The “Swiss Made,” 
COSC, or “Poinçon de Genève” labels do not only certificate the tech-
nical quality of watches but also legitimize the image of the regional tra-
dition and know-how for watchmaking. Other institutions such as 
watchmaking museums or tourism promotion institutions have also been 
created to combine the regional industrial culture with the knowledge of 
tourism promotion. La Chaux-de-Fonds and Le Locle, two historical cit-
ies of watch production, are preparing an application to become World 
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Heritage Sites of the UNESCO. However, most of the time, the image 
produced is not stabilized by a common strategy or common under-
standing of the regional resources (no common territorial marketing 
strategy). It mostly emerges from the image produced by each watch-
making firm in competition the other ones. 
Some TKDs related to image co-production have also been developed 
with other areas. As regional or neighboring metropolitan areas concen-
trate more services in the field of media, communication, arts, events, 
etc. and are symbolic knowledge generators, their importance for combi-
natorial knowledge dynamics has grown and the traditional region tends 
to broaden. With the exception of its polytechnic university, the Lau-
sanne metropolitan area was traditionally not part of the watchmaking 
region. Now, this area is becoming increasingly important for providing 
new services such as marketing and communication or media and multi-
media production for the watch industry. More distantly, many commu-
nication and advertising campaigns are elaborated by offices situated in 
London. 
Furthermore, cities like Paris or Milan are at the same time territories of 
image co-production (communication, art, design, marketing services) 
and territories driving complementary authenticity (historical tradition 
for fashion, luxury, jewelry, and so forth). 
It is possible to observe a third type of territorial relation. Some places 
are actually diffusion spaces where the Swiss watch manufactures sell 
their product by creating an image adapted to the local market culture. 
For instance, a place like Tokyo is a platform where shows, shops or ex-
hibitions are organized and where the emotion created around the prod-
uct diffuses locally. Some other places are territories of diffusion as well 
as image co-producers. This has always been the case of the city of Basle, 
which is not directly involved in watch production but once a year be-
comes the international centre of the watch industry through its world 
watch and jewelry show. The city state of Singapore not only diffuses the 
image of Swiss watches to the local culture but also co-produces a com-
plementary image by producing new kinds of lifestyle media dedicated to 
watches. It also appears that, at certain times, places become territories 
of diffusion and of authenticity. For instance, the city of Valencia, during 
the international sailing competition of the America’s Cup, becomes the 
place where a watch brand sponsoring a boat uses the local sea culture in 
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order to promote the authenticity of its watch especially produced for 
this event. 
Finally, it is interesting to observe that the city of Geneva has continu-
ously been an international promotion portal for the whole Swiss watch 
industry with traditional cumulative knowledge dynamics (watch manu-
facturing) and combinatorial knowledge dynamics (events, tourism, 
press, etc.). But the position of this city in the TKDs of authenticity pro-
duction, image co-production and diffusion is strengthening. Punctually 
(through events) or continuously (through services, museums or market-
ing schools for luxury) Geneva can be seen as the place where 
knowledge dynamics combine, circulate, and anchor within the region 
very strongly. 
 
 Innovation and proximity Territorial knowledge 
dynamics 
Unit of analysis Innovation processes Knowledge dynamics 
Mobilization Punctual/discontinuous Generalized/continuous 
Knowledge 
articulation 
Cumulative and technological 
trajectories (mono-sectoral) 
Combinatorial dynamics of 
technology and non-
technology (multi-sectoral) 
Market 
interdependencies 
Specialized production 
systems in the global market 
Complex production–
consumption systems 
Territorial 
dimension 
Spatial division of 
activities/labor 
Multi-location knowledge 
dynamics 
Table 1: From innovation and proximity to territorial knowledge dynamics (Source: Jeannerat and 
Crevoisier 2007).  
 
The traditional articulation between the regional production system and 
the global market seems to loose pertinence. On the one hand, multi-
location knowledge dynamics are increasingly complex on the value 
chain of image production. On the other, authenticity and the image 
produced have to be implemented within differentiated spaces of con-
sumption and be diffused in a standardized and differentiated way. The 
new stake for the Swiss watchmaking region is to remain within these 
multi-location TKDs by continuously developing new combinatorial 
knowledge dynamics. 
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A synthesis of the considerations developed in the points made above is 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The case of the Swiss watch industry shows new socio-economical stakes 
in relation with the development of non-technological innovation and 
with the growth of mobility and accessibility of knowledge. 
For Swiss watchmaking enterprises—but also for all the subsidiary or 
complementary activities in the traditional area of watch production—
non-technological innovations have become crucial in order to remain 
competitive in the global economy. The capacity to produce emotions or 
authenticity directly connected to the product permits the traditional 
watch industry to differentiate and to create an important value added in 
extra-regional markets. Furthermore, such innovations in non-
technological fields depend strongly on the ability to combine other ac-
tivities in the media, organization of events, auctions, tourism, museolo-
gy, show production, and even architecture. Thus, traditional technologi-
cal and cumulative knowledge dynamics anchor with combinatorial 
knowledge dynamics. The role of technological development (technical 
improvement of the functioning of watches) has changed. In the Swiss 
watch industry, technology is no longer the driving force of innovation 
but it is the adaptation or the consequence of non-technological changes. 
Its adequate matching with non-technological innovations is crucial in 
order to sell a coherent symbolic and synthetic product. 
However, the selling of products whose added value is not based on 
technology requires a complex diffusion system and legitimation by the 
market. Control of technical quality by watchmaking companies is no 
longer enough. Brands have developed control strategies all along the 
authenticity and image production chain. Watches represent the largest 
monetary income into the system, so all complementary activities in non-
technological fields are coordinated in the same business model. The au-
tonomy of legitimizing third parties is very important because a watch is no 
longer a functional object and its symbolic added value needs to be au-
thenticated. 
New territorial considerations can also be formulated. On the one hand, 
even though the technical nature of watches is produced through mostly 
regional and cumulative knowledge dynamics, their non-technological 
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component, based on symbolic knowledge dynamics, is highly combina-
torial and multi-located. Image, authenticity and emotional value added 
are generated and co-produced between the traditional watchmaking ter-
ritory and creative cities (Paris, Milan, Singapore, and so forth). The cul-
tural role of cities is also important to bridge both production and con-
sumption systems and to diffuse (anchor locally) the image and authen-
ticity created elsewhere. Moreover the role of Geneva in the production 
of watches and authenticity, legitimation and diffusion is strong. This 
could be seen as a “clusty” function for the whole traditional watchmak-
ing region by making knowledge circulate to and from different territo-
ries and anchor locally. 
New economic stakes in a knowledge-based economy and non-
technological knowledge dynamics have to be studied if one wants to 
understand the success of such a sector as the Swiss watch industry. The 
region is not only the place where technical competences cumulate but 
also the place where an image can be created and multi-location 
knowledge dynamics combine, circulate and anchor. In that respect, pol-
icy on multi-sectoral project development and institutional promotion of 
regional images are bound to play an increasing role. Non-technological 
transfers from more art or socio-cultural training to industry can also be 
considered to be important as traditional technological transfer policies. 
It seems that it is by interacting multi-locally, by matching technological 
and non-technological innovations, and by projecting and anchoring 
combinatorial knowledge dynamics, that territories are able to perform 
globally. 
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Introduction: Towards a Theory of Robust Innovation 
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Abstract: In accordance with a developing alternative mainstream in in-
novation research, the contributions to the present book stress the im-
mense impact of non-technological and non-economic innovations on 
economic performance. Unfortunately, current discourses on non-
technological innovations, non-economic, or social innovations lead to 
logical dead ends or case-study based detours, than consistent pathways 
towards competitive indicators and strategies of innovation beyond the 
“bringing technology to the economic market” paradigm. 
Against this background, this introduction develops a three-dimensional 
model of innovation distinguishing between an object dimension, a time 
dimension, and a social dimension of innovation. This “innovation trian-
gle” of both universal and distinctive categories helps to analyze, to 
compare, and to coordinate most diverse approaches to innovation. 
The model will be applied to the contributions of the present book, 
where it provides an editorial structure. Accordingly, the individual con-
tributions represent interest-specific access points to the innovation con-
tinuum and, thus, for the development of problem-adequate concepts 
and indicators of non-technological and non-economic innovation. 
Then, with special regard to the social dimension of innovation, we refer 
to evidence for the existence of non-economic markets. Based on that, 
we adapt the concept of socially robust knowledge; we argue that inno-
vations that succeed in more than one market are more robust innova-
tions. Thus, robust innovations can be defined as objects, processes, and 
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advantages that realize advantages in more than just one market of socie-
ty. To this effect, these multi-impact innovations can be assumed to be 
both more profitable and more sustainable than single-market innova-
tions. 
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Abstract: The direct link between innovation and economic markets 
seems to go without saying. The result of this is the close link between 
innovation and technological and economic advance. If we switch from 
innovation as a cause for prosperity and welfare to factors that have an 
impact on innovation, we can identify two “well-known” main frame-
works: technology and economics. This focus on only two rationalities 
seems to be questionable—especially when a modern society shows sub-
stantial variety in its social systems. In addition to that theoretical stand-
point the hard core of innovation seems to evolve in accordance to the 
shift of modern society to a so-called “next society” in which non-
technological and non-economic communication could have a more vis-
ible impact on the variation, selection and stabilization of innovation. 
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Abstract: Since the beginning of the 1990s, the topic of innovation man-
agement has been increasingly present in the strategic speeches of com-
panies. However, researchers focus their attention mainly on technologi-
cal innovations in the industrial sector and abandon the service sector, 
which is, nevertheless, the first in terms of capacity to innovate. Howev-
er, services are very heterogeneous, so we suggest focusing on one case: 
the little-studied case of retail banking. We aim to propose a typology of 
innovations in retail banking and to clarify the concept and its implica-
tions for banks. We propose, through the study of the main French 
banking group (Crédit Agricole), to investigate the various facets of in-
novation in this sector. So we aim to: (a) capture the specificities of in-
novation in the retail banking sector; (b) propose a typology of the vari-
ous forms of innovation developed in this sector, and (c) discuss future 
ways of research. The analysis of the innovation practices within Crédit 
Agricole highlights three main contributions. First, banks do not only 
innovate in an incremental way. Second, while the literature often fo-
cused on technology as the only source of innovation, sources are in fact 
multiple: regulatory relief, new customers’ needs, and competitors’ inno-
vations. Third, innovation in the retail banking sector often takes the 
shape of process innovation, which is hardly patentable and can be easily 
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copied, unlike product innovation. This characteristic means that such 
innovations are almost invisible to customers and competitors, but allow 
banks to obtain a durable competitive advantage.  
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Abstract: The engineering industry of Rajkot represents the towering am-
bition of India’s economic might. Industry is spread across a 20-mile in-
dustrial belt, and is home to more than 3,000 small and medium enter-
prises (SMEs); employing 100,000 people and generating an annual turn-
over of Indian Rupees 3,000 crore. 
The engineering industry of Rajkot is divided into clusters of sub-
processes like forging, casting, machining, machine manufacturing and 
turning. It has had a strong focus on product, process, and technological 
innovation. There has been some research on the product and techno-
logical innovation capabilities of the engineering industry of Rajkot. 
The engineering industry of Rajkot has very successfully used non-
technical innovations to move up the value chain. These innovations 
have fostered technical as well as product capabilities and have gone be-
yond organizational boundaries to affect the economy of the city at large. 
These innovations have generated less research but have a significant 
impact on the growth trajectory of the organization and beyond. 
Qualitative research tried to identify the role of non-technical innova-
tions on the growth of engineering industry of Rajkot using grounded 
theory approach. The researcher studied the top ten innovative organiza-
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tions from the engineering industry and attempts to probe into unex-
plored aspects of non-technical innovations and the role that they have 
played in the growth of the organization. In the later part of the research, 
the researcher used focused group discussion among key industrialists, 
economists and social scientists from the city to discover the impact of 
non-technical innovations on the economy of the city and on society 
there. 
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Abstract: At the beginning of the 21st century and the emerging 
knowledge society, social science seems to be in a very difficult situation. 
On the one hand, there is a growing demand for social knowledge in the 
different spheres of society. On the other hand, social science itself is 
undergoing a deep crisis. The traditional academic ways of knowledge 
production and dissemination no longer work in a satisfactory way. As a 
result there is unease about the efficiency and social importance of social 
science. New modes of producing social science, characterized by a more 
social process of science production, are therefore becoming the two 
faces of an increasingly relevant type of professional social scientific 
work. “Mode 2” has been a label tagged to this newly emerging type of 
knowledge production by Gibbons, Nowotny, and others, mostly refer-
ring to the natural or engineering sciences. The author shows that “social 
science production” is a specific type of social knowledge production by 
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social intervention based on a growing set of methods and tools. Their 
common denominator is the promotion of the self-reflection capacities 
of social actors, thus enhancing the democratic potential of civil society. 
The chapter provides a self-reflective discussion of new modes of inno-
vation in the field of organizational development and networking. It in-
cludes a brief case study showing how sfs (Sozialforschungsstelle Dort-
mund), a German public research institute now forming part of the 
Dortmund University of Technology, has been developing the functional 
characteristics of effectiveness and efficiency of a company by working 
with private companies and numerous public institutions, eventually un-
derstanding itself as a competence network in a network of networks. 
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Abstract: Today there is growing evidence that the innovation process is 
determined by complex interactions between science, society, and indus-
try. While a lot has been done to shed light on such interactions, many 
dynamic aspects of such interactions remain obscure. For example, it is 
not clear whether the non-technological innovations (NTI) are only a 
function of technological advances and technological innovations (TI) 
and to what extent technological advances imply the direction of further 
scientific and technological progress by facilitating the introduction of 
NTI in government, enterprises and society. It is supposed that the rela-
tion between, and the interdependence of, NTI and TI has to be one of 
the starting points in the discussion on NTI, if we want to have a clear 
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vision of the role of NTI phenomena as a whole. The focus of our anal-
ysis of NTI is organizational and managerial innovation (OMI), which 
can take form either of rather slow and predictable adaptive changes or 
radical innovations. A methodological distinction between adaptive and 
radical aspects of OMI is proposed. Radical innovations are described in 
terms of deliberate and proactive action having influence upon enterprise 
value creation, networking and knowledge acquisition strategies in the 
long term. The reflection of OMI on corporate strategy and decision-
making process is considered on the basis of the results of a preliminary 
case study, involving 120 Russian companies. 
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Abstract: A recent study at the Center of Social Innovation in Vienna al-
lowed me to investigate forms of social innovation (SI) in private com-
panies. The study followed a rather classic research design and included a 
theoretical discussion of the concept of social innovation, a presentation 
of companies and their projects, and an additional comparative analysis 
based on qualitative research methods. 
After discussing the general definition of SI as well as its application to 
private companies, this chapter presents the typology of company and 
project characteristics, which resulted from comparative analysis, as well 
as examples of investigated projects. The theoretical considerations are 
guided by the proposition that the concept of SI has to be linked closely 
to fields of practical application to gain a specific meaning. This also 
means that SI has to be distinguished from more general forms of “so-
cial change.” Our theoretical strategy was to point out several character-
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istics shared by social and technical innovations: intention, institutional 
context, responsible actors, and so forth. This helped us to go beyond 
formal definitions and to apply the term “social innovation” to projects 
in private companies, which usually do not have large effects on social 
change and are better understood when compared to incremental tech-
nological innovations. Rather than establishing a clear distinction be-
tween non-economic (non-technical) and economic innovations, our re-
search explored projects in which both aspects are combined. 
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Abstract: Innovations fascinate us. They work with suggestions and sim-
plifications. They often appear to be something they are not, because 
they bring us very close to the action and things going on around us. 
Distance and space are decisive for being able to actually understand 
how novelty turns into innovation. The first step therefore, refrains from 
simplifications and looks at social systems as the “place” of innovation 
instead of the objects themselves. We can ask how discontinuities in so-
cial systems can be continued and under what conditions innovations 
arise. In addition to this basic theoretical decision, it will be established 
that innovations are influenced by long-term, historical factors and social 
processes of transformation. Consequently, their operation is dependent 
on macro-social conditions that should be made obvious. Accordingly, in 
a second step we identifiy the patterns of rationality going along with 
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long-term and current processes of transformation. At the same time, 
though, innovation is also dependent on micro-social conditions. Here a 
change of social support structures is observed, away from the single in-
ventor working alone toward a complex network of structures. Hence, 
the last part of this chapter deals with the consequences for innovation 
functions that are related to these new structures. 
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Abstract: Innovation, creativity, and design are among the most frequent-
ly used words in business and society today. In most situations, innova-
tion studies focus on markets and technical road-mapping for future in-
novations. Less attention is paid to non-economic and non-technical in-
novations. Contrary to common trends, this chapter focuses on non-
technical and non-economic innovations. Furthermore, in this chapter 
we discuss key models of non-economic and non-technical innovation. 
The chapter is not a fully comprehensive survey, but focuses on just four 
important models of modern innovation studies, which should be a part 
of the research agenda in the field of innovation research into non-
technical and non-economic innovations. In this chapter I aim to add a 
non-economic element to traditional innovation models. In this way I try 
to build a new theory of NMI. 
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Abstract: In recent decades, territorial approaches have played an im-
portant role in the economy of innovation. They have given rise to a vast 
array of literature on conceptual models such as innovative milieus, 
technopoles, industrial districts, or more generally clusters. One the one 
hand, these models have been able to explain the role of technology and 
“diffuse focused” learning within geographical proximity as innovation 
drivers. On the other, they presented the evolution of local production 
systems as a specialization process in the global economy. 
New theories on the knowledge economy suggest that, in new innova-
tion processes, knowledge is mobilized more systematically, more per-
manently, and at longer distance. Furthermore, works on cultural re-
sources, cultural clusters or creative cities, for instance, have shown that 
numerous innovations today take place more frequently via socio-
cultural dynamics than techno-scientific ones. Production-consumption 
systems have changed and the traditional regional networks have scat-
tered within space. 
The case of the Swiss watch industry, principally in the Jura Arc, gives a 
good example of this evolution. In order to remain competitive, Swiss 
manufacturers have developed a new business strategy using culture as 
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new resource for innovation. Watch brands sell authenticity and the 
high-tech watch has become the material base. 
Through the case of the Swiss watch industry, the article proposes a new 
conceptual framework giving importance to knowledge dynamics be-
tween production and consumption systems, between technological and 
non-technological factors as well as their territorial consequences. 
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